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Abstract	
This study explores the financial dimension of global production networks, a major lacuna in 
global production networks theory only recently beginning to be addressed. It conceptually 
challenges accounts of capitalism as a uniform process by evidencing spatially variegated 
practices of capital sourcing by car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern 
Germany. It aims to determine how such patterns can be explained and understood by the 
firms’ agency and embeddedness both in variegated forms of capitalism and, through 
ownership, within global production networks. The study further aims to assess potential 
implications on the firms’ governance and on local and regional development prospects. 
The research applies a mixed-methods approach combining quantitative analysis of data 
collected from publicly available sources with qualitative data from secondary sources. Based 
on a conceptual framework combining existing literature on variegated capitalism, global 
production networks and geographies of firm finance, it analyses the capital sources of around 
160 Hungarian and 160 Eastern German car component manufacturers in the light of their 
location, size and ownership, arguing that financing practices (i) are not uniform but 
variegated, depending on historical, socio-institutional and political/regulatory contexts of 
regions in which firms operate, and on the firms’ agency also shaping this context and (ii) are 
shaped by the firms’ integration and relative position within networks of firms, shareholders, 
financial institutions and capital market investors.  
The thesis empirically evidences geographical variegation in the capital sourcing patterns of 
the firms analysed and provides empirical evidence of variegation at regional levels. It 
highlights the important financial dimensions of global production networks by showing how 
firms owned by other firms within a global production network are financed in a way 
fundamentally different from those that are not. It also contributes to a better theorisation of 
less studied variegations of capitalism such as formerly state-socialist regions, supporting calls 
for a more fine-grained and nuanced analysis of geographies of finance both at and beneath 
the national level. 
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Chapter	1 Introduction	
The geographical nature and implications of finance and its interrelatedness with local and 
regional development have increasingly attracted the attention of economic geographers over 
the years - often, but not exclusively, around financial crises (cf. e.g. Engelen and 
Faulconbridge 2009; Lee et al. 2009; Pike and Pollard 2010; Christophers 2013b; Pani and 
Holman 2013; Martin and Pollard 2017). This study interrogates firm’s choices of capital 
sources and how and why they matter for local and regional development. It critically explores 
shifting spatial structures and variegated patterns of capital sourcing in firms marked by both 
post-socialism and global production networks, engaging with and challenging some of the 
existing debates in economic geography, with an empirical focus on a sample of car 
component manufacturers in Eastern Germany and Hungary. Too often, as Martin and Pollard 
(2017) recall, financial structures and processes are insufficiently analysed from a spatial level. 
This study responds to this and other similar calls for more critical attention and a more fine-
grained and nuanced analysis of the geographies of firm finance and its implications. In the 
context of this study, the term capital (or firm capital) is used in the sense of the money made 
available to a firm (either by a third party such as equity investors or banks or through the 
production of the firm itself in the form of retained earnings) to make investments such as 
purchasing or renewing machinery or undertaking research and development, or to cover 
short term operating needs, with a focus on the relationships this entails between the entity 
that provides capital and the firm that uses it. While the term finance is used in a broader 
sense, being the processes and relationships whereby money circulates in an economy, the 
focus within this study is generally on the provision of capital as defined above and the 
relationships this entails. 
This introductory chapter is organised in three parts. The first section (1.1) briefly presents the 
context and research background of the study based on a review of existing literature on 
variegated capitalism, global production networks and geographies of firm finance. The 
second section (1.2) provides an overview of the research objectives and research questions, 
exploring whether and how diverging patterns and practices of capital sourcing can be 
empirically evidenced among small, medium-sized and large car component manufacturers in 
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Eastern Germany and Hungary, and potential reasons and implications thereof. The third 
section (1.3) presents the general structure of the study.  
1.1 Point	of	Departure	and	Research	Context	
Firm finance, understood here as the origin and modes of utilisation of capital in a firm (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976), is a fundamental aspect of any capitalist firm’s activity. Capital is 
necessary to ensure production is possible. Finance is therefore a key function within any firm, 
be it in the form of a dedicated department or taken care of by the firm’s owner in the case 
of small firms. Understanding firm finance and the relationships between the various actors 
involved within and outside the firm in the provision and management of the firm’s capital is 
consequently key for anyone concerned with operating a firm or, such as academic 
researchers, interested in understanding the relevant processes and their wider implications. 
Such implications also touch upon wider questions of local and regional development: finance 
and development are not two separate and independent areas of human activity. They are 
rather strongly interrelated, with many situations being not either financial or development-
related but both at the same time, simply looked at from different perspectives. Finance is 
sometimes considered as being separate from wider economic relations both within academic 
research and in wider political and economic discourse (e.g. opposing finance with the ‘real 
economy’) and has traditionally been seen as beyond small firm analysis (e.g. Gilman and 
Edwards 2008), but this distinction is increasingly being recognised as not pertinent (e.g. Lee 
et al. 2009; Pollard et al. 2017).  
Can firms choose indifferently from different capital sources such as equity, bank debt or debt 
capital markets? If not, which geographical factors impact which sources firms can and do 
use? What is the firms’ agency in this process? This study explores these questions through 
the empirical example of car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany. Too 
often, capital is simply assumed by economic geographers as a ‘taken for granted’ aspect of 
production, with too little attention to the availability, sources and modes of utilisation of it 
(Pollard 2003). The central argument of this study is that there is geographical variegation in 
patterns of capital sourcing, and that such variegation matters for firm governance and local 
and regional development outcomes. The study aims to explain why and how that is the case, 
arguing that such variegation persists through time and space and countering arguments of 
homogenisation through globalisation in line e.g. with Peck and Theodore (2007). It advances 
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the understanding of financing patterns beyond the national frame by revealing what drives 
sub-national variegations at different scales beneath the national, including the regional level 
– with a key role for the ownership position of firms within global production networks. The 
study argues that the firms’ embeddedness (in both regions and networks) needs to be 
considered in this context, in that it shapes patterns of capital sourcing and firm agency with 
differentiated local and regional development outcomes.  
Relevance	of	a	Geographical	Analysis	of	Firm	Finance	
Traditionally, the study of firm finance is an aspect on the curriculum of studies dedicated to 
the operation of firms (such as business administration or economics). It is much less 
frequently conceived as a topic of geographical interest and many of the common handbooks 
on finance do not mention space or place as a dimension of relevance for the understanding 
of firm finance. However, as shown hereafter, a significant amount of geographical research 
has been dedicated to firm finance, and the research field continues to grow. 
Why is it relevant to study firm finance from a geographical perspective? In theory, firms can 
source capital in different forms such as equity, debt or subsidies, in each case from a variety 
of sources such as domestic or foreign shareholders or lenders, from the stock market or 
private equity investors. In pure economic theory and in a perfectly efficient market it does 
not matter from where and in which form the capital comes (cf. e.g. Miller and Modigliani 
1958). In fuzzy reality however, and in geographic theory, it very much does: different sources 
of capital have different implications in terms of governance of the firm. The reason is that 
each form of capital is provided by specific types of individuals or institutions, the provision of 
capital therefore creates a relationship between the firm and the capital provider, and the 
characteristics of the capital provider (such as their type, their location etc.) impact the 
conditions under which capital is provided. The place of firms and their capital providers 
matter in the way the relationships between the two unfold across space and the implications 
on the firm’s operations are of a geographical nature as well. Providers and users of a firm’s 
capital are both embedded geographically and in circuits of value (understood as the 
circulation, capture and reinvestment of profits generated by a firm). The relationship 
between providers and users of a firm’s capital are marked by relationships of power and 
agency, and how a firm is financed, as well as the embeddedness and relationships of 
providers and users of a firm’s capital has an impact on the firm’s governance and wider local 
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and regional development. A geographical perspective on firm finance therefore undoubtedly 
contributes to a better understanding of these processes and their implications. 
Firm finance has captured the interest of (at least certain) economic geographers for many 
years now (cf. e.g. Harvey 1982; Corbridge et al. 1994; Leyshon 1995). Recent years have seen 
an upsurge in this interest, to the point that a certain sub-field of economic geography was 
dubbed ‘financial geography’ concerned with geographies of finance on a range of different 
scales ranging from the individual and household to national economies, but also interested 
in finance at the level of individual firms (for an overview cf. e.g. Martin and Pollard 2017). 
Nevertheless, firm finance often continues to be seen as a kind of a “black box” (Pollard 2003), 
as a “taken for granted aspect of production” by economic geographers, with little focus on 
the sources and dynamics of capital provision to firms, little discussion of where and how firms 
source the capital they use in their production process and of how this influences their 
governance and development prospects. Even though there has been increasing attention to 
it over the last 20 years, an increasing number of scholars have drawn attention to the relative 
neglect money and finance continue to face within economic geography and regional studies 
(Lee et al. 2009). Despite the strong increase in geographical research on firm finance over the 
last years, it is therefore widely recognised that there remains a need to better understand 
how geographical factors interact with firm finance. 
This study responds to these calls by making the case that firm finance is indeed very much a 
geographical topic, and that looking at firm finance from a geographical perspective can 
contribute significantly to better understanding its processes and wider implications. It is 
important not to simply assume the form, role and implications of finance for the governance 
of firms as well as local and regional development, but to empirically investigate to try to 
understand the underlying mechanisms (Pollard 2003). Among the large range of relevant 
perspectives from which the relationship between finance and local and regional 
development can be explored, this study addresses some of the research gaps identified by 
undertaking research on the evolving modes of capital sourcing of small, medium-sized and 
large car component manufacturers that are part of global production networks in post-
socialist contexts. In other words, the thesis explores where the capital used by these firms 
comes from and aims to understand what that may mean for the firms’ governance as well as 
local and regional development implications. The question of agency (what options or means 
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the firms themselves have in this context) is also considered. Rather than considering the 
geography of finance from the perspective of financial centres or global financial institutions 
on which extensive research is available (cf. e.g. Jarvis 2011; Engelen and Glasmacher 2013; 
Wójcik 2013a; Zademach and Musil 2014), this study focuses on a group of firms as entities 
embedded both in regions and, through ownership in particular, in trans-regional networks of 
production. Such production networks consist of firms and non-firm actors embedded in 
various territories at various scales and in other types of networks. The car component 
manufacturing industry was chosen as an example of a capital-intensive industry where it 
could be expected that more firms would be likely to use capital market finance and be 
particularly sensitive to variations in cost and availability of capital rather than a labour-
intensive industry (such as the garment industry, cf. e.g. Tokatli 2008). The car manufacturing 
industry is indeed a very complex universe of firms of all sizes, types and locations, employing 
about 8 million people worldwide (Dicken 2011) and producing a large variety of products 
ranging from the simplest components to the most complex assembled car. This study looks 
at small, medium-sized and large firms from the car component manufacturing industries as 
these, by the nature of their activity, are integrated into global production networks, 
producing not directly consumer goods, but rather elements used by their clients (larger 
component manufacturers and car assemblers) to produce cars. As a result, the integration of 
firms within these global production networks, and especially the ownership of some smaller 
firms by some of the larger firms therein could be expected to constrain and/or enhance the 
way these firms have access to, need and/or use capital in their production process.  
Research	Background	
The topic of this study is situated at the intersection of research on variegated capitalism at a 
macro-level, research on global production networks at a meso-level and research on firm 
finance and its geographies, which is the micro level on which the empirical part of this study 
focuses, framed and informed by the two other, broader perspectives. In a novel approach 
aiming to integrate these three areas into a single conceptual framework for the analysis of a 
specific topic of financial geography, all three areas are analysed with a focus on the specific 
context of two post-socialist economies (Hungary and Eastern Germany). Each area is 
presented very briefly here before being reviewed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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To assess factors explaining, at a macro-level, why firm finance materialises in differentiated 
ways in different spatial contexts, the theoretical frameworks of varieties of capitalism and 
variegated capitalism provide a useful tool of analysis (Section 2.1.1). They highlight the 
importance of (geographically differentiated and historically grown) institutional 
infrastructures, including both formal and informal institutions and the relationships between 
them. The idea underlying the concept of ‘variegated firm finance’ is that firm finance is not a 
homogeneous, monolithic and geographically undifferentiated phenomenon but it rather 
materialises in different forms depending on the institutional and historical context and the 
way it is mediated locally, and the outcome is variegated in different geographical contexts. 
The conceptual framework is further refined by going below the national level, highlighting 
how certain aspects of capitalist variegation are differentiated at the regional level (2.1.2). 
Each of these regional contexts responds differently to financial processes and is also likely to 
be transformed in a different way by actors, processes and discourses of finance. Overall these 
conceptual frameworks help understand and theoretically frame institutional infrastructures 
of capital provision as shaped by the specificities of the relevant variegations of capitalism in 
Hungary and Eastern Germany as analysed in the empirical part of this thesis. Local 
variegations of capitalism with a recent state-socialist past (such as these two regions) are a 
particularly interesting terrain to assess particular institutional infrastructures of capital 
provision because of the (historically grown and path-dependent) various ways in which 
institutions are constituted and have evolved there since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Research 
on variegated capitalism has contributed much to a better understanding of how different 
institutional contexts shape the operation of firms in different regions, but has so far 
insufficiently taken into account the institutional infrastructures of capital provision in post-
socialist contexts. 
At a meso-level, several frameworks defining trans-territorial firm networks of production are 
available to analyse the effects on local and regional development of firms being integrated in 
such networks. The global production networks (GPN) approach (2.2.1) is the most suitable 
for this study because of its strongly geographical dimension and its consideration for non-
firm actors: it is therefore used as the basic framework for this study. However, the global 
commodity chain (GCC) and global value chain (GVC) frameworks offer interesting concepts 
such as governance and industrial upgrading, and are therefore used to complement the GPN 
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framework. Both the GPN and the GCC/GVC frameworks are particularly useful to illustrate 
how factors impacting the functioning of such production networks (such as in particular 
power relations between the firms) can in turn impact local and regional development 
through the effects of strategic coupling, creation, enhancement and capturing of value as 
well as industrial upgrading. The various factors influencing a firm’s activity as part of a global 
production network influence the way it can operate, develop, create and add value, maintain 
jobs and contribute to local and regional development. Post-socialist transition economies in 
Central Europe constitute a particularly interesting terrain to analyse global production 
networks given their specific historical, social and institutional context, their specific 
ownership patterns and generally the questions of path dependency that can be explored 
there (2.2.2). Many global production networks in Central Europe, especially in the car 
manufacturing industry, are composed of foreign lead firms and their foreign tier-one 
suppliers, with local suppliers often relegated to the position of less influential tier-two and 
tier-three actors. Finance, including the ways in which firms are able or not to use 
comparatively inexpensive and stable/reliable capital, has thus far only received limited 
attention within GPN literature even though this is increasingly being recognised as a gap in 
the literature that is starting to be addressed (Section 2.2.3). More specifically however, the 
study of capital sources within GPNs has been and remains broadly absent from the literature 
so far. The conceptual structure of the GPN framework does provide the potential to integrate 
considerations regarding capital sourcing, and this study proposes to do so. The circulation of 
financial capital in the form of equity and dividends through the capital market between 
investors and the lead firms of global production networks is very common and largely 
analysed in the financialisation literature, but it is much less thematised as far as the debt 
sources of lead firms and any capital sources for smaller firms are concerned. Outside the 
scope of lead firms, the modes of capital sourcing at the level of supplier firms within global 
production networks remain largely under-researched (for a very interesting exception, cf. 
Baumeister and Zademach 2017). This research gap therefore remains large and is only just 
being recognised and addressed in the literature. 
At the micro-level, firm finance has constituted an area of interest for economic geographers 
for many years now and it is recognised that it does not develop indifferently across regions 
and economic sectors (2.3.1): it is a profoundly geographical and historical phenomenon, 
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“mediated and contested by specific and particular configurations of spatialised social 
relations, social agency and socio-institutional contexts over time, across space and in place” 
(Pike 2006: 202). The form, degree and effects of financial processes depend on the specific 
context in which they take place, with that context’s specific regulatory, institutional and 
political conditions. There is a large general literature about firm finance and sources of capital 
available (Section 2.3.2), raising a range of interesting questions at the level of an individual 
firm, including (i) in what forms capital circulates between firms and capital providers, (ii) why 
that may (or may not) be the case and (iii) what the consequences thereof are. Why do (mainly 
large) firms issue equity through the stock market rather than keep their ownership private? 
Why do they issue bonds rather than use bank loans, state subsidies and/or internal funds? 
The reasons can be several and include both the availability and the cost of this resource as 
opposed to other possible sources of capital: capital obtained through the capital markets may 
be easier or more difficult to obtain than through state subsidies and bank loans, and it may 
be cheaper or more expensive than these alternative sources. It may also be more stable and 
reliable or less so as a source and it may come with more or less ‘intrusive’ constraints on the 
organisation and governance of the firm. Another key question is what effects this has on the 
activity of the firm and on its contribution to local and regional development. This implies 
issues such as, among others, a strengthened position of capital owners in their relationship 
with firm managers - with the concept of ‘shareholder value’ having for long dominated the 
debate but also received increased criticism within the financial community itself in recent 
times (Denning 2011; 2012), including its characterisation by a former CEO of General Electric 
as “the dumbest idea in the world” (Guerrera 2009) - the increasing financial activity of non-
financial firms, and the increasing presence and international scope of action of new types of 
financial actors such as sovereign wealth funds and pension funds. Post-socialist economies in 
Central Europe, such as the two regions analysed in the empirical part of this thesis represent 
a particularly interesting context to analyse due to the fundamental transition from state-
socialism to capitalism they have gone through since the late 1980s. Transition in these 
regions also meant the ‘importation’ of economic and financial concepts by certain actors 
(both public and private, local and international), which met existing local economic and 
political processes and demands and was mediated by them. The overall aim of this study is 
to get a more finely grained understanding of processes of capital sourcing and their 
geographies: why is it relevant to analyse patterns of capital sourcing and firm finance from a 
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geographical perspective? The question in a post-socialist context is how capital markets 
developed there and whether ‘market adjustment’ and the adoption of economic models was 
maybe more open than elsewhere. It remains to be seen though this study, however, to which 
extent the circulation of financial capital between investors and firms through the capital 
market in these regions can be evidenced. Despite the strong contributions made by research 
on geographies of finance so far, more research remains to be done to better understand the 
reasons and implications of differing patterns in the way capital is sourced differently by 
different types of firms in post-socialist regions like Hungary and Eastern Germany. One way 
of trying to shed light on this is to try and understand better how firms are embedded in 
networks with other actors that impact the way they source their capital.  
To summarise, this study reviews literatures on variegated capitalism, global production 
networks and geographies of firm finance in a novel approach aiming to integrate the three 
areas to formulate a single conceptual framework and identify and answer recognised 
research gaps. 
1.2 Research	Aim	and	Questions	
The study aims to contribute to the growing literature on geographies of firm finance by 
addressing the following research gaps: (i) better understand uneven geographies of capital 
sourcing by firms, i.e. the importance of space and place for processes of capital sourcing and 
the impact of different sources of capital on uneven economic geographies, (ii) highlight the 
intersection between the financial sphere (including different types of capital providers) and 
the governance of small, medium-sized and large firms and (iii) contribute empirical work on 
regions other than the comparatively better explored economies of the US and the UK. These 
gaps are addressed by empirically studying a group of car component manufacturers in 
Eastern Germany and Hungary, asking the following research questions:  
• What are the main sources of capital used by these firms and which structural patterns 
can be observed? 
• How can these patterns be explained by geographical factors concerning both firms 
and capital providers, as well as their respective institutional context? 
• What is the potential impact on the firms’ governance and on local and regional 
development more broadly? 
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These research questions guide the empirical analysis based on the conceptual framework 
developed in Chapter 2. The empirical analysis is conducted using concepts taken from this 
theoretical framework (such as, for example, strategic coupling or industrial upgrading), so 
that findings relate to and interrogate these frameworks. Existing theory is used to guide the 
empirical research and at the same time, empirical findings are used to interrogate existing 
theory (cf. e.g. Hall 2012). By looking at empirical evidence from firms in Central Europe, it 
aims to understand what firm finance means in regional contexts, in line with the call made 
by, e.g., Lee et al. (2009).  
The methodological approach retained to answer the research questions as well as its 
rationale and justification is presented in detail in Chapter 3. In short, it is based on a mixed 
methods approach combining (i) the analysis of quantitative data from publicly available 
sources with (ii) the analysis of qualitative data from secondary sources. The main 
contribution and novelty of this methodological approach consists in the utilisation of an 
original and unique dataset of legal, economic and financial firm-level data collected from 
publicly available annual statements for a sample of about 320 small, medium-sized and large 
firms split among the two regions, allowing to look inside the ‘black-box’ and explore how 
firms are actually financed rather than making assumptions in this respect and just taking the 
presence of the capital for granted (Pollard 2003). By conducting this contextualised 
comparative analysis of firms of various types and sizes integrated in global production 
networks within two different post-socialist regions in Central Europe, the study illustrates 
how sourcing of capital is not a homogeneous spatially neutral process, but rather one that 
unfolds differently in different geographical and institutional contexts. 
1.3 Structure	of	the	Study	
After this Chapter 1 presenting the point of departure and research context of the study as 
well as its aims and methodological approach, the rest of this study is structured in six further 
chapters. The literature review in Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of key aspects of the 
existing body of theoretical and empirical research in the fields of variegated capitalism, global 
production networks and geographies of firm finance. It identifies gaps in the existing 
literature and develops a conceptual framework which leads to the formulation of the three 
research questions. Chapter 3 then presents the methodology used to answer the research 
questions, consisting in a mixed-methods approach combining quantitative analysis of data 
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collected from publicly available sources with qualitative data from secondary sources. 
Chapter 4 sets out the empirical context describing the car component manufacturing industry 
in Hungary and Eastern Germany and the characteristics of the sample of around 160 
Hungarian and 160 Eastern German car component manufacturers analysed in this study, with 
a focus on their location, size and ownership. It further provides an overview of the specific 
institutional infrastructures of capital provision in these two regions as well as of the evolving 
modes of capital provision for firms that are integrated, in particular through ownership, into 
global networks of production. 
Empirical findings are presented in the next two chapters. Chapter 5 discusses the variegated 
patterns of capital sourcing evidenced by the analysis of quantitative data, put into 
perspective with the firms’ location, size and ownership. It empirically evidences geographical 
variegation in the capital sourcing patterns of the firms analysed and provides empirical 
evidence of variegation at regional levels. It further highlights the important financial 
dimensions of global production networks by showing how firms owned by other firms within 
a global production network are financed in a way fundamentally different from those that 
are not. Chapter 6 interrogates potential reasons for and implications of the patterns observed 
by discussing how institutional infrastructures of capital provision may help explain why 
certain types of firms tend to use certain sources of capital more than others, arguing that 
financing practices (i) are not uniform but variegated, depending on historical, socio-
institutional and political/regulatory contexts of regions in which firms operate, and on the 
firms’ agency also shaping this context and (ii) are shaped by the firms’ integration and relative 
position within networks of firms, shareholders, financial institutions and capital market 
investors. It further explores what implications this may have on the firms’ governance 
internally and on local and regional development outcomes more generally, assessed through 
the lens of strategic coupling and industrial upgrading.  
Chapter 7 recaps the research undertaken to highlight its key empirical findings and, derived 
therefrom, the main theoretical and conceptual contributions the study makes to the existing 
literatures in the area analysed. It concludes by highlighting potential routes for further 
research based on the limitations of the study as they appeared during the research process. 
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Chapter	2 Conceptualising	Variegated	Firm	Finance	and	Global	
Production	Networks	
This chapter reviews relevant existing academic literature in economic geography and other 
cognate social sciences, with contributions and current debates related to understanding 
financing patterns of firms operating in post-socialist regions as part of global production 
networks. Three distinct but connected areas of research are reviewed, starting at a macro 
level before narrowing down to the firm level: first variegated capitalism in post-socialist 
contexts, then finance in global production networks and, finally, geographies of firm finance. 
The review does not attempt to provide an extensive or detailed overview of these areas, both 
because it would exceed the scope of this study and because extensive reviews are already 
available elsewhere for variegated capitalism (e.g. Peck and Theodore 2007; Crouch et al. 
2009; Dixon 2011), for global production networks (e.g. Henderson et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2008; 
Coe 2015) and for geographies of firm finance (e.g. Pollard 2003; Lee et al. 2009; Hall 2013). 
The purpose is rather to briefly present the context, scope and connections between the areas 
to elaborate an integrated conceptual framework and identify research gaps addressed by the 
empirical part of this study. 
The chapter is organised in three sections. The first section (2.1) assesses how the 
heterogeneity of capitalism shapes patterns of firm finance differently across regions and 
leads to a differentiated, context-specific and localised predominance of certain capital 
sources over others. To this effect, it first presents the conceptual frameworks of varieties of 
capitalism and variegated capitalism and then considers how such variegation may be 
conceptualised at the regional level in complement to the national level. This prepares the 
terrain to explore how institutional infrastructures of capital provision in Hungary and Eastern 
Germany can be analysed within the conceptual framework of variegated capitalism in the 
empirical part of this thesis. The second section (2.2) introduces the concept of trans-regional 
networks as a complementary dimension of relevance for analysing firm finance. It first 
presents the theory of global production networks and the related frameworks of global 
commodity chains and global value chains. The section then discusses some of the specificities 
of global production networks in post-socialist regions and how the embeddedness of a firm 
in both regional variegations of capitalism and global production networks shapes the types 
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of capital to which it tends to have access. It finally discusses the integration of finance in 
global production networks, mainly to demonstrate that this dimension has been largely 
absent from the literature on global production networks so far. The third section (2.3) 
discusses geographies of firm finance, first by reviewing how firm finance has been 
conceptualised in economic geography generally so far and then shifting the focus to capital 
sources and how these have been discussed in previous geographically-oriented research to 
date. It is on this basis that the provision of capital to firms in Hungary and Eastern Germany 
is analysed from a geographical perspective in the empirical part of this thesis based on the 
conceptual framework of regional variegations of capitalism and finance in global production 
networks. The chapter’s conclusion summarises the research gaps identified and formulates 
the research questions. 
 
Figure 1 Structure of literature review 
Source: author, following a scheme proposed by Thrower (2018) 
CONCEPTUALISING VARIEGATED FIRM FINANCE AND GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS
Micro perspective: firms
2.3 Firm Finance and its Geographies
Meso perspective: networks
2.2 Finance and Global Production Networks
Macro perspective: territories & regions
2.1 Capital Provision in Regionally Variegated Capitalism
Research Questions
RQ1: Which sources of capital used by which types of firms?
RQ2: Potential explanation through institutional infrastructures of capital provision?
RQ3: What implications of firm governance and local and regional development?
Theoretical frameworks
2.1.1 VoC & Variegated Capitalism
Extension to regional level
2.1.2 Regional Variegations of Capitalism
Theoretical framework
2.2.1 Global Production Networks
Focus on this study’s context
2.2.2 Specificities in a Post-Socialist Context
Identification of major research gap
2.2.3 Enter Finance
Theoretical framework
2.3.1 Geography’s Interest in Firm Finance
Focus on this study’s perspective
2.3.2 Firm Finance and Sources of Capital
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2.1 Capital	Provision	in	Regionally	Variegated	Capitalism	
The heterogeneity of capitalism shapes patterns of firm finance differently across regions and 
leads to a differentiated, context-specific and localised predominance of certain financing 
practices over others. This section first (2.1.1) presents the theory of existing conceptual 
frameworks of varieties of capitalism, of a rather binary nature, and variegated capitalism, 
which insists more on the complexity of real world situations. It then (2.1.2) considers how 
such variegation may be conceptualised at the regional level in complement to the national 
level for a more nuanced and fine-grained analysis. 
2.1.1 Varieties	of	Capitalism	and	Variegated	Capitalism:	Theoretical	Frameworks	
Following mainly Peck and Theodore (2007), this section reviews the general theoretical 
framework of the (relatively binary) varieties of capitalism approach with its contributions and 
limitations, as well as the (more nuanced) variegated capitalism approach. This provides a 
conceptual framework for understanding how financial processes are shaped, “mediated and 
contested by specific and particular configurations of spatialised social relations, social agency 
and socio-institutional contexts over time, across space and in place” (Pike 2006: 202). More 
specifically, it provides the conceptual tools for the analysis of capital sources of car 
component manufacturers in the empirical section of this study. 
Varieties	of	Capitalism:	a	Binary	Approach	
The collapse of the state-socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the 
resulting apparent universality of capitalism spawned a number of publications claiming the 
‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992) and the advent of a ‘borderless world’ (Ōmae 1990). This 
orthodox globalization thesis implied there was ‘one best way’, one universal economic model 
that would eventually prevail, that this model was US-American neoliberal capitalism and that 
there were no viable alternatives to it (Peck and Theodore 2007). Very quickly, however, 
critical voices contested the idea of a ‘one best way’, drawing attention to the lack of 
uniformity within capitalism and to existence of varieties within this regime. One of the first 
to do so was Albert (1991), claiming that the end of state-socialism would not lead to a 
unipolar market order dominated by the USA, but rather to a struggle between two main 
existing forms of capitalism: the socially coordinated ‘Rhinish’ model prevalent in much of 
Continental Europe and Japan on the one hand, and the neoliberal model represented by the 
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US in the post-Reagan era and the United Kingdom of the Thatcher years. As Peck and 
Theodore (2007) point out, Albert’s analysis implies a judgment, opposing a normatively 
superior Rhinish model emphasising collective success, consensus and long-term concerns to 
a less sustainable more aggressive neoliberal American model based on individual success and 
short-term financial gain, willing to “sacrifice the future for the present” (Albert 1993: 259). 
Further publications by other researchers from various disciplines followed, also contesting 
the ‘one world, one best way’ claim of orthodox globalisation thesis by proposing a model of 
a bipolar global economy, comprising two competing capitalisms. By the late 1990s, these 
publications formed a rich, diverse and multidisciplinary literature referred to as the ‘varieties 
of capitalism’ (VoC) school with two main strands: one focusing on the firm and the national 
scale (cf. in particular Hall and Soskice 2001b) and another with a more multi-scalar and 
regulationist approach (e.g. Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997a; Boyer 2005). 
In line with Albert (1991), Soskice (1991) establishes a conceptual distinction between 
coordinated market economies (CME) with a ‘patient capital’ approach and shareholder-
driven ‘liberal market economies’ (LME). While Germany is considered as the archetypical 
example of a CME, the US are considered to represent the purest example of an LME. For 
Soskice (1991), CMEs and LMEs represent two different forms of institutional frameworks that 
“incentivise and sustain different patterns of (economic) behavior” (Peck and Theodore 2007: 
736) and different forms of responses to similar external stimuli. Unlike neoliberal theory, 
Soskice does not consider CMEs to be suboptimal per se and inferior to LMEs – on the 
contrary: like much of the following varieties of capitalism literature, Soskice expresses 
normative preference for CMEs (Peck and Theodore 2007). The VoC school focuses on the way 
strategic behaviour of firms and other economic actors is embedded in their institutional 
environments in complex ways (Hall and Soskice 2001b) and how this embeddedness 
determines the organisation and regulation of production in a given context. This literature is 
based on a “relational conception of the firm as a social institution” (Peck and Theodore 2007: 
738) that strongly depends on its institutional and cultural environment and is “embedded in 
‘production regimes’ or ‘social systems of production’” (Peck and Theodore 2007: 738), 
focusing on the relationship between leading industrial sectors and their associated 
governance regimes. In other words, as Peck and Theodore (2007) recall, the VoC school 
recognises that economic structures and relations are institutionally mediated and socially 
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embedded. Firms are assumed to behave in accordance with the principles that correspond 
to the specific institutional framework of their national economy (Crouch et al. 2009).  
A distinctive feature of the main strand of the VoC school as represented in particular by 
Soskice and colleagues is its firmly national perspective: institutions and social relations that 
mediate economic structures and firm behaviour are considered as nationally anchored, 
governed by national legislation (Peck and Theodore 2007). It therefore has a “tendency to 
reify national economic boundaries” (Peck and Theodore 2007: 738), a conception 
increasingly challenged with the growing attention given to processes set on both the supra-
national and the infra-national (local and regional) scales. Such challenges of the national-
centric perspectives come even from within the VoC school (Schmitter 1997), from a strand 
represented by Hollingsworth and Boyer (e.g. 1997a) affiliated to regulation theory. It explores 
mechanisms of economic coordination and their connection with social systems of production 
at different scales and in different contexts, and is most concerned with the coherence of 
social systems of productions, defined as 
“the way that the following institutions or structures of a country or region are 
integrated into a social configuration. The industrial relations system; the system 
of training workers and managers; the internal structure of corporate firms; the 
structured relationships among firms in the same industry […], firms relationship 
with their suppliers and customers; the financial markets of a society; the 
conceptions of fairness and justice held by capital and labour; the structure of the 
state and its policies; and a society’s idiosyncratic customs and traditions as well 
as norms, moral principles, rules, laws and recipes for action.” (Hollingsworth and 
Boyer 1997b: 2; quoted by Peck and Theodore 2007), emphasis added by the 
author 
In contrast to this multi-scalar regulationist perspective, Hall and Soskice (2001b) propose a 
“firm-centric analysis of institutional variety” and an analysis of “national institutions as 
reciprocally adjusting shapers of economic action at the firm level” (Peck and Theodore 2007: 
743) and base their conceptual framework on the firm as a relational entity that, to achieve 
profitable production over time, needs to interact rationally with the institutions that govern 
its activity. Without denying the importance of sub-national institutions, Hall and Soskice 
(2001b) consider that the determining factor is the role of institutions at the national level in 
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five spheres: industrial relations (including the coordination of wages and working conditions), 
vocational training and education, corporate governance (including access to capital markets 
and firm-investor relations), inter-firm relations (including relations with clients, suppliers and 
competitors), and employees (including social organisation of workplace and competence 
management) (Peck and Theodore 2007). On this basis, Hall and Soskice (2001a: 8) compare 
national political economies “by way of reference to the way in which firms resolve the 
coordination problems they face in these five spheres” and obtain the ideal-typical opposing 
situations of the LME (with hierarchical and competitive market arrangements as the main 
source of coordination) on the one end, and the CME (with reliance on networks, collaborative 
relations and other non-market modes of coordination) on the other end. Hall and Soskice 
(2001a) consider the ideal-types of the LME ad the CME as the two extremes of a linear 
spectrum “along which many nations can be arrayed” (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 8). The 
analytical focus of this literature, however, is on comparative case studies of the ideal-types 
at the extremes of the spectrum (or on the countries considered to represent them best) 
rather than on intermediate situations which the authors consider as having a tendency of 
evolving towards one of the extremes.  
Arguing that complementary and efficient institutional relations exist in both LMEs and CMEs, 
Hall and Soskice (2001b) consider that none of the two ideal-types is a priori superior to the 
other and that both can sustain economic performance at a high level – albeit with varying 
results in terms of distribution and LMEs evidencing higher inequality than CMEs (Peck and 
Theodore 2007). VoC literature generally sees a complementarity between institutions, 
certain combinations of which have a reinforcing effect on each other, while others are 
incompatible and dysfunctional if combined (Crouch et al. 2009). One feature this national-
centred literature shares with the multi-scalar regulationist perspective is the view that 
economic regimes tend to evolve in path-dependent and not necessarily convergent ways: 
inherited institutional differences act as obstacles to convergence, hence diverging patterns 
of development are possible even in the long-run (Peck and Theodore 2007). Similarly, for 
Boyer (2000: 275), “various configurations of capitalism can coexist on a long-term basis, 
without converging towards one accepted form”, and most of the major industrialised 
countries correspond to one of four typical forms of capitalism:  market-led (prime example: 
US), meso-corporatist (Japan), state-led (France) and social democratic marked by negotiated 
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compromise between representatives of labour, capital and public authorities (Scandinavia, 
Austria and, to a lesser degree, Germany). 
The two main strands of the varieties of capitalism approach as reviewed above have clearly 
made a strong contribution to the understanding of capitalism, in particular by highlighting 
that capitalism is not a uniform and monolithic phenomenon, but one that is context-specific 
and that takes different forms depending on the geographical context it is situated in. Since 
the early 1990s, various strands of the varieties of capitalism school have produced many 
publications often contributing, as Peck and Theodore (2007) note, to long-standing concerns 
of political economy: causes of economic growth and crisis and relationships between 
economic development and social equity. By evidencing that institutional and social context 
matter and that political-economic change is path-dependent, this literature contributed to 
contest the ‘one best way’ discourse of orthodox globalisation theory (Peck and Theodore 
2007). Any geographically interested analysis of capitalism, including the one proposed by this 
thesis, can therefore benefit from the key contributions of the varieties of capitalism literature 
in trying to distil how the specificities of a geographical context may shape the way capitalism 
unfolds in particular regions and for particular firms therein. 
However, it is also necessary to highlight certain limitations of the VoC literature which limit 
its direct relevance and applicability for an analysis empirically centred on firms operating in 
two post-socialist regions and integrated in trans-regional networks of production as is the 
case of this study. Peck and Theodore (2007: 750) for example2 reject the “excessively narrow, 
firm-centric, and rational-action model” of analysis of the main VoC strand represented by 
Hall and Soskice: this indeed leaves little room for the consideration of networks and non-firm 
actors as necessary in the empirical analysis conducted by this thesis, focusing on the provision 
of capital by non-firm actors to firms that are integrated in trans-regional networks of 
production. Peck and Theodore (2007: 750) further criticise the “exaggerated normative and 
explanatory weight” given to the superstructural phenomena of institutional logics and 
rationalities, the “false impressions of coherence and complementarity” given by the holistic 
treatment of institutional ensembles: this leaves little room for a more nuanced analysis of 
the “fuzzy reality” of how firms and institutions interact in regions that correspond neither to 
                                                        
2 Cf. Hancké et al. (2007) for another critique/development of the varieties of capitalism approach. 
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an LME nor to a CME, as is the case of Hungary and Eastern Germany. Peck and Theodore 
(2007: 750) finally reject the “methodological nationalism” of the VoC literature where the 
“coherence of national regulatory configurations is presumed rather than demonstrated”, as 
well as its privileging of the description of two ideal-typical models and situating all real 
economies on a linear continuum between these two ideal-types. The fuzzy reality of most 
real-world economies (including in particular the post-socialist economies analysed within the 
scope of this thesis) is that they fit neither into the description of an LME, nor into that of a 
CME, or into any intermediary position between these two ideal types. In addition, the 
“methodological nationalism” of this VoC research leaves little room for the analysis of infra-
national differences in the organisation of capitalism – an analytical focus that can yield 
relevant insights as the empirical part of this study aims to demonstrate.  
Concerning the ideal-types themselves, Peck and Theodore (2007: 751) observe that while 
“the CME model represents a stylized description of the actually existing economies of 
countries like Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, the LME model is a curious hybrid of 
neoclassical economic theory and a correspondingly idealised form of American capitalism”. 
Peck and Theodore (2007: 751) see CME as a “chaotic conglomeration” of heterogeneous real 
economies and LME as a “pseudo-concrete rendering of the free market”, none of which 
adequately describes any real-world situation – and neither of which is particularly relevant 
for post-socialist economies like Hungary and Eastern Germany. Echoing Peck and Theodore 
(2007: 752), one can consider that the conceptual ingredients of each of the two ideal-types 
“must be (problematically) combined in any actually existing capitalist […] system”. Rather 
than in terms of quantitative variation of more market or less market, real world economies 
should be analysed in terms of “qualitative variegation” of the various aspects constituting 
both ideal-types (Peck and Theodore 2007: 752). The CME-LME dichotomy is particularly 
inadequate to analyse the post-socialist economies of Central Europe, as these are too varied 
to be classified in the VoC categories (Lane 2008). Even the two-dimensional continuum 
between CME-LME lacks the adequate space to situate post-socialist economies because it 
does not account for further factors (such as the specific post-socialist context) that need to 
be taken into account. Crouch et al. (2009) note that VoC theory tends to reduce the actual 
empirical variety of institutional frameworks, drawing up ‘holistic images’ through which 
national economies appear to be extremely coherent. Peck and Theodore (2007) also contest 
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the tendency of the main strand of the VoC school to consider neoliberalism as a reified, 
fundamental and exclusive component of LMEs acting as an external threat to CMEs, 
considering that such a view misrepresents the actual nature of change in all real-world 
economies. Their argument implies that neoliberalisation is not a uniform process that is 
either rejected or adopted but rather a multi-form phenomenon that is mediated and 
contested in various ways. Finally, Peck and Theodore (2007: 758) consider the VoC school’s 
“monoscalarity [at the national scale] as a serious obstacle” and call for an increased 
consideration of “‘models within models’ at the local scale and network-style ‘models 
between models’ in translocal space”. This is echoed by Lane’s critique of the VoC literature’s 
focus on the national, rather than the global context and its lack of consideration of the impact 
that the action of global firms can have on national institutional arrangements (Lane 2008). 
For Lane (2008: 234), it is important to explore how ‘global firms either reinforce and even 
export national institutionalised practices or corrode national patterns of firms’ co-ordination 
with other actors’.  
The above critique of VoC theory found in the literature is certainly relevant for the 
perspective taken by this study, in that this literature appears to provide insufficient tools to 
analyse the complexity of the real-world situations represented by the capital provision to 
firms operating in certain post-socialist regions and at the same time integrated in networks 
of global production. Recognising both the contributions of the VoC theory and its limitations 
for the purpose of this thesis, the next section therefore examines a potential complementary 
or alternative framework to account for the complexity of how capitalism is differentiated 
across geographies: the more recent ‘variegated capitalism’ approach proposed by Peck and 
Theodore (2007), which addresses the critique of the VoC literatures set out above. The 
concept of “variegation” (like others such as financialisation, embeddedness etc.) is widely 
used in different contexts and sometimes with different meanings, leading to a risk of over-
use and fuzziness of the concept: it is therefore necessary to clarify and justify the sense in 
which it is used here to ensure its use is justified in this context. For the purpose of this study, 
and in accordance with its utilisation by the literature on variegated capitalism below, 
‘variegation’ (of capitalism and of capital provision) allows to account for the complex, multi-
shaped reality of a phenomenon which takes different forms and nuances depending on each 
specific context in which it materialises. It is helpful in contexts where the reality of a 
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phenomenon defies any attempt to categorise into a typology that would list clearly distinct 
varieties of a phenomenon to one of which any real world situation could be attributed. As 
the empirical section of this study will show, the pattern observed with regards to the sourcing 
of capital by car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany, the sources of 
capital they use depending on their size, location and their ownership defies any 
categorisation into a hypothetical ‘Hungarian model’ and a hypothetical ‘Eastern German 
model’. Even though certain trends do emerge (and justify an analysis from a geographical 
perspective), the reality appears too complex and differentiated for a categorisation into 
‘varieties of capitalism’ to be relevant. By contrast, the concept of ‘variegation’ while 
recognising the existence of a difference between situations in different geographical 
contexts, at the same time allows for a gradual shift and ‘grey zones’ between the situations, 
better reflecting the reality of capital provision which depends on a multitude of factors, which 
can all be combined in different ways and to different degrees in a given situation, leading to 
an aggregate picture (of capital provision for certain firms in post-socialist regions) in which a 
multi-faceted ‘variegation’ of capitalism appears to better describe reality than a hypothetical 
juxtaposition of ‘varieties’. 
Variegated	Capitalism	
In response to the VoC school’s static vision of a bipolar global economy and to its limitations 
identified in the previous section, Peck and Theodore (2007) propose a more nuanced 
‘variegated capitalism’ approach building on the achievements of the VoC school while at the 
same time enhancing them by contributions that economic geography can make to answer 
the question of Boyer (2005) ‘how and why do capitalisms differ’ (quoted by Peck and 
Theodore 2007).3 Peck and Theodore (2007) summarise their proposal, in comparison to the 
VoC approach, as follows: 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Jessop (2014a) also develops a concept of variegated capitalism as a critique of the VoC literature, although 
seemingly independently from Peck and Theodore (2007) (who are not referenced therein) and more from the 
perspective of a Marxist critique of political economy. 
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 Varieties of capitalism Variegated capitalism 
Problematique Understanding institutional variability 
among advanced capitalist economies 
Explicating processes and forms of uneven 
development within, and beyond, late 
capitalism 
Case study 
rationale 
Comparative cases positioned relative to the 
privileged axis of LME ↔ CME 
Individual cases selected according to their 
theoretically generative properties 
Method Tendency for parsimonious institutional 
political economy with strong rational-choice 
component; ideal-typical theorising; reliance 
on secondary sources and game-theoretic 
procedures 
Relatively ecumenical institutional/ cultural 
political economy, qualitative case studies; 
post-positivist theorising; inclination to 
urban and regional analysis; rejection of 
methodological individualism 
Privileged 
agents 
Firms, business associations, and policy 
entrepreneurs 
Agents afforded relatively weak analytical 
status as bearers of prevailing modes of 
restructuring or nascent forms of resistance; 
embedded in constitutive network relations 
Analytical gaze Privileging of national institutional 
archetypes and relatively bounded national 
economies; emphasis on lead firms, 
dominant industries, and formal institutions 
Emphasis on decisive moments of economic 
transformation & institutional restructuring; 
real-time analysis of regulatory projects and 
experiments in organisation of production; 
multi-scalarity 
Temporal 
dynamics 
Equilibrium within selected institutional 
fields (absent exogenous shocks); emphasis 
on relative stability, incremental change 
reinforcing institutional settlements, 
punctuated by occasional disruptions 
Dynamic analysis, concern with endemic 
restructuring; presumption of disequilibrium 
and persistent crisis-proneness 
Scalar 
dynamics 
Methodological nationalism, presumption of 
high degrees of endogenous institutional 
coherence and a national-economic space; 
supermodularity registered at the national 
scale 
Social construction & relativisation of scale; 
potential supermodularity and conjunctural 
effects at multiple special scales (e.g. ‘locality 
effects’); concern with multi-scalarity (eg. 
‘glocal hybrids and cross-scalar networks) 
Historical 
trajectory 
Dual convergence or ‘twin peaks’; static-
comparative analysis of archetypal 
development models 
Combined & uneven development; embrace 
of contingency; rejection of the necessity of 
either convergence or divergence; concern 
with path-shaping and path-altering change 
Typical levels 
of abstraction 
Micro-analytical accounts of firm behaviour 
embedded within meso-level institutional 
architectures 
Meso-analytic interpretation of relatively 
concrete institutional conjunctures within 
unevenly developed (capitalist) system 
Normative 
project 
Defense of European- and Japanese-style 
social democracy and corporatist regimes; 
concern to explicate non-neoliberal modes of 
development 
Revealing internal contradictions of 
neoliberal globalization; identification and 
promotion of alternative (and/or 
progressive) forms of local development. 
Figure 2 Varieties of capitalism vs. variegated capitalism  
Source: Peck and Theodore (2007: 763) 
Many aspects of this ‘variegated capitalism’ approach, which Peck and Theodore consider as 
a “new form of spatialised political economy” (Peck and Theodore 2007: 765) constitute a 
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mutual enhancement of the varieties of capitalism school and economic geography for a 
“nuanced analysis of the temporality and spatiality of capitalist development” and of 
“capitalist variegation, understood as a […] ‘relational’ conception of variety” (Peck and 
Theodore 2007: 760).  This approach aims to involve “holding together questions relating to 
the uneven development of capitalism and co-constitutive/co-evolving forms of institutional 
restructuring, for instance at the interface of neoliberalisation and financialisation” (Peck and 
Theodore 2007: 764). Dixon (2011) takes the concept of variegated capitalism further by 
calling for a stronger engagement of economic geographers with the variegated capitalism 
literature and proposing to enhance it by studying it through the lens of financial geographies 
of the firm.  
Peck and Theodore (2007: 764-765) consider that more rigorously comparative research in 
this field would help provide empirical evidence that “neoliberalism is not monolithic or 
universal in form, but exists (only) as a variegated hybrid [that] is, at the same time, an 
international phenomenon, a facet of national polities, and a networked, ‘local’ construction 
[…] deeply entwined with the dynamics of financialisation [and] associated with qualitatively 
different forms of combined and uneven development”. Different institutional infrastructures 
of capital provision are likely to lead to different outcomes, as reflected by the idea that 
“financialisation is generally seen as more advanced in ‘neoliberal’ economies such as the US 
and the UK” (Coe et al. 2013: 12) because the capital market is more developed there and that 
“trends of financialisation vary according to the historical, institutional and political relations 
in each country, resulting in uneven development of financialisation” (Lapavitsas and Powell 
2013: 360). The research done to date based on the framework of variegated capitalism 
mostly focused on major European economies such as the UK, France or (Western) Germany 
(Macartney 2010; Jessop 2014b), with only rare exceptions also covering post socialist regions 
in Central and Eastern Europe (cf. e.g. Lendvai and Stubbs 2015; Brown and Spencer 2017). 
Based on the above, both the varieties of capitalism and the variegated capitalism literature 
would appear to provide useful analytical frameworks for the analysis of capital provision to 
car component manufacturers operating in Hungary and Eastern Germany. However, 
preference in this study is given to the variegated capitalism framework as it, echoing the 
critique of the VoC approach and case of variegated capitalism by Peck and Theodore (2007), 
better allows to take into account the different ways in which various types of third party 
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capital providers (in particular local and international industrial equity investors, banks and 
capital markets) interact with the various types of firms depending on context variables such 
as the firms’ size, location and ownership leading to different ways in which these firms source 
the capital used in their production process.  
2.1.2 Regional	Variegations	of	Capitalism	
The idea of coherent national varieties of capitalism is not only challenged by the variegated 
capitalism approach presented in the previous section. It is also complemented, with a 
different analytical focus, by research evidencing the existence of regional and sectoral 
varieties of capitalism (Crouch et al. 2009; Ebner 2015). The analysis of Crouch et al. (2009) 
starts with the observation that, in every national economy, certain firms, regions or economic 
sectors prosper in a way seemingly incompatible with the global model. Such apparent 
contradictions can be due, according to Crouch et al. (2009), to several (potentially 
cumulative) factors: 
• A firm’s activity can be embedded and supported by local (and transnational) 
institutions/infrastructure differing from and contradicting the national framework; 
• Such a contrast may lead to ‘creative incoherences’ by leading firms to adopt 
innovative behaviour; 
• A firm’s activity can be less dependent on or influenced by national institutions and 
infrastructure than classical VoC theory would suggest. 
In other words, the national institutional framework is only part of what shapes a firm’s 
activity: regional and sectoral as well as transnational institutions (including patterns of 
corporate finance and corporate governance, industrial relations, vocational training as well 
as research and development) need to be considered as well and influence firm behaviour in 
a way that can be different from the general national framework (Crouch et al. 2009). Regional 
and sectoral institutions can be loosely coupled with the national institutional framework, and 
this can allow firms to bypass constraints of national institutions leading to the creation and 
subsistence of autonomous regional or sectoral subsystems (Crouch et al. 2009). This then 
enables firms (especially larger ones with access to transnational resources and firms that are 
owned by larger foreign firms) to establish distinct governance structures that can contrast 
with the typical structures seen from a national point of view (Crouch et al. 2009). Crouch et 
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al. (2009) consider that the variegation or challenging of national institutional frameworks by 
distinct regional, sectoral and transnational institutions is particularly evident in countries 
whether these national frameworks are weak, such as Central and Eastern Europe. In 
summary, Crouch et al. (2009: 672) consider that ‘companies act rationally in response to 
sector-specific challenges, being partly bound by the existing institutional framework that they 
encounter, but partly acting to alter it’. Depending on whether the existing national 
framework is beneficial for the firms’ actions or not, they will aim to either preserve it or 
modify it by developing their own regional and sectoral structures drawing on local and/or on 
transnational resources: 
 
Figure 3 Regional and sectoral varieties of capitalism 
Source: Crouch et al. (2009) 
Examples of empirical research performed to date with a focus on regional variegations of 
capitalism include for example Colombo and Regini (2016) on Italy or Zhang and Peck (2016) 
on China. As for research on variegated capitalism more generally, little research in this area 
has been dedicated to post-socialist regions so far. Section 4.3 in the context chapter 
therefore discusses how institutional infrastructures of capital provision in Hungary and 
Eastern Germany can be analysed in this context. One of the main questions from the 
perspective of capital provision analysed in this study is whether the relative location of firms 
with respect to financial centres, i.e. the question of centre vs. periphery, influences the firms 
capacity (and/or, potentially, willingness) to source capital from capital providers such as 
banks, private equity investors or capital markets.  
Overall among the various strands of literature analysed above with regards of how capitalism 
unfolds differently in different geographical contexts, the context-sensitive variegated 
Actions of 
companies
National 
institutions
Local and extra-nat. 
institutions
Expected 
specialization
Unexpected 
specialization
creative 
incoherences
  Literature Review 
 
 
 
26 
capitalism approach combined with the sub-national focus of literature on regional 
variegations of capitalism provide a useful conceptual framework for the empirical analysis 
proposed by this study. They allow for an analysis of how the provision of capital by the 
different types of capital providers (in particular individual and industrial equity, banks and 
capital markets) unfolds in differentiated manners depending on the size, location and 
ownership of the firms analysed. 
2.2 Finance	and	Global	Production	Networks	
This second section of the literature review introduces the concept of trans-regional networks 
of firms as a dimension complementary to the national and regional variegations of capitalism 
discussed earlier. It first provides a brief overview of the theory of global production networks 
and related frameworks such as global commodity chains and global value chains (2.2.1). It 
then has a closer look at the specificities of global production networks in the particular 
context of post-socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe (2.2.2) and finally 
introduces the idea of finance in global production networks, mainly to show that this 
dimension has been largely absent from the literature so far even though the gap has been 
widely recognised (2.2.3). 
The combination of the GPN framework with certain aspects of GCC/GVC literature is 
necessary for the purpose of the empirical analysis proposed by this study given that an 
analysis of capital provision to certain types of firms integrated into global networks of 
production both requires an analytical framework taking account of geographically-situated 
non-firm actors (as possible in the GPN framework) and one that allows to analyse the effects 
capital provision has on a firm, through the way it impacts the firm’s governance and capacity 
for industrial upgrading (as these two concepts are more specifically theorised in GCC/GVC 
literature). 
2.2.1 Global	Production	Networks:	Theoretical	Framework	
There is a large and diverse academic literature on the organisation and functioning of multi-
territorial networks of production within and between firms in various economic sectors, 
analysing how global industries are organised and governed. Much of this literature is 
affiliated to one of the related but distinct frameworks of global commodity chains (GCC) 
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(Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994), global value chains (GVC) (Gereffi et al. 2005) and global 
production networks (GPN) (Henderson et al. 2002) which can be summarised as follows: 
 Global Commodity Chains Global Value Chains Global Production Networks 
Theoretical 
foundation 
 
World-systems theory; 
Organisational sociology 
Global commodity chains; 
International business 
literature 
Management studies 
(Porter); 
New Economic Sociology; 
Actor-Network Theory; 
GCC/GVC Analysis 
Intellectual 
influences 
 
MNC literature 
Comparative development 
literature 
International business / 
industrial organisation 
Trade economics 
Global/international 
production 
networks/systems 
Political economy of 
development 
Object of 
inquiry 
 
Inter-firm networks in global 
industries 
Sectoral logics of global 
industries 
Networks of firm and non-
firms actors in global 
industries 
Orienting 
concepts 
 
Industry structures 
Governance (PDCC/BDCC 
distinction 
Organisational learning/ 
industrial upgrading 
Value-added chains 
Governance models 
(modular, relational, captive) 
Transaction costs 
Industrial upgrading and 
rents 
Value (and its creation, 
enhancement and capture) 
Power (corporate, 
institutional, collective) 
Embeddedness (territorial, 
networked, societal) 
Strategic coupling, de-
coupling and re-coupling 
Analytical 
level 
 
Micro (individual firm) and 
meso (sector) 
Micro (individual firm) and 
meso (sector) 
Micro (individual firm and 
non-firm actors) and meso 
(sector) 
Policy 
orientation 
 
High Very high So far low 
Non-firm 
actors 
Low relevance Low relevance High relevance,  
broad range of actors 
Institutional 
context 
Low relevance Low relevance High relevance 
Geographic 
dimension 
Low relevance Low relevance High relevance, multi-scalar 
and multiple spatialities 
Figure 4 Overview of the GCC, GVC and GPN frameworks 
Source: Bair (2005), Bair (2008a) and author  
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The GPN framework is particularly useful for this study because it allows consideration of 
multiple geographic spatialities and the multi-scalar nature (i.e. global, national, regional and 
local) of production systems as well as the importance of institutional, regulatory and socio-
political context and the large range of relevant (including non-firm) actors to a far larger 
extent than the GCC and GVC frameworks (Henderson et al. 2002; Bair 2008a). However, 
certain aspects of GCC and GVC analysis (such as concepts of governance and industrial 
upgrading) can usefully complement the GPN framework. The existing literature using the 
GPN and GVC frameworks also includes a rich body of empirical work on the car component 
manufacturing industry (e.g. Humphrey and Memedovic 2003), including in Central and 
Eastern Europe (cf. e.g. Pavlínek and Ženka 2011; Pavlínek and Žížalová 2016). In what follows, 
the GPN framework is presented in more detail, before those aspects of GCC and GVC analysis 
used to complement it are developed and the interrelation with local and regional 
development is discussed.  
Global	Production	Networks:	Theoretical	Framework	
The global production networks perspective (for its theoretical foundations and further 
developments, cf. Henderson et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2004; Coe et al. 2008; Coe and Hess 2011; 
Coe 2012; MacKinnon 2012; Coe 2015; Yeung and Coe 2015; Dörry 2016) is a relational, 
network-based and geographic approach to the study of the global space-economy (Amin 
2002; Hess and Yeung 2006). Global production networks are defined as “discontinuously 
territorial” (Henderson et al. 2002: 446) and as “the globally organised nexus of 
interconnected functions and operations by firms and non-firm institutions through which 
goods and services are produced and distributed” (Coe et al. 2004: 471). Global production 
networks integrate firms into “structures which blur traditional organisational boundaries 
through the development of diverse forms of equity and non-firm equity relationships” (Coe 
et al. 2004: 471). Complementary to the GCC/GVC literature, GPN research has a stronger 
geographical focus, recognising that the precise nature and articulation of production 
networks is deeply influenced by the concrete socio-political context in which they are 
embedded (Coe et al. 2004). This links the approach to relational economic geography, which 
“is concerned primarily with the ways in which socio-spatial relations of actors are intertwined 
with broader structures and processes of economic change at various geographic scales” 
(Yeung 2005). GPN research also explores the “social and political processes by which industry 
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standards are created”, including efforts of both governments and corporates to influence the 
setting of such standards (Bair 2008a: 356). Some of the research on the automobile industry 
performed to date has been explicitly based on the GPN perspective (e.g. Liu and Dicken 
2006).  
After the initial generation of GPN literature in the early 2000s (“GPN 1.0”), more recent 
contributions (cf. e.g. Coe 2015; Yeung and Coe 2015) sought to emphasise the dynamics of 
how GPNs are constituted over the more static approach of the original literature, which 
focused on governance typologies and analytical categories such as power and embeddedness 
(Yeung and Coe 2015). This new generation of GPN research (“GPN 2.0”) finally introduces 
some form of attention for finance through the consideration of financial discipline (including 
access to finance and the power exerted by capital providers) as one of the three dynamic 
forces shaping actor-specific strategies in the formation and evolution of global production 
networks (Yeung and Coe 2015). This new generation of “GPN 2.0 research” aims to surmount 
some of the limitations of earlier GPN research by taking into account a broader range of 
factors and the dynamics that shape the constitution and evolution of global production 
networks – making it even more suitable as a conceptual framework for an empirical analysis 
aiming to better understand the dynamics of capital provision to firms that are integrated (in 
particular through ownership) into global networks of production. 
GPN research focuses on a broad range of actors and on three conceptual categories (value, 
power and embeddedness) to analyse the organisation and functioning of global production 
networks (Henderson et al. 2002). “Encompass[ing] all relevant sets of actors and 
relationships” (Coe et al. 2008: 272), including both firm and non-firm actors, inter-firm 
relations, firm-state relations as well as relations with other stakeholders such as labour 
associations and civil society, GPN research proposes a more open and less linear perspective 
than the GCC/GVC approach (MacKinnon 2012). The framework involves both local actors in 
specific regions (labour, state) and non-local actors in global production networks 
(transnational corporations, financial capital), with differing degrees of territorial 
embeddedness (and ‘boundedness’ or mobility), “shaping how value and power are 
distributed in their relational interaction” (Coe et al. 2004: 471).  
• Focal firms: similar to the lead firms in GCC/GVC research, the central actors of global 
production networks are large international focal firms, defined as “dominant firms 
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spearheading the global organisation of production networks through their corporate 
and market power” (Coe et al. 2004: 473). 
• Other firms: including subsidiaries, suppliers (tier-one, tier-two, tier-three) etc., 
typically smaller and more locally embedded than the focal firms. 
• Governments: national, regional/local and supra-national bodies such as the EU, the 
regulations and policies of which form the legal framework of the global production 
networks’ operations. 
• Further actors: including labour unions, employers’ organisations, non-governmental 
organisations etc. 
The GPN framework recognises that all types of actors have a certain degree of autonomy, 
power and agency (although to differing degrees, and with different strategies and priorities) 
in shaping the constitution, organisation and evolution of global production networks and 
hence the prospects of local and regional development in the territories involved. In the 
context of the empirical analysis of this thesis, the main actors to be considered, besides the 
firms themselves, are the various types of capital providers, including in particular individual 
and industrial shareholders/equity providers (whether local or foreign), banks as well as more 
‘financialised’ types of capital providers such as private equity firms and the capital markets. 
Value in GPN research is defined both in Marxian terms of surplus value and in more orthodox 
terms of economic rent (Henderson et al. 2002). In the latter sense, Coe et al. (2004) base 
their definition of value on Kaplinsky (1998), defining value as “various forms of economic 
rent” realised through market and non-market transactions and exchanges. Value in this sense 
is created through the labour process, technological or relational rents, organisational 
attributes, trade policy and branding. Some regions are better in creating and retaining some 
forms of rents rather than others and value takes different forms as it moves in a spatialised 
network of flows (Coe et al. 2004). GPN research thus explores how value is created (within 
the firms that form part of the global production network), enhanced (at the level of lead firms 
and/or local suppliers) and captured, i.e. who ultimately benefits from it (Henderson et al. 
2002). In the context of the empirical analysis of this thesis, the creation, enhancement and 
capture of value can be analysed with regards to the distribution of profits to the firm’s various 
capital providers and/or their retention (in the form of retained earnings) and re-investment 
in the firm’s production process.  
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Power is considered by GPN research as the decisive element for capturing and enhancing 
value, and thus “for the prospects for development and prosperity” (Henderson et al. 2002: 
450). Henderson et al. (2002) distinguish three types of power: 
• Corporate power, exercised mainly by lead firms but also by smaller firms when given 
circumstances (including e.g. collective action of smaller firms) enable them to pursue 
their own strategies; 
• Institutional power, exercised by (i) political institutions at national level, regional 
level (where relevant), and supra-national level (e.g. the EU) and (ii) private institutions 
such as the large credit rating agencies; and 
• Collective power, exercised in particular by trade unions, employers’ associations, 
lobbying organisations and the civil society in general. 
While earlier GPN research tends to consider power relations to be relatively balanced, 
enabling the different actors to engage in strategic negotiations, MacKinnon (2012: 231) 
stresses that relations between lead firms and local communities and their power relations 
with regional institutions are often unequal due to the higher spatial mobility of lead firms 
enabling them to engage in ‘regulatory arbitrage’. Such asymmetries however weaken when 
assets specific to the region and less interchangeable correspond to the lead firms strategic 
needs: in such cases, the bargaining power of regional institutions is comparatively high (Coe 
et al. 2004). In the context of the empirical analysis of this study, the question of power 
relationships between firms and their capital providers covers a range of issues such as the 
role capital providers (in particular but not limited to shareholders/equity providers) play in 
the governance (and hence the strategic decision making) of the firm, including with regards 
to the distribution and/or retention of profits. It also covers the power of potential capital 
providers (such as banks assessing whether or not to grant a loan) in imposing certain 
obligations (for example of transparency or reporting) onto the firm as a conditions for 
providing the capital requested.  
Finally, the concept of embeddedness, based in particular on Granovetter (1985b), is used to 
assess the “social and spatial arrangements in which [GPN] firms are embedded[,] which 
influence their strategies” and can explain path-dependencies such as for example in post-
socialist Central Europe (Henderson et al. 2002: 451). In economic geography, embeddedness 
is mostly conceived as firms being embedded in networks and institutional settings at the local 
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and regional levels (Hess 2004). While globalisation was sometimes described as a process of 
disembedding, it was soon clarified that there are also other forms of embeddedness, such as 
embeddedness in transnational ethnic networks and global production networks which 
complement the original concept of territorial embeddedness at the local and regional level 
(Hess 2004). Embeddedness is therefore now conceived as the ‘social relationships between 
both economic and non-economic actors (individuals as well as aggregate groups of 
individuals, i.e. organisations)’ and materialises in three major dimensions: societal 
embeddedness, network embeddedness (conceived as a ‘network of actors a person or 
organisation is involved in, i.e. the structure of relationships among a set of individuals and 
organisations regardless of their country of origin or local anchoring in particular places) and 
territorial embeddedness (considering ‘the extent to which an actor is ‘anchored’ in particular 
territories or places’) (Hess 2004). GPN research therefore distinguishes three forms of 
embeddedness: 
• Societal embeddedness, regarding “how actors are positioned within wider 
institutional and regulatory frameworks” (MacKinnon 2012: 230); 
• Territorial embeddedness, both in home regions of lead firms and in host regions, 
evidences how global production networks “absorb, and in some cases become 
constrained, by the economic activities and social dynamics that already exist in those 
places” but also how the implementation of lead firms “might generate a new local or 
regional framework of economic and social relations, involving existing firms as well as 
attracting new ones” (Henderson et al. 2002: 452); 
• Network embeddedness, meaning the formal or informal connections between 
network members, characterised by ‘architecture’, durability and stability (Henderson 
et al. 2002) or, more generally, the “social and economic relationships in which a 
particular actor or firm participates” (MacKinnon 2012: 230). 
Largely conceived as a “spatial concept related to the local and regional levels of analysis” 
(Hess 2004), the concept of embeddedness of economic action into wider institutional and 
social frameworks is used not only in the context of global production networks but much 
more widely in economic geography since the yearly 1990s by Dicken and Thrift (1992) based 
on original contributions by Granovetter (1985a) and Polanyi (1944/2001). While the original 
contribution of Polanyi (1944/2001) aimed to ‘demonstrate that the economy is enmeshed in 
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institutions, both economic and non-economic’, the concern of Granovetter (1985a) is to 
‘avoid both undersocialized views of economic action, as in neoclassical economics, and 
oversocialised views in sociology’ and to ‘scale down’ the embeddedness concept (from 
Polanyi’s rather abstract economies and societies) towards an emphasis on individual and 
collective agency’ including the ‘social relations between firms’ (Hess 2004). The concept has 
been the object of some critique in recent years (Krippner et al. 2004; Peck 2005; Jones 2008) 
for the way it abstracts the economy from its context and is perceived to be 
‘overterritoralized’ (Hess 2004), ‘increasingly popular but confusingly polyvalent’ (Jessop 
2001) and calling for a clarification of “’who’ is embedded in ‘what’ and what is so ‘spatial’ 
about it” (Pike et al. 2000): this critique needs to be taken into account when using it for 
empirical research.  
Territorial embeddedness is considered an important factor in terms of value creation, 
enhancement and capture from a local and regional development point of view (Hess 2004) 
and network and territorial embeddedness together are the most important ones for 
economic geography in general and this study in particular: while the locatedness of the car 
component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany reflects their territorial 
embeddedness, their integration in global production networks (in particular through 
ownership by other car component manufacturers) reflects their network embeddedness.  
Complementing	Concepts	from	Chain-Based	Frameworks	
While the GPN framework appears to be the most suitable framework for the purpose of this 
study because of the way it allows for consideration of geographic factors and non-firm actors 
(such as capital providers), the well-established frameworks of global commodity chains (GCC) 
and global value chains (GVC), on the basis of which much empirical research has been done 
over the last 20 years, including on the global automotive industry (e.g. Sturgeon et al. 2008) 
and which are regularly used in policy-related projects do have certain aspects that constitute 
useful complementarities to the GPN framework. These include in particular the concepts of 
governance and industrial upgrading which are less explicitly theorised in the GPN literature.  
The GCC approach defines global commodity chains as ‘sets of inter-firm networks (involving 
transnational corporations, their subsidiaries and/or independent companies of varying sizes) 
which connect manufacturers, suppliers and subcontractors (as well as exporters, purchasers, 
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distributors and marketing activities) in global industries to each other, and ultimately to 
international markets’ (Czaban and Henderson 1998: 587; Bair 2005: 156). Similar to GCC 
research, GVC research is analytically situated at the micro-level of individual firms and at the 
meso-level of economic sectors (Bair 2005) but unlike GCC research, it explicitly claims 
intellectual influence from international business scholars (Gereffi et al. 2005) and pays much 
attention to sector-specific governance and sector-internal logics shaping inter-firm relations, 
considering external factors such as the institutional environment as well as questions of 
value-distribution along the chain to a lesser extent (Bair 2005). Rather than a complete or 
detailed overview of the GCC and GVC frameworks (for these, cf. Gereffi 1994; Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz 1994; Gereffi 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001; Bair 2005; Gereffi et al. 2005; 
Bair 2008b; a; Gibbon et al. 2008) the following only presents the concepts of governance and 
industrial upgrading to the extent relevant for this study as these are less explicitly theorised 
in GPN literature yet relevant for an empirical study focused on the provision of capital: the 
provision of capital both directly impacts the governance of a firm through the introduction 
of the capital providers as new stakeholders to the firm and its availability (or lack thereof) 
impacts the way a firm is able to achieve industrial upgrading. 
The governance dimension, consisting of ‘authority and power relationships that determine 
how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain’ (Gereffi 
1994: 97), has received particular attention, with a focus on the creation and distribution of 
value within a commodity chain and the role of lead firms in this respect (Bair 2005). It reflects 
the idea that the “value adding capacities of companies [within a global commodity chain] are 
constrained by the way the chain is organised and by the nature and distribution of corporate 
power within it” (Czaban and Henderson 1998: 587). Power is here defined in a more narrow 
way than in the GPN framework, focussing on the capacity to “explicitly coordinate activities” 
between firms in a chain (Sturgeon 2008: 11). More collaborative forms of network 
governance exist in some networks, but they depend on a specific distribution of resources 
between the firms and are often not compatible with an objective of maximised profitability 
(Lane 2008). Governance influences the way firms are able to adapt to risks such as the 
volatility of energy prices (Mulhall and Bryson 2013), but also to the availability and cost of 
capital. GVC research sees governance to be expressed through the parameters imposed by 
lead firms on suppliers regarding both the objects to be produced and the conditions of their 
  Literature Review 
 
 
 
35 
production including working conditions, quality control, environmental standards etc. (cf. 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2001; as quoted by Bair 2005). Governance takes various forms 
ranging from hierarchy (equity owning) and captive over relational to modular and market 
governance (Gereffi et al. 2005). Governance is a key aspect for the empirical analysis 
proposed by this thesis as it allows to account for how, depending on the type of capital and 
the context at stake, the providers of capital gain influence over the strategic decision making 
process of a firm, including the distribution or retention of profits and its ability to raise further 
capital to achieve industrial upgrading as defined below. 
Having received significant attention from policy makers at local, national and international 
levels, the GCC approach puts much effort into understanding the relationship between the 
functioning of commodity chains and the development prospects of (in particular developing) 
countries (Bair 2005). A major concern of the GCC approach therefore is the question of 
‘industrial upgrading’, i.e. how firms can acquire the skills, competencies and supporting 
services to improve their relative position in a particular value chain (Bair 2005). The GVC 
approach also claims to be policy-relevant in respect to ‘industrial upgrading, economic 
development, employment creation and poverty alleviation’ (Gereffi et al. 2005: 79), seeking 
to determine how firms (particularly in developing countries) can improve their position 
within value chains (to create and capture more value for their benefit) through industrial 
upgrading (Bair 2005). Upgrading is here considered to be possible in four different ways 
(Gereffi et al. 2001; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001): 
• Intra-chain/functional upgrading, i.e. strengthening the firm’s position within the 
value chain by increasing the range of functions fulfilled by the firm; 
• Product upgrading, i.e. producing more sophisticated goods with higher value; 
• Process upgrading, i.e. improving the firm’s production system and technology; 
• Inter-chain upgrading, i.e. moving to another industry 
There has been work to date aiming to integrate the concept of industrial upgrading into the 
framework of global production networks, such as Barrientos et al. (2010) for example. In 
many cases the ability of a firm to achieve upgrading will depend on its ability to raise capital 
in a form and amount enabling it to make the investments required for the upgrading: this is 
how this study’s focus on the geographical factors driving the capital sourcing by the firms ties 
in with this aspect of GVC research. 
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Global	Production	Networks	and	Local	and	Regional	Development	
GCC/GVC research and, even more so, GPN research have made significant contributions in 
understanding processes of local and regional development. This section briefly presents the 
concepts through which the interaction between production networks and local and regional 
development is assessed, as well as some critiques formulated in this respect. Much attention 
is dedicated to difficulties firms experience in their upgrading efforts and to governance 
barriers that exist within value chains (Bair 2005), including in the automotive industry 
(Isaksen and Kalsaas 2009). Glückler and Panitz (2016) propose the concept of ‘regional 
upgrading’ as a complement to the traditional upgrading categories of products, processes or 
function to analyse how countries may benefit from moving from the periphery to the core 
through a stronger integration of their firms in global production networks implying a 
positional change of firms in inter-firm networks. The analysis of the effects seems to be 
focused more at a country level rather than a regional level.  
While recognising the significant contribution of GCC/GVC research, there has also been 
critique of the upgrading concept in the literature (Bair 2005; Tokatli 2013) and of its lack of 
engaging with questions of development (Dussel Peters 2008). Bair (2005) sees a ‘unit of 
analysis dilemma’ in GVC research’s focus on firm-level upgrading lacking an explicit link to 
questions of development at regional or national levels. She further notes that a firm’s 
upgrading does not necessarily imply that it (taken as whole) really benefits in terms of 
increased security or profitability, and that such benefit is even less evident for certain 
stakeholders of the firm (such as higher wages, greater job security or improved working 
conditions for workers) or other local firms in the same sector (and, more generally, for the 
region). This raises the question of the social implications of industrial upgrading (Rammohan 
and Sundaresan 2003) and the question of ‘upgrading for whom’ (Tokatli 2013) (cf. also the 
question ‘local and regional development for whom’ by Pike et al. (2007)) leading to the 
conclusion that the narrow industrial upgrading concept on its own may be insufficient as a 
development-policy oriented tool (Bair 2005; Tokatli 2013). Machacek and Hess (2017) 
highlight effects of a deskilling of the workforce in car component manufacturing as a potential 
corollary of industrial upgrading by these firms. 
Bair (2005) therefore calls for a stronger consideration in GVC research of ‘external’ variables 
such as regulatory mechanisms, market institutions and structural properties of contemporary 
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capitalism, on “how chains are articulated within and through the larger social, cultural and 
political-economic environments in which they operate” (Bair 2005: 168) and to what extent 
“commodity chains exhibit features of path dependency, and with what implications for the 
various actors involved” (Bair 2005: 170). This echoes the understanding that economic actors 
(such as firms operating in global value chains) “are always embedded in dense social and 
institutional networks of relations (including labour relations state regulations) at both 
national and local levels, and these relations impinge in important ways upon the variability 
of economic development outcomes across space” (Smith et al. 2002: 48).  
Questions of development have been more a concern from the outset for GPN research, 
where regional development corresponds to the creation, enhancement and capture of value 
(as discussed earlier) for the benefit of the region (Henderson et al. 2002): 
• Value creation means the generation of various types of rents, including technological, 
organisational, relational, brand or trade-policy rents; 
• Value enhancement (related to the concept of industrial upgrading in the GCC/GVC 
literature) involves technology transfers to local firms, the improvement of the quality 
and technological sophistication of the products and an increase in the demand for 
skilled labour in the region;  
• Value capture corresponds to the retention of profits and their local reinvestment, 
resulting from local ownership and embeddedness of firms in regional economies 
(MacKinnon 2012) or, more generally, through taxation, upgrading of skills or 
investment in infrastructure (Coe et al. 2013). It is highly dependent on questions of 
government policy, firm ownership and corporate inter-firm governance. 
Coe et al. (2004) propose an interesting way to analyse the relationship between global 
production networks and local and regional development. They not only provide tools to 
describe the mechanisms through which the two concepts are interrelated, but also identify 
the conditions that need to be fulfilled if the activity of production networks is to have a 
positive rather than a neutral or negative impact on local and regional development. The 
combined consideration of production networks and local and regional development 
evidences the pertinence of seeing relational and territorial approaches as complementary 
rather than competing (cf. also Markusen 1994; Pike 2007). Local and regional development 
is a set of relational processes with interactive effects (Coe et al. 2004). It depends not only 
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on what happens within the region, but also on “wider sets of relations of control and 
dependency, of competition and markets” (Coe et al. 2004: 469). Local and regional 
development is the “dynamic outcome of the complex interaction between territorialised 
relational networks and global production networks within the context of changing relational 
governance structures” (Coe et al. 2004). 
As the above shows, production networks are relevant for local and regional development 
insofar as they can foster (or impede) industrial upgrading of firms. The capacity of economic 
actors and regions to create, enhance and capture value depends, inter alia, on the existing 
and potential connections between production networks and localities and regions. GPN 
research pursues this analysis by considering that local and regional development results from 
a ‘strategic coupling’ between global production networks, and the assets of a locality or 
region. Yeung (2009: 213) defines strategic coupling as “the dynamic processes through which 
[strategic interests are] coordinate[d], mediate[d] and arbitrage[d] between local actors and 
their counterparts in the global economy”. Local actors include government agencies, local 
businesses and business associations (Coe et al. 2013). According to Coe et al. (2004), 
endogenous factors are necessary (but not sufficient) for local and regional development: in 
order for development to occur, regional assets must produce (i) economies of scale 
(concentration of knowledge, skills and expertise embodied in local social actors that fosters 
the agglomeration of firms) and/or (ii) economies of scope/spillover effects represented by 
“learning and a cooperative atmosphere facilitating a broad spectrum of production and 
entrepreneurial activities” (Coe et al. 2004: 471). The organisational strength and flexibility of 
labour are a key asset whose relative spatial immobility enhances the capacity of global 
production networks to mobilise economies of scale and scope (Coe et al. 2004: 472). More 
particularly, “regional socio-economic conditions are crucially important for the location 
decision of investments in the most sophisticated knowledge-intensive stages of the value 
chain” and “preferences of [multi-national corporations] for the location of their foreign 
activities are increasingly likely to vary according to the value chain stages that are being re-
located outside their home countries” (Crescenzi et al. 2013: 1 and 2). Local and regional 
development also requires ‘strategic coupling’ between regional assets and the needs of 
trans-local actors situated within global production networks (Coe et al. 2004: 471). Coe et al. 
(2004) identify a necessary (but not sufficient) condition as the “strategic coupling of the 
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global production networks of firms and regional economies which ultimately drives regional 
development through the processes of value creation, enhancement and capture” (Coe et al. 
2004: 468), emphasising the “multi-scalarity of forces and processes underlying regional 
development” (Coe et al. 2004: 468). The “dynamic strategic coupling of global production 
networks and regional assets” is “an interface mediated by a range of institutional activities 
across different geographical and organisational scales” (Coe et al. 2004: 469). The coupling 
effects can be “enhanced and exploited through particular sets and practices of ‘regional’ 
institutions” (i.e. local, regional, national and supra-national institutions whose activity 
impacts the region) (Coe et al. 2004: 470). Institutions are strongly embedded in regions and 
their configurations (including their relationship with other local actors such as labour) shape 
how regions are articulated into global production networks (Coe et al. 2004: 472).  
The strategic needs of focal firms in global production networks do not necessarily intersect 
with regional benefits: according to Coe et al. (2004: 469), “[local and] regional development 
ultimately depend[s] on the ability of [the strategic coupling process] to stimulate processes 
of value creation, enhancement and capture”. The developmental impact of the coupling 
process is “highly variable and contingent, and by no means automatically beneficial for the 
region” (Coe et al. 2004: 481). Strategic coupling is insufficient for regional development, as 
regions may be creating types of value that do not maximise their potential (Coe et al. 2004: 
474). Regional institutions (public authorities, government agencies etc…) can promote the 
right creation of value and attract value added activities by training and educating the 
workforce, promoting start-up firms and supplier networks, facilitating venture capital 
formation and encouraging entrepreneurial activities (Coe et al. 2004: 474). Regional 
institutions can promote the enhancement of value through the transfer of knowledge and 
technology and industrial upgrading, as well as through the development of the infrastructure 
and the human resources required for value enhancement (Coe et al. 2004: 474). Institutions 
(public authorities, government agencies, trade unions…) can promote the creation and 
capturing of value through the right articulation of their regions into global production 
networks. Value capture is related to questions of power and control, in the negotiation 
between institutions and focal firms involving development policies, ownership patterns, and 
corporate governance (Coe et al. 2004: 474). The information asymmetry tends to give the 
advantage to focal firms, but institutions can mobilise their regional assets to improve their 
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bargaining position (Coe et al. 2004: 474). However, strategic coupling, value creation and 
value enhancement are not sufficient for local and regional development, as a region may not 
be capturing the value it creates (Amin and Thrift 1992; quoted by Coe et al. 2004) depending 
on whether profits (i.e. realised value) are repatriated or retained and reinvested in the firm. 
The likelihood of value capture is the “dynamic outcome of the complex bargaining process 
between regional institutions [offering region-specific assets] and focal firms in global 
production networks” (Coe et al. 2004: 476). The conceptual framework of GPNs and regional 
development can be summarised as follows: 
 
Figure 5 Global production networks and local and regional development 
Source: Coe et al. (2004) 
While earlier GPN research focused on strategic coupling as a means to enhance local and 
regional development, more recent contributions (e.g. Coe and Hess 2011) recognise that 
relationships between production networks and regions can also deteriorate, leading to 
disinvestment, the departure of foreign firms and the loss of access to foreign markets 
(MacKinnon 2012). MacKinnon (2012) adopts a ‘path-sensitive’ evolutionary economic 
geography perspective to recall that the interaction between production networks and 
localities and regions is complex and not necessarily unidirectional: processes of increasing 
integration (coupling) can be accompanied or followed by processes of changing and 
decreasing integration (recoupling and decoupling) and depend, inter alia, on regional path-
dependent situations. Such an evolutionary economic geography perspective implies a “social 
and pluralist conception of institutions and agency” (MacKinnon 2012: 232) echoing the 
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variegated capitalism approach presented in Section 2.1.1. While strategic coupling ‘highlights 
the dynamic processes by which relational assets are matched to the strategic needs of lead 
firms in [production networks], with regional institutions playing a key role in this process, […] 
recoupling and decoupling as a result of regional selection and abandonment processes, 
respectively, can be seen as key mechanisms of uneven socioeconomic development’ 
(MacKinnon 2012: 241). MacKinnon (2012) summarises key dimensions for analysing strategic 
coupling (also with an impact on recoupling and decoupling) as follows: 
Dimension Scenarios 
Mode of entry of lead firms Greenfield, repeat investment, merger/acquisition 
Status of TNC affiliates Autonomous – dependent 
Type of region Source, host 
Regional assets Distinctive – generic 
Type of coupling Organic, strategic, structural 
Degree of coupling Full – none 
Depth/layering of recoupling Deep – shallow 
Power relations Symmetric – asymmetric 
Regional development outcomes Development – dependency 
Exposure to decoupling Low – High 
Figure 6 Key dimensions of coupling between global production networks and regions  
Source: MacKinnon (2012) 
In a similar way, the ‘upgrading’ process so central to GCC/GVC research is non-unidirectional, 
comprising dimensions of downgrading and corporate abandonment, for example in intra-
firm competition between branch plants for investment from the mother company 
(MacKinnon 2012). The impact of production networks on local and regional development 
therefore changes over time, not only enhancing but also impeding or transforming the way 
local and regional development occurs. From a more positive perspective, Horner (2013) 
highlights that deliberate decoupling and subsequent recoupling can have positive 
development effects when this allows to replace/rebalance an existing negative/asymmetrical 
form of integration by a more advantageous/symmetrical one. Research on car manufacturing 
conducted from a GVC or GPN perspective with a concern for local and regional development 
include for example Picknernell (1998) in respect of the restructuring of the UK car 
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components manufacturing industry, Pavlínek et al. (2009) in respect of industrial upgrading 
in the automotive industries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, Pavlínek 
and Ženka (2010)’s study on the impact of the automotive crisis of 2008-2009 (and of the 
relative position of car component manufacturers within the value chain) on regional 
unemployment in the Czech Republic, or Bailey and De Propris (2014)’s study on the limits of 
‘re-shoring’ of car manufacturing in the UK due to the availability of skills and finance in the 
supply chain. 
The question of the firm’s resilience in times of economic and financial crises is also of 
relevance in this context: as Wehinger (2013) recalls, SMEs tend to have significant difficulties 
in accessing capital in times of crisis, notably due to a reduction in lending by banks during 
such periods. This is likely to affect the resilience primarily of firms that do rely on banks loans 
to source capital, but as the empirical section of this study will show, this is not the case of all 
firms. The question of ownership is also crucial: studies conducted by Alfaro and Chen (2012) 
and Kolasa et al. (2010) for example found that firms owned by larger foreign firms tend to 
show higher resilience in times of crisis than firms that are locally owned, especially when 
there is a strong vertical integration and financial linkages (in particular intra-group lending) 
between the firms. As the empirical section of this study shows, there is a clear dichotomy of 
firms particularly in Hungary, with one group being locally owned, and the other being foreign 
owned – and those that are foreign owned very often get a significant proportion of capital 
from their owner. This would suggest, following Alfaro and Chen (2012) and Kolasa et al. 
(2010), that these firms are expected to show stronger resilience in times of crisis, although 
this would need to be confirmed empirically for the firms analysed in this study. 4  The 
relevance of foreign ownership (as well as strong trade relationships) in the capacity of firms 
to weather economic crises (and more generally to resist increasing competitive pressures) 
has also been highlighted by Smith et al. (2014) (in respect of the Slovak clothing industry),  
Put into perspective with the empirical research of this thesis, the above raises questions 
about the extent to which the firms’ capacity to obtain capital from different sources (or their 
potential reliance on retained earnings in the absence of external capital providers) enhances 
                                                        
4 Cf. also Cainelli et al. (2012) regarding the effect of financial linkages in inter-firm networks on their resilience 
to external shocks 
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or impedes their capacity to contribute to the local and regional development of the regions 
in which they operate and to be resilient in times of crises. 
2.2.2 Specificities	in	a	Post-Socialist	Context	
GPN research has very early on been concerned with the specificities of post-socialist regions 
and in particular their path-dependency (Coe et al. 2004). This section has a closer look at 
these specificities, first by discussing the double embeddedness of firms in both territories and 
production networks, then focusing on what this means for post-socialist regions. 
Double	Embeddedness	of	Firms	in	Territories	and	Production	Networks	
By definition, production networks do not exist in abstract space but are embedded in various 
specific territories: both the lead firms’ home territories and the other territories into which 
the production networks expand (Lane 2008). Consequently, the question of how the 
production networks interact with the types of capitalism that are prevalent in these 
territories is an important research question (Lane 2008). Research explicitly based on the 
combined consideration of production networks and varieties of capitalism has already been 
undertaken by some scholars (see e.g. Herrigel and Wittke 2005; Lane 2008; and Lane and 
Probert 2009) on the sectors of car manufacturing, clothing and pharmaceuticals with lead 
firms from the US, the UK and Germany. Among the findings of these works is the 
understanding that the interaction between production networks and capitalist variegation is 
a factor of change for both the production networks and the capitalist variegation, i.e. that a 
mutual impact can be evidenced at several levels and both ways. However, the form and type 
of this mutual impact differs between specific geographical contexts and between industrial 
sectors (Lane 2008). 
On the one side, existing capitalist variegation between territories can both encourage or 
discourage the constitution of production networks and shape the way these networks 
operate. Indeed, one of the reasons for the constitution of production networks involving 
territories with differing types of capitalisms is that firms seek to escape institutional 
constraints in their home countries and/or to benefit from more favourable institutional 
frameworks in the host countries (Lane 2008). Capitalist variegation can therefore be a factor 
encouraging the constitution of production networks between certain territories. 
Furthermore, the functioning of production networks can be shaped by capitalist variegation 
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in both the home countries and the host countries of the lead firm. On the one hand, the 
geographical origin of the lead firm may shape the way the production network is organised 
and the way governance is exercised therein (Lane 2008). Firms from different types of 
political economies can differ substantially due to the institutional context in these respective 
political economies, including but not limited to the financial systems and regulatory context 
which ‘shape[…] access to finance and impact[…] ownership and investment, patterns of 
growth and corporate governance systems’ (Lane 2008: 252): bank-centred systems of the 
German type favouring medium-sized, owner-managed firms (i.e. the ‘Mittelstand’) on the 
one hand, and stock market-centred systems of the US type characterised inter alia by very 
large listed firms (Lane 2008). As a result, pressures from shareholders in these listed firms 
can lead these to organise their production networks differently than a privately owned CME-
centred lead firm, or to reorganise their production networks in circumstances where a CME-
centred lead firm would not reorganise its production network (Lane 2008). In terms of 
governance, such differences can be reflected in a different assessment of priorities between 
quality considerations and cost concerns, for example (Lane 2008). As Lane (2008) recalls, the 
VoC literature assumes that firms headquartered in CMEs behave differently beyond their 
national borders than do firms headquartered in LMEs. This is however not necessarily the 
case: as Herrigel and Wittke (2005) conclude their analysis of the networks of German and US 
car producers, firms with different origins sometimes adopt similar types of network 
governance due to the particularities of their sector (cf. also Milkman and Macduffie 1993; 
Lane 2008). Lane (2008) shows that the impact of the lead firm’s home institutions is 
particularly large when it retains a strong orientation towards the domestic sales market and 
maintains strong domestic networks, as well as when the suppliers in the host countries 
remain inter-changeable due to their inability to develop high expertise and global standards. 
At the same time, capitalist variegation in the host countries may (or may not) encourage lead 
firms to adopt alternatives modes of co-ordination and, more generally, shape the 
organisation and activity of these firms (Lane 2008). Such capitalist variegation needs to be 
considered at all relevant levels, comprising not only the regional level, but also the national 
and supra-national levels (MacKinnon 2012). As a result, it is important to analyse the 
institutional context of the political economies in which the lead firms are based as well as of 
the political economies into which they extend their production networks (Lane 2008). 
Furthermore, Lane (2008: 235) recalls that ‘there exists diversity within a given model of 
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capitalism in the way sectors and firms respond to global constraints and opportunities’, i.e. 
that the specificities of each sector are also relevant for the way production networks are 
shaped by any given type of capitalist variegation in the lead firm’s home and host countries. 
The type and scope of this impact depends on the industrial sector considered: as Lane (2008: 
254) recalls, ‘[c]hange is neither wholly path-dependent, nor are global influences invariably 
disruptive of national institutional complementarities’. The behaviour of firms in different 
sectors differs and depends both on the institutional contexts in the lead firms’ home and host 
countries and on the specificities of the concerned sector (Lane 2008). 
However, the influence between production networks and variegations of capitalism also 
works the other way: existing production networks shape and change variegations of 
capitalism both in the home countries and in the host countries of lead firms. Through its 
trans-territorial production network, a lead firm can create pressures on the institutions of its 
home country (Lane 2008), e.g. by threatening to close and relocate domestic production 
sites. Inversely, lead firms from different political economies may (or may not) shape the 
evolution of capitalist variegation in the production networks’ host countries (Lane 2008). As 
Dawley (2011) argues, trans-national lead firms exercise both structural and political power 
to see regulatory environments at regional and national levels evolve in line with their needs. 
As a result, the comparative advantage of a given variety of capitalism both in the home 
countries and in the host countries of a production network’s lead firm can be consolidated 
or impaired by the constitution and specific organisation of production networks (Lane 2008). 
Capitalist variegation can be considered as a “product of the interaction between regional 
assets and [production networks], mediated by institutional frameworks at the regional, 
national and supra-national scale” (MacKinnon 2012: 233). This ongoing process of regional 
variegation comprises both the creation of new paths (with innovation and new knowledge 
generation) and the destruction of old paths (with corporate abandonment and the closure of 
firm plants) (MacKinnon 2012).  
Consequently, a ‘multi-level analysis’ (Lane 2008: 255) is necessary to apprehend the influence 
of global, national, regional and sectorial capitalist variegation on the organisation, 
governance and functioning of production networks and, inversely, the impact of production 
networks on capitalist variegation at these multiple levels. Linking to this ‘multi-level analysis 
proposed by Lane, this study proposes a ‘multi-agent/actor analysis’ that takes into account 
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not only the various types of firms that are part of the global production networks, but also 
their non-firm capital providers, in particular individual shareholders, banks and investors 
acting through the capital markets. The analysis proposed by this study thereby broadens the 
scope of a classical GPN analysis by taking into account the capital providers to the firms. 
Specificities	of	Production	Networks	in	Post-Socialist	Variegations	of	Capitalism	
Bair (2005) sees potential for fruitful ‘geographical context and historical path-sensitive’ GVC 
research in the post-socialist economies of Eastern and Central Europe because of their 
specific institutional context (with 40 years of central planning) and its more recent 
transformations that shaped and reshaped new organisational forms (Czaban and Henderson 
1998). As Smith et al. (2014) recall, the political economy within which global production 
networks (and strategies such as industrial upgrading) are embedded need to be considered 
if their constituent factors and implications are to be understood. The historical, political, 
economic and social context of post-socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. 
their variegations of capitalism, has a relevance for the way firms in this region accede to and 
function within global production networks. While the GCC and GVC frameworks do not offer 
tools to apprehend and understand this aspect, the GPN framework does – it was even 
originally developed in response of the critique of GCC and GVC research’s insufficiency in this 
respect, with the aim to provide tools to analyse local context and, even more specifically, the 
context of post-socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe for the nature and effects 
of global production networks (Czaban and Henderson 1998; Henderson et al. 2002). For 
Czaban and Henderson (1998: 585), “institutional legacies of the state socialist past and 
inherited macro- and micro-economic structures influence the integration of the region’s 
companies into global production networks”. They emphasize that firms in post-socialist 
economies in Central Europe, as already industrialised economies that remained relatively 
isolated from the rest of the world economy for a comparatively long time, have “very 
different historical backgrounds and modes of incorporation into the world economy” (Czaban 
and Henderson 1998: 585) as compared to companies in developing countries of Asia, Africa 
and South America developing ties with trans-national corporations (which is what GCC and 
GVC research focuses on). At the same time, Czaban and Henderson (1998) also emphasize 
the importance of such global production networks for understanding the way post-socialist 
economies in Central Europe have been transforming since the fall of the Iron Curtain. 
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Empirical studies that already used the GPN and GCC/GVC frameworks to assess regional 
development prospects in post-socialist contexts include Pavlínek and Ženka (2011), analysing 
the industrial upgrading of car component manufacturers in the Czech Republic in the light of 
their domestic or foreign ownership for example. More particularly, the specific ways in which 
global production networks in the automobile sector have developed (with a more or less 
strong local embeddedness) in Eastern and Central Europe through foreign direct investment 
into a formerly largely state-owned industry since the early 1990s, as well as the implications 
thereof on local development prospects, industrial upgrading and labour relations has 
received significant academic attention, although earlier works do not use the term global 
production networks (Sadler et al. 1993; Sadler and Swain 1994; Swain 1998). Among the 
factors to be considered when looking at global production networks in post-socialist 
contexts, Czaban and Henderson (1998) see the historical construction of those global 
production networks, the types of firm ownership and the specific social and institutional 
contexts. The particular social and institutional context in post-socialist economies of Central 
Europe must be considered to understand “national and local differences in labour-market 
organisation, working conditions [and to assess] the developmental impact of the ways 
international production, distribution and marketing are organised” (Czaban and Henderson 
1998: 589). For Czaban and Henderson (1998: 604-5), the “parameters for foreign involvement 
[are] derived from the characteristics of domestic markets and institutional arrangements and 
how these develop over time”. The crucial role of the state in the constitution of global 
production networks has been highlighted for example by Smith (2015: 291), recalling that 
various levels of the state intervene, through “policies for national economic competitiveness, 
industrial policy, trade policy, labour regulation” etc. in particular to attract foreign capital into 
their territorial remit. The strong presence of foreign-owned firms in Hungary, as seen in the 
empirical section of this study, is thus to a large extent the result of the actions of the 
Hungarian state to create the conditions fostering foreign investment. It is indeed the state 
who “provides the conditions of existence for capital” (Smith 2015: 297) by enabling and 
guaranteeing private property rights and contracts through legislation and who fosters it 
through national fiscal and industrial policies. Smith (2015) further recalls that these actions 
take place at various levels of the state (sometimes with different or even contradictory 
strategies), creating the conditions for regional variegations of capitalism as discussed earlier. 
  Literature Review 
 
 
 
48 
Regarding the relevance of firm ownership for understanding economic and social 
development (a classical theme in political economy of development), Czaban and Henderson 
(1998: 589) consider this to be another explanatory component in post-socialist contexts, 
“determining in important ways such things as the labour market behaviour of firms”. The 
various possible forms of firm ownership include ownership by the state or by private bodies, 
by domestic or by foreign actors, in the form of concentrated private or fragmented publicly 
listed shares. The type of firm ownerships (and the resulting degree of management control 
by the owners) determines many aspects of corporate behaviour including, among others, the 
labour market behaviour, banking relationships and customer relationships (Czaban and 
Henderson 1998). As the empirical section of this study will show, the type of ownership of a 
firm also strongly determines the way it sources capital, in particular when it is owned by 
another foreign firm. 
Depending on by whom firms were owned before and after the collapse of state socialism, 
corporate structures, technologies, processes and products in place under state socialism 
persisted to a more or less large extent in the years after its collapse (Czaban and Henderson 
1998). Many firms which were state-owned under state socialism (such as, for example, the 
car manufacturing industries in Poland and Czechoslovakia) were privatised, i.e. sold to foreign 
investors after the regime change. Privatisation sometimes started as a joint venture between 
the foreign investor and the domestic manufacturer, but eventually led to further acquisitions 
and full managerial control (Czaban and Henderson 1998). The social and institutional context 
and the historical construction of production networks is relevant because “the social 
relations embodied in the networks may have imposed a ‘path dependency’ upon them”, and 
the “institutional contexts and social arrangements of the state socialist period [including pre-
existing national and international inter-firm relations established during the state socialist 
period] linger on, and circumscribe in important ways the potential for economic and political 
development”. Even though this may be true less today than in 1998, and even though foreign 
capital has been a significant actor in the transformation process (Czaban and Henderson 
1998) the specific paths firms therefore had before and after the collapse of state socialism 
have shaped the networks in ways that are still visible today. 
The effects of these structural legacies were perceptible both in the short term and in the long 
term (Czaban and Henderson 1998). During the state socialist period, most of the foreign trade 
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done by firms in Central Europe was done with firms in other countries of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), with only limited contacts between those firms and 
most of the crucial issues (quantity of goods traded, their timing, their pricing and the after-
sales service) being determined in inter-government negotiations (Czaban and Henderson 
1998). Trade with non CMEA partners (in particular with OECD countries) did grow from the 
1970s onwards and reached sometimes significant proportions by the 1980s (with e.g. up to 
40% of trade for Hungary) but here again, the individual firms had only very limited contact 
with their foreign partner firms as these contacts were managed by specialised foreign trade 
companies (Czaban and Henderson 1998). As a result, when the CMEA disappeared in 1991 
and the specialised foreign trade agencies ceased to intermediate contacts with OECD firms, 
firms in Central Europe suddenly had to manage trade contacts by themselves without having 
previously acquired the skills and resources to do so and, as a result, found themselves in 
situations of subordination and dependency vis-à-vis their OECD trade partners (Czaban and 
Henderson 1998). Furthermore, both the system of state subsidy of certain export prices and 
the relatively monopolistic positions of certain Central European exporters within their home 
markets (enabling also these exporters to cross-subsidise their export prices), which had until 
then enabled these firms to compete on international markets through lower prices, also 
disappeared around 1990 (Czaban and Henderson 1998). As a result, the export-based 
business of many of these firms became unsustainable following the regime change (Czaban 
and Henderson 1998). More important for the purpose of this study, however, are the long 
term effects of the structural legacies in post socialist economies of Central Europe. 
Companies under state socialism were often strongly vertically integrated, with a strong 
backward integration into component manufacturing, in a way representing state-socialist 
versions of classical Fordist business structures (Czaban and Henderson 1998). Trade was 
strongly controlled by the governments, creating secure markets which ensured adequate 
returns, but, at the same time, reduced the necessity of regular product innovation (Czaban 
and Henderson 1998). After the end of state socialism, these corporate structures became 
unsustainable, but at the same time, the costs of abandoning them (both from a political, 
economic and social point of view), were extremely high (Czaban and Henderson 1998). As a 
result, the corporate structures were adjusted relatively slowly, more slowly than could 
originally have been expected (Czaban and Henderson 1998). The uncertainties regarding 
domestic markets and ownership as well as the institutional deficiencies in Central Europe 
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following the collapse of state socialism initially encouraged foreign investors to acquire 
equity stakes rather than develop less committed (and therefore less controlled) forms of 
corporate relations (Czaban and Henderson 1998). As the new macro-economic and political 
environment then began to stabilise in these countries, foreign investors often kept the type 
of control over their subsidiaries which they had implemented initially (Czaban and Henderson 
1998). Among the reasons for this, Czaban and Henderson (1998: 603) see “propitious 
institutional arrangements (regarding labour legislation, regulatory frameworks, forms of 
corporate governance [and] positive legacies of state-socialism)”. 
Based on the above, it appears that to analyse the financial dimension, and more particularly 
the sources of capital, of firms operating in post-socialist regions as part of global production 
networks, such as car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany, it is 
necessary to consider both their territorial embeddedness in specific post-socialist 
variegations of capitalism and their network embeddedness in global production networks, 
with different types of relationships with other firms within these networks (including 
relationships of ownership) as well as with non-firm actors such as other types of capital 
providers (individual shareholders, banks and capital markets in particular). 
2.2.3 Enter	Finance	
Despite the obvious relevance of finance for understanding processes and power relations 
underpinning global production networks, finance remained for a long time a neglected ‘blind 
spot’ in GCC/GVC and GPN research - as recognised by GPN research itself (Coe et al. 2014). 
More particularly, an aspect not considered in classical GCC/GVC research is the role different 
capital sources play in enabling or inhibiting industrial upgrading for firms integrated in global 
commodity chains or global value chains. Pollard (2003) also recalls how economic geography 
too often starts when and where firms, sectors, global production networks etc. already have 
their capital in place. 
Finance:	a	Recognised	Gap	in	GPN	Research	
Earlier literature did not consider the financial dimension as central to the GPN framework. 
For Coe et al. (2004: 472), “global production networks may not directly encapsulate financial 
capital in their networks configuration”, even though they recognised that financial capital 
institutions are non-local actors that have a significant impact on regional development and 
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differentiated three types of financial actors with different degrees of territorial 
embeddedness: local venture capital, national banking institutions and globally decentralised 
financial networks (i.e. the capital markets). Coe et al. (2004) consider that venture capital is 
important for regional development as a source of financing for high risk ventures, cutting 
edge technological development and industries that supply global production networks. The 
national banking institutions, they argue, play a role through their relationship with the 
industries (in particular in Germany and Japan) and therefore have a direct influence on 
regional development. The development of other regions depends on their articulation into 
globally decentralised financial networks mediated through global financial centres like New 
York and London. In short, Coe et al. (2004: 473) consider the “availability of investment and 
equity funds [as] critical to growth and development” of a region and that the “uneven access 
to local and non-local forms of financial capital can both enhance the strategic importance of 
some regional economies to global production networks and diminish others”. A question not 
initially raised by Coe et al. (2004) however, and which this study explores, is which type of 
capital firms in a given region actually use, as well as the reasons thereof and their potential 
effects on firm governance and local and regional development. 
Early exceptions crediting the importance of finance in global production networks included 
Gibbon (2002); Palpacuer (2008); Milberg and Winkler (2010); Baud and Durand (2012), and 
the gap was increasingly being recognised as ‘a persistent and certainly valid critique’ of 
research on production networks over the years (Coe 2012: 392; Coe et al. 2013). The question 
of how activities of GPN firms are financed and the intersection of finance with geographies 
of production was increasingly understood as an “important nexus for understanding 
economic processes [including the formation and evolution of GPNs] and developmental 
outcomes” (Aoyama et al. 2011; Taylor 2012; Coe et al. 2013: 2; Hall 2013), the development 
of which would “enrich [GPN research] conceptually, and enable it methodologically and 
empirically” (Coe et al. 2013). According to Coe (2012: 392), the ‘challenge remains [however] 
to drill down into the impacts of financialisation at the sectoral and corporate level on GPN 
structures and dynamics’. The relevance of finance was recognised to an even more extensive 
degree more recently, cf. e.g. Cichon (2015), analysing global value chains as “embedded not 
just in a productive global economy but also a financial global economy” (Cichon 2015). 
According to Evans and Habbard (2008), cited by (Cichon 2015), financialisation has led to a 
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change in the ownership structure of many companies. The car component industry in 
Hungary is a prime example of this as the empirical part of this study will show, with a large 
number of firms owned by foreign car component manufacturers. One of the rare but very 
relevant attempts made to delve even deeper into questions of finance in global production 
networks is Baumeister and Zademach (2017)’s study of actual and potential forms of 
enhancing finance through inter-firm collaboration in the automotive industry in Germany and 
Brazil. Citing the example of (primarily West) German car component manufacturers, 
Scheuplein (2012) evidences how the strategies of financial investors such as private equity 
acquiring ownership stakes in firms that are part of global production networks can clash with 
(and ultimately fail due to) the opposing strategies of these networks’ lead firms, German 
OEMs in the case of German car component manufacturers. Attention has increasingly shifted 
towards further integration of finance into global production networks in recent times. More 
work is likely to emerge in this area over the coming years and this study contributes by 
‘exploring, rather than assuming the financial anatomy of a territorialised production system’ 
(Pollard 2007; Lee et al. 2009: 736; Zademach 2009) by looking at the degree, mode, reasons 
as well as local and regional development effects of connections between capital markets and 
the firms that form a global production network. This approach aims to link with the proposal 
of Coe et al. (2014) to integrate finance into global production networks by looking at ‘global 
financial networks’ and their interconnection with global production networks.  
Conceptualising	capital	provision	for	firms	in	global	production	networks	
When aiming to understand the financial anatomy of a territorialised production system, the 
sources of the capital used by firm represent a key dimension: which types of capital do firms 
use and who are the actors that provide it? As set out in Section 2.1 this depends to a large 
extent on the specificities of the variegation of capital at hand. However, when the firms are 
not only integrated territorially in these variegated capitalisms but also in global production 
networks, as is the case for car component manufactures, another dimension comes into play: 
the network integration of these firms in these global production networks, and their 
relationships with other GPN firms. This relationship may include a financial dimension such 
as when one firm is owned by the other (and receives some of its capital in the form of equity 
from that other firm) or when one is a supplier to the other (and provides capital in the form 
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of supplier credit when the good is delivered some time before its price is paid). Further 
questions of relevance in this context include  
• which firms within global production networks have direct equity or debt connections 
with capital markets (most probably lead firm and tier-one firms, but maybe also tier-
two firms) 
• whether and how the integration into a global production network increases the 
likelihood of smaller (tier-two and tier-three) firms of having direct connections with 
the capital markets 
• whether a lead firm’s connections with capital market changes the way it deals with 
smaller firms in the global production network (affecting ‘value chain governance’ in 
GVC terms) 
• how financialisation might have an impact on the constitution and evolution of the 
global production network itself (Coe et al. 2013) 
The effect of a firm’s double territorial and network integration on its sourcing of capital may 
also have an impact on various dimensions of strategic coupling as proposed by MacKinnon 
(2012), recoupling and decoupling processes as well as firms’ prospects for industrial 
upgrading. This echoes the call of MacKinnon (2012: 242) that “future research should focus 
on the type, degree and depth of coupling processes, the underlying power relations between 
regional institutions and [lead firms] and the dynamics of recoupling and decoupling through 
repeat investment”. A further aspect of relevance is the role of specific types of actors and 
structures such as capital market actors including the ‘transition industry’ (Swain 2006), 
‘advanced business services’ and ‘global financial networks’ (Wójcik 2013b) play in the 
geographical diffusion of financing practices and their introduction in the various types of 
firms that are part of global production networks. 
2.3 Firm	Finance	and	its	Geographies	
This third section discusses the geographies of firm finance with an analytical focus on the firm 
rather than on a territory (as in Section 2.1) or network (as in Section 2.2). More precisely, it 
focuses on the firm as an entity integrated in both territories and networks, the financing of 
which therefore needs to be analysed from a geographical perspective allowing to account for 
the spatialities of relationships of capital provision and for the different types of 
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embeddedness. It is organised in two parts: the first part (2.3.1) assesses how firm finance has 
been conceptualised in economic geography so far, focusing on what is spatial about firm 
finance and how firm finance is mediated through space. The second part (2.3.2) looks more 
specifically at sources of capital from a geographical perspective, highlighting the unequal 
relationships of power between providers and users of capital, how both parties are 
embedded in their respective territorial and network contexts and what impact this has on 
the governance of the firms. It concludes by formulating the research questions of this study. 
2.3.1 Geography’s	Interest	in	Firm	Finance		
Although firm finance is traditionally conceptualised primarily in economics and business 
administration, it has been extensively theorised in economic geography to date, evidencing 
how it unfolds differently across space and how it is mediated through space. One of the 
points of attention has been the uneven availability of certain types of capital to certain types 
of firms (e.g. small firms, or peripherally located firms). Other (perhaps more recent) points of 
focus have been the uneven implications of certain types of capital on the firm’s operations 
as well as the process conceptualised as ‘financialisation’ in particular of large international 
firms: space and place are not neutral to the ways in which capital is used by firms. 
A	Geographical	Perspective	on	Firm	Finance	
While local and regional development has been a longstanding and consistent concern of 
research in economic geography, finance for long remained a more sporadic and intermittent 
object of interest (often around financial crises) but a significant literature developed in 
particular since the 1990s (Leyshon 1995; 1997; 1998). As recalled by Pollard (2003), much of 
the earlier work on geographies of finance focused on the role of finance in producing uneven 
development (Harvey 1973; 1982), on particular financial institutions and services (Martin and 
Minns 1995; Clark 2000), on global financial institutions (Clark 2005), on the nature and 
dynamics of specific financial centres (Sassen 1991; Thrift and Leyshon 1994; McDowell 1997; 
Clark 2002; Engelen 2007) or on international processes (Clark 2005). It also focused on the 
(centralised or decentralised, domestic or foreign dominated) structures and transformations 
of national or regional financial and banking sectors (Dow 1992; Porteous 1995; Blažek 1997; 
Dow and Rodríguez-Fuentes 1997; Klagge and Martin 2005). Attention to the regional impacts 
of financial processes was rare but not totally absent (McKillop and Hutchinson 1990; Dow 
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1992; Martin and Minns 1995; Crevoisier 1997; Martin et al. 2005), and so was research 
focusing on post-socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe (Csank 2003; Weill 2003; 
Gál 2005).  
More recently, interest of economic geographers in finance increased significantly, spurred in 
particular by the financial crisis that started in 2007 (Engelen and Faulconbridge 2009; Lee et 
al. 2009; Pike and Pollard 2010; Marshall et al. 2011; Wójcik 2012; Christophers 2013b; Hall 
2013; Marshall 2013; Pollard 2013; Soederberg 2013; Wójcik 2013a) and leading to the 
development of ‘financial geography’ as a new sub-discipline of economic geography (cf. e.g. 
Sokol 2013 for a detailed list of references). Research on financial geographies in post-socialist 
Central and Eastern Europe remained limited but some important work was done in this 
respect (Gorzelak and Goh 2010; Smith and Swain 2010; Sellar 2012; Blažek and Bečicová 
2016). Like previous research, much of this research still focuses on processes and phenomena 
at the international level, such as global financial institutions (Clark and Monk 2013), global or 
regional financial centers (Karreman 2009; Jarvis 2011; Engelen and Glasmacher 2013; 
Zademach and Musil 2014; Gordon 2016) national banking sectors (Blažek and Bečicová 2016) 
and the integration of cities into global financial flows (Zademach and Musil 2014) as well as 
analysis with a focus on regions (Alessandrini et al. 2009; Appleyard 2011). Other recent 
contributions analyse the interdependent relationship between historical trends in the 
internationalisation of banks and the evolving representation of banks’ activities along and 
across conceptual borders of productivity (Christophers 2011; 2013a), on the banking sectors 
of specific countries (Blažek and Bečicová 2016) on Islamic Finance (Pollard and Samers 2013) 
or on the day-to-day experience of individuals ranging from the economically vulnerable 
(Coppock 2013) to the super-rich (Beaverstock et al. 2011). The spatial nature of finance was 
also recognised by the field of social studies of finance, cf. e.g. Corpataux and Crevoisier (2016) 
who provide a critique focusing on the lacking focus on the interconnection between the 
financial sphere and the ‘real’ economy and the ‘embryonic or even metaphorical’ conception 
of space within social studies of finance. They further recall that “finance is fundamentally a 
spatial industry, which creates and organises hyper-mobility of capital in space”, “changing 
the spatial allocation of capital” and “transforming the geography of productive activities and 
spatial hierarchies” (Corpataux and Crevoisier 2011). 
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Despite this now longstanding and recently significantly increased interest of economic 
geographers for financial phenomena and the rich body of research available to date, there is 
strong consensus among economic geographers that the understanding of the geographical 
nature of finance remains insufficient and that more research is needed to shed more light on 
this area, including the financing of firms (Pike and Pollard 2010; Sokol 2013). In particular, 
studies focusing on how financial practices and mechanisms unfold at the level of particular 
firms remained relatively limited to date (Bečicová and Blažek 2015). According to Pollard 
(2003: 446), “an important challenge [is] to understand firms in their appropriate regional, 
institutional and sectoral context [and] find the categories and languages necessary to connect 
micro-economic analyses of firm finance with broader conceptions of the social and political 
construction of financial networks that shape firms’ access to finance and their subsequent 
governance”. Clark and Wójcik (2007: 15) recall that the firm not only has a history but also a 
geography, “apparent in terms of the location of its owners, its productive assets, its markets, 
and its competitive spheres of influence” and that  the connection with institutional investors 
from other regions through the capital markets exposes the firm to a “set of expectations [of 
these investors] as regards their status and the proper form of corporate governance [which 
may be] at odds with history and geography [of the firm]” (Clark and Wójcik 2007: 17). 
How well conceptualized and theorized is firm finance in economic geography? Is the 
definition precise and operational or is it vague and ‘ill-theorised’ and therefore contested and 
multi-dimensional? Just like the term ‘financialisation’ (Lapavitsas 2011), the term ‘firm 
finance’ is contested and has multiple meanings. According to Marx, “capital is not a thing but 
a social relation” (Bryan et al. 2009: 464) which recalls that understanding finance requires, 
among others, an understanding of the relationship between actors that provide capital (i.e. 
the capital providers) and those that use it (i.e. the firm), combining a relational perspective 
with a territorial perspective (Pike 2007). Empirical studies that extend a relational approach 
to finance by a topological approach, focusing even stronger on the geographical element (and 
using an ethnographic approach to explore topographies of debt at the level of individuals and 
families), include Harker (2016) as well as work on financial ecologies (Leyshon et al. 2004; 
French et al. 2011; Lai 2016). Corpataux and Crevoisier (2016) liken the relationship between 
a business and those who own capital to a social relationship and note that in the case of 
financial markets and portfolio-style management such relationship is extremely narrow, 
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focusing only on financial return and risk. By contrast, Corpataux and Crevoisier (2016) note 
that the social connection between firms and capital owners outside financial markets 
involves further issues “dealing with the (often unwanted) environmental and social effects of 
a company’s policy, the more or less willing political involvement in local or national society 
etc.”.  
Firm	Finance	across	Space	
Previous research suggests that the way in which capital is allocated to firms (whether it be in 
the form of equity or debt) is not neutral to space and place. Significant attention has, for 
example, been given to the question whether there is a ‘credit gap’, i.e. whether access to 
credit is more difficult for firms located in peripheral regions in particular when a country’s 
financial system is centralised (Dow 1992). Lee and Brown (2016) analyse potential variations 
in the demand and supply of bank finance for innovative SMEs in UK peripheral regions. Klagge 
and Martin (2005), for example, ask whether the flows of capital to firms across regions is 
impacted by the (more or less centralised) spatial organisation of the financial system in the 
relevant regions and find that it does to a certain extent.  
Much work of economic geographers in relation to firm finance has concentrated on the 
concept of ‘financialisation’. According to French et al. (2011: 800), even though 
financialisation is a “profoundly spatial phenomenon”, research in this field has been 
“insufficiently attentive to space and place”, both in terms of processes and effects, and to 
the “geographies of money and finance”. As French et al. (2011: 805) put it, the role of space 
and place within monetary and financial processes is a “glaring lacuna at the heart of the 
financialisation project”. Lee et al. (2009: 735) consider the exploration of “the economic 
geographies of financialisation [as] a crucial task” with focus on the “geographically specific 
contexts [that] mediate processes of financialisation”. Financialisation is seen as a profoundly 
geographical phenomenon (Hall and Leyshon 2013) comprising a historical dimension 
(Christophers 2014) and is a form of what Swain (2006: 208) calls the “geographical transfer 
of abstract economic knowledge” (including concepts, models and representations) having a 
“formative impact on economic practices”, and which is mediated through local agency in the 
‘receiving’ regions. It is both a local and extra-local process which is “articulat[ed] with 
indigenous economic and political processes” and which “cannot be simply grafted in toto 
onto existing economic and political processes [which are beyond their control], but inevitably 
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combines and recombines with them” (Swain 2006: 210 - in respect of neoliberalisation, but 
the same description could be used for financialisation). Despite the substantial existing 
literature on financialisation, this geographically and historically differentiated dimension of 
the phenomenon, the geographically differentiated nature of small firm finance (Pollard 2003) 
and the “highly interconnected entanglement of geographies and finance” (Pani and Holman 
2013: [19]) with the “dynamic and intricate geographies of […] actors, ideas and practices [of 
financialisation]” (Pollard et al. 2014: 321) remains comparatively less explored to date and is 
increasingly being called to further attention (Lee et al. 2009; Pike and Pollard 2010; French et 
al. 2011; Sokol 2013). Research on financialisation so far has focused on processes and effects 
of financialisation on three spatial scales: the nation state, the firm and the 
household/individual. According to French et al. (2011: 805), research has so far been 
insufficiently attentive (i) to other spaces such as the region and the international financial 
system and (ii) to geographical registers other than scale, such as networks for example. 
French et al. (2011: 809) recommend “taking the international financial system and other 
missing geographies of financialisation seriously”, and to “move beyond a scalar geographical 
imaginary towards a network approach to money and finance” (emphasis added). This 
highlights a further gap in existing research which this study aims to address, the question 
being whether the study can evidence the presence of forms of capital (such as capital raised 
directly from the capital markets) that would suggest a strong ‘financialisation’ of firm in these 
regions. 
Research on the intersection between the financial sphere and industrial capital and their 
implications on local and regional development has also remained limited to date (Pike 2006). 
Notable exceptions include analyses of how financialisation can lead, for example, to the 
relocation/disembedding of corporate activities in the United States (Muellerleile 2009) or to 
the closure of corporate activities in North-East England (Pike 2006).5 The financial dimension 
of production networks (cf. Section 2.2.3), can be considered as a spatially sensitive narrative 
of finance, one aspect of how finance unfolds across space.  
Much of the literature highlights that different categories of firms do not have the same access 
to capital, and that new, small and peripheral firms in particular struggle more to access 
                                                        
5 For related pre-financialisation work on this cf. e.g. Leyshon (1996); or Martin (1999) 
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capital, whether it be in the form of equity provided by stock markets or venture capital firms 
(Klagge and Martin 2005; Martin et al. 2005) or debt provided by banks (Dow 1992; Dow and 
Rodríguez-Fuentes 1997; Pollard 2003; Alessandrini et al. 2009; Appleyard 2013; Lee and 
Brown 2016), being understood that other authors question this conclusion and remain more 
open about the adverse effects of peripheral locations on capital provision (McKillop and 
Hutchinson 1990; Smallbone et al. 1999; Patterson and Anderson 2003; Bečicová and Blažek 
2015). Lee and Brown (2016) provide further references to empirical work analyzing (with 
conclusions in one sense or the other) the question of credit gaps for firms in peripheral 
regions and the potential reasons therefor. Corpataux and Crevoisier (2016: 618) provide an 
interesting overview of work concerned with the difficulty for SMEs to access capital (Dow and 
Rodríguez-Fuentes 1997; Dow 1999; Pollard 2003; Klagge and Martin 2005; Torrès 2011) and 
unable to grow without losing their independence (Crevoisier 1997; Corpataux and Crevoisier 
2005), contrasting this with “multi-institutional, multi-national and multi-local groups whose 
parent companies are well connected to the financial milieus and who know how to use 
financial resources to develop their activities and external growth”. SMEs face longstanding 
problems of access to finance, as evidenced by several studies done on the situation in the UK 
(Cowling et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2015; van Der Schans 2015; Henry et al. Forthcoming). 
Spatial	Mediation	of	Finance	
As mentioned earlier, finance not only unfolds across space and effects different territories 
differently: it is also promoted, mediated and contested unevenly through this space. 
According to Pike (2006: 206), “geographies of financialisation and shareholder value […] 
unfold in uneven ways across the range of interdependent, socially constructed and contested 
scales”. This corresponds to the ‘uneven geographies of financialisation’, i.e. the role of space 
and place within processes of financialisation and the importance of financialisation for 
understanding uneven geographic development (Pike and Pollard 2010; Dixon 2011; French 
et al. 2011). Although there already has been growing academic attention on related 
questions (e.g. Pollard 2003; Martin et al. 2005), subjects to be further explored include, for 
example, the link between shareholder value orientation and the disembedding of regional 
social relations of ownership and control (Pike 2006), the geographical embeddedness of 
subjectivities that implement or resist financialisation, and the role of the international 
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financial system (including global financial markets and circuits of securitisation) in local 
contexts of financialisation (French et al. 2011).  
French et al. (2011) recommend three directions for further research on financialisation: first, 
a greater engagement with the wider political-economy literature on money, finance and 
neoliberalisation (which focused on financialisation long before the neologism was coined). 
Second, the recognition of the relational nature of financial and economic change and the 
growing integration of the international and domestic financial systems. Third, an increased 
attention to the “spatial causes and consequences of the circularity or flow of funds”: the 
“inescapable geographic construction, context and rootedness of financial networks and 
practices” (Pike and Pollard 2010: 38). The analysis of capital sources and financing patterns 
in this study aims to contribute to this by exploring which relations between capital providers 
and firms exist in the sample of firms analysed, and how financial networks may be rooted in 
the regions analysed through the presence of capital in these firms. 
2.3.2 Firm	Finance	and	Sources	of	Capital	
Within the general topic of the geographical nature of firm finance, sources of capital are 
crucial as they represent the relationship between two actors (the capital provider and the 
firm) which are both embedded in specific contexts spatially and otherwise. According to 
Zingales (2000: 1625), Webster’s dictionary defines the verb “to finance” since 1866 as “to 
raise or provide funds or capital for”. Zingales (2000) further notes that the adjective 
“corporate” (or firm) helps distinguish corporate finance (i.e. the financing of firms as a unique 
combination of physical and human capital) from other forms of financing, such as real estate 
finance (which concerns the financing of real estate assets) and personal/consumer finance 
(which concerns the financing of an individual or household). Public finance could be added 
here as the financing of the state and other public entities. Even though they have always 
constituted a minority of firms even in the US (La Porta et al. 1999), publicly traded firms with 
a diversified investor base have traditionally been the focus of the study of corporate finance, 
simply because data is most easily available for these firms (Zingales 2000) – and the same is 
true for much of the research on firm finance done by economic geographers so far. The 
problem is that, as Zingales (2000) notes, these firms tend to have abundant internal financing 
and any external financing (especially with equity) is a rare event. Most of the theoretical and 
empirical effort has therefore been dedicated “where we expect finance to matter the least” 
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(Zingales 2000: 1628). According to Zingales (2000) most companies have only one or a small 
number of shareholders and do not have their equity publicly traded. Studies of firm finance 
have so far largely ignored (or understudied) the younger and smaller firms that do not have 
access to public markets (Zingales 2000) and economic geographers focusing on SME finance 
are among the rare exceptions. “The firm represented in academic research is large, publicly 
traded, owes its origins to twentieth century industries, and has a national identity even if it 
trades in markets around the world (Williamson 1985). But this is not the whole story” (Clark 
and Wójcik 2007: 11). Zingales (2000) therefore proposes a general theorization of the firm 
including the raising of capital from other sources. A theorisation of the firm is also proposed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) including the question of agency and ownership and Jensen 
(2000) as well as Jensen and Murphy (2006) with a focus on governance and organizational 
forms, Harris and Raviv (1991) with a survey of capital structure and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
with a survey on corporate governance. As Henderson and Alderson (2016) show in respect of 
legal advisory which is closely related to financial services, geographical proximity between 
service providers (whether they be lawyers or financial intermediaries) and clients (i.e. the 
firms) retains an important role even in a world that is seemingly increasingly globalized and 
in a seemingly global and a-geographical sector such as financial services. The same could be 
expected to likely apply to capital providers and is the objective of the empirical analysis of 
this study with respect of the sources from which small, medium-sized and large car 
component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany (very few of which, if any, are 
publicly traded firms with a diversified investor base) typically obtain their capital. 
“Capital is an essential resource for firms and it is a resource that is uneven and uncertain in 
its supply” (Pollard 2003: 436). Among the types of firms that can be studied with regards to 
finance from an economic geography and regional studies perspective, small and medium 
sized firms are particularly interesting because, on the one hand, they have comparatively 
more difficulties in accessing capital at reliable and affordable conditions than larger firms 
and, on the other hands, they play a key role in economic activity and local and regional 
development (Pollard 2003). It is therefore relevant to ask how and from where they access 
capital, how they use it and what effects their financial commitments and relationships have 
on their decision making, operating and development prospects (Pollard 2003).  
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Taxonomy	of	Capital	Sources	
It also needs to be considered that different types of capital are employed for different 
purposes: equity will often be used for strategic investments, long term debt for the 
acquisition of machinery, short term debt for working capital requirements. The productive 
process within a firm (including purchase of machinery, modernisation of equipment, funding 
of the time gap between acquisition of material and sale of the finalised product etc.) can be 
financed by different types of capital (notably equity, debt, subsidies or own funds) provided 
by different types of sources. These sources can be internal (retained earnings, working 
capital…) or external. Whether it is in the form of equity or debt, the external capital 
contributed to a firm’s production process can in principle be obtained either from 
“traditional” sources (bank debt, state subsidies, providers through invoice discounting etc.) 
or from the capital market directly (public equity, bonds etc.) or indirectly (with funds 
provided by financial institutions that refinance themselves on the capital market). 
“Traditional” sources have as a common point that they are not predominantly “market 
driven” in the sense that they often have stronger and longer-term relationships with the firm 
as opposed to market-sources. Capital market investors include insurances, pension funds and 
other institutional investors etc. Venture capital and private equity can probably be 
considered as an intermediary form of equity finance between non-capital market finance and 
capital market finance, because it constitutes a form of finance that shares characteristics of 
both areas. 
Firms need to source capital not only over the medium and long term to invest in fixed assets 
(such as new plants, equipment, technology and products) and R&D expenses, but also in the 
short time to finance working capital, purchase material and to bridge the gap created by 
extended payment terms granted to powerful clients exceeding those granted by less 
powerful suppliers (Baumeister and Zademach 2017). These unequal power relationships can 
be illustrated by the differing ‘C2C’ (cash-to-cash) cycles of lead firms and the various tiers of 
less powerful suppliers. At the most abstract theoretical level, the provision of capital to firms 
can be conceived of in contrasting terms by conventional (neoclassical) economic theory 
(based on the assumption of perfect, efficient capital markets) on the one side and 
Keynesian/post-Keynesian theory (based on the assumption of imperfect capital markets) on 
the other side (Klagge and Martin 2005). While the former postulates perfect markets with 
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perfectly informed and rationally behaving market participants, and therefore considers 
external capital as a perfect substitute for the internal funds of firms (Klagge and Martin 2005), 
the latter takes into account the imperfections of markets with ‘asymmetric information, 
agency, uncertainty and interdependence’ and therefore recognizes the space-relevance of 
capital provision and of the relationships between providers and users of capital (Klagge and 
Martin 2005). Firm finance as defined above implies unequal relationships of power between 
firms as capital users and other external actors as capital providers. According to Zingales 
(2000: 1630), critiquing the irrelevance of financing choices advanced by Miller and Modigliani 
(1958) under theoretical conditions, “the secret to finding reasons why capital structure does 
matter lies in a deeper understanding of the content of the firm ‘black box’ and how this 
content is affected by different choices of financing instruments”. The following graph shows 
how and through which channels the different sources of capital interact with the firm: 
 
Figure 7 Placing finance in the governance of a firm 
Source: Wood et al. (2016: 5), adapted by the author 
When firms invest in new premises, purchase new machines, maybe acquire another 
subsidiary, to expand or at least maintain the standard of modernity of their equipment, the 
capital they use to finance these investments needs to be available over a relatively long term 
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given that it will be bound in these investments for a certain number of years. The main 
sources of capital typically used for this purpose are (i) ‘industrial’ equity, i.e. equity provided 
either by the founding individual or family owners, or by other industrial firms operating in a 
related sector, (ii) long-term bank loans, (iii) subsidies and (iv) ‘financial’ capital raised through 
the capital markets or other financial actors such as private equity firms. Each category implies 
a specific type of unequal power relationship between firm and capital provider: for example, 
in the case of ‘industrial’ equity, there is purportedly an operational and managerial link 
between provider and user of the equity, while in the case of ‘financial’ equity the investment 
is seen as a financial asset by the equity provider (although this needs to be relativized in the 
case of private equity which will often be hands-on/activist). Another reason for the 
distinction is that one could potentially consider ‘industrial’ equity as being less ‘financialised’ 
than ‘financial’ equity. The distinction between these forms is not always self-evident or clear-
cut, such as when founding families hold significant portions of shares of a firm traded on the 
stock market (as is the case of the controlling share in VW and Porsche held by the Piëch and 
Porsche families, for example) or when industrial firms hold shares in other firms as part of 
their ‘financialisation strategy’ rather than as part of a strategy of production chain 
integration.  
The following ‘taxonomy of types of capital’ illustrates the various types of capital generally 
found in firm finance, each type coming with its own characteristics, constraints, 
opportunities, conditions, costs, risks etc.: 
 
Figure 8 Taxonomy of capital sources 
Source: author 
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Theoretically possible sources of capital include different types of equity such as equity paid 
in by an individual/family owner, by a foreign private equity or venture capital firm, by capital 
market investors (i.e. openly traded with potentially constantly changing ownership) or by a 
foreign car supplier owning the firm. The most classical form of capital is equity provided by a 
firm’s founders/owners, even though this in practice today tends to constitute only a 
comparatively small portion of the capital employed in a firm. 
Another key source of capital for firms is long-term debt provided by local or foreign banks 
and bonds issued on capital markets, and there has been research to date analyzing this 
dimension from a geographical perspective. Bečicová and Blažek (2015), for example, question 
the idea of a credit gap for firms located in peripheral regions (Dow 1992). The role banks and 
other financial institutions typically play in the provision of capital to firms in a region strongly 
depends on the structure and typology of the banking sector in that region and on the 
relationships of that sector with the region’s firms. Germany, for example is well known for 
the strong and long-term relationships between small and medium-sized firms owned by 
domestic individuals (the “Mittelstand”) and their “relationship banks” (“Hausbanken”), 
playing the role of a reliable source of finance for the investment needs of these firms (Handke 
2011). While the literature postulates that such a strong relationship between banks and firms 
exists to a far lesser extent in capital-market driven economies such as the US, only little is 
said about what the situation is in post-socialist economies such as Hungary or even in the 
formerly state socialist regions of Germany. One of the key differences between capital 
markets and banks as capital providers to firms is resumed by Aglietta and Breton (2001: 438) 
as being that in capital markets, firms are the object of a ‘public evaluation that brings 
together and co-ordinates the opinions of the largest pool of potential investors available’ 
while bank loans represent bilateral relations between the firm and the bank(s) that provide 
the credit. Oversimplifying a bit, these bank loan relations tend to be stronger and longer-
term related than the relationship between firms and investors on the capital markets. 
Aglietta and Breton (2001) recall that the long-term nature of relationships in bank credit (with 
renewed lending over the years between the same counterparties) can lead to mutual 
relationships of trust with the capitalization on past experience and a preference given to 
likelihood of continued credit over securing the lowest cost. Aglietta and Breton (2001: 441) 
further set out the main differences between capital markets and bank debt as well as the 
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main differences in the form of control exercised on the firms (and hence the impact on firm 
governance). Aglietta and Breton (2001: 450) note that “the interrelations between the 
decisions that the company makes and the financial agents that hold an interest in the firm 
can be seen in the use of profits generated and the financing of the accumulation process” 
although “even in market finance systems, internal finance and bank debt remain the 
predominant sources of financing […] and the stock market does not play a major role”. 
Concepts such as ‘supply chain financing’ fall into this category and have elicited the interest 
of economic geographers in certain contexts (Baumeister and Zademach 2017). Further capital 
sources also include various other forms of debt such as short term revolving lines from a local 
or foreign bank, intra-group loans from a shareholder company (e.g. if the firm is owned by 
another industrial firm), debt to suppliers (e.g. in case of delayed payment of invoices), loans 
from other GPN firms (e.g. an OEM that is the firm’s client, as part of a supply chain finance 
programme) and other forms of inter-firm finance (Baumeister and Zademach 2017), 
subsidies by the state or other public organisms. Subsidies tended to play an important role 
in Eastern Germany in the years following the reunification, but they tend to be less and less 
present in recent years. 
Retained earnings, that is the profits of previous years that have not been distributed as 
dividends but retained in the firm, constitute an often overlooked but in practice significant 
source of capital for many firms. The preference of firms for retained earnings according to 
pecking order theory, as shown below, as opposed in particular to external equity can be 
explained, among other factors with the loss of autonomy of entrepreneurial management 
and control that external capital (in particular equity, but also debt) involves, with a shift of 
power and control to external stakeholders (Klagge and Martin 2005). Technically, retained 
earnings are considered as part of the equity in economics, business administration and 
accounting (and counted in the equity ratio for example). From the perspective of geographies 
of finance, however, it makes sense to distinguish ‘actual equity’ (which are external funds 
contributed by a shareholder to the firm) and retained earnings, which although technically 
the property of the shareholders, is not an external source but capital generated internally 
through the firm’s production process. According to Aglietta and Breton (2001), the 
development of financial markets (and more generally what has been conceptualized as 
‘financialisation’) in recent decades has led to an increased pressure on publicly traded firms 
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to distribute dividends or buy back shares (in order to maintain a minimum return on equity, 
boost their share price and protect them against the threat of takeover by other firms). 
Aglietta and Breton (2001) further note that as a consequence, a lesser portion of profits is 
retained by these firms and used to fund internal growth, making them more dependent on 
funding provided by banks.  
The ‘cost of capital’ (be it in form of dividends, interest payments or other types of costs) and 
the general availability of capital (or the conditionality thereof) is an important factor 
determining the competitive position of a firm – similar to the cost of other factors such as 
energy (Mulhall and Bryson 2013). Given that the access to capital (as well as the cost and 
conditionality thereof) differs between firms and locations, the question of costs, availability 
and volatility of capital is relevant for a firm’s activity and firms are forced to adapt in order to 
survive and/or remain competitive (cf. also (Bluhm and Martens 2008: author-year) on the 
financing strategies of German SMEs).  
Capital	Structure	and	Pecking	Order	Theory	
Classical financial theory has long argued whether different types of capital have different 
types of impact on a firm by discussing whether there is something like an ‘optimal capital 
structure’ (i.e. mix of equity and debt on the firm’s balance sheet). While the mix of capital 
types is considered irrelevant in a hypothetical tax-less, friction-less world (Miller and 
Modigliani 1958), it is recognised that the question is relevant in the ‘real world’ (with taxes, 
frictions etc.) and that it is not neutral through which sources a firm finances its operations 
(Myers 1993; 2001). The conscience of this relevance within the firms themselves is expressed 
by the ‘pecking order theory’, i.e. the idea that firms have an order of preference for certain 
types of capital over others: according to pecking order theory, their preferred source of 
funding would be internal funds (i.e. retained earnings), next would be debt financing and only 
in the last instance would they seek to raise capital in the form of equity (Myers 1984; Myers 
and Majluf 1984). The reason for this ‘pecking order’ according to Myers (1984) was that 
capital was assumed to be the more expensive the further away the capital’s owner was from 
the firm itself (and therefore from the information regarding the situation of the firm). But 
this debate has largely been a ‘non-geographic’ one, the question only being between equity, 
debt and own funds. Geographic aspects such as the location of the firm, of its owners or of 
its lenders (and therefore the relevance e.g. of the question which type of investor the equity 
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is invested by) were largely absent from this debate and were only later on taken on, in 
particular but not exclusively by economic geographers. In addition, the classical financial 
theory has to a large extent focused on cost as the distinguishing factor between different 
types of capital, while economic geographers (and other cognate disciplines) have widened 
the scope to include questions such as governance, flexibility, resilience in crises etc.6 
Changing	Modes	of	Sourcing	Capital?	
The previous section demonstrated that sources of capital are not space-neutral in their 
presence and availability to different types of firms located in different types of locations. But 
the relevance of analysing firm finance from a geographical perspective goes beyond that: 
even if one assumed that, although coming from different types of sources depending on the 
typology and locations of a firm, capital was always available in an amount sufficient for the 
needs of the firm (and therefore the firm’s activity not restricted by the lack of availability of 
capital from any type of source), the question from which of the possible sources the required 
amount of capital comes has an impact on the governance of the firm and local and regional  
development. A geographical perspective on the patterns of firm finance is therefore relevant 
not only to understand why the patterns look the way they do but also what further 
implications this has. This has also been the focus of geographically interested research so far, 
for various types of capital sources as set out above. It would be wrong to use a universalizing 
language, assuming financial processes unfold and work in the same way regardless of 
geography, while in reality this is not the case. 
Another way of considering the potential implications of a firm being financed by certain 
sources of capital rather than others is the concept of financialisation widely discussed in the 
economic geography literature. Coined in the late 1990s (Engelen 2008), the concept was 
explored in a variety of cognate social sciences, focusing on complementary aspects of the 
phenomenon without any single, uncontested definition so far (e.g. Epstein 2005; French et 
al. 2011; Lapavitsas and Powell 2013).7 Lapavitsas (2011) recalls that the concept emerged 
                                                        
6 Lee and Brown (2016) provide further useful references on the pecking order theory including Frank and Goyal 
(2003) 
7 Cf. also Andrew Sayer re: “chaotic conceptions” with many different approaches and roots as well as Ann 
Markusen’s (2003) “Fuzzy concepts, scanty evidence, policy distance: the case for rigour and policy relevance in 
critical regional studies” claiming we should be “wary of ‘fuzzy concepts’ that are difficult to operationalise, 
measure or feed into policy” (Sturgeon et al. 2008: 318) 
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within Marxist political economy, and describes it as implying the decreased reliance of large 
corporations on banks, the shifting of banks’ activities from lending towards mediating in 
financial markets and the increased involvement of households in financial operations. This 
relates to the “highly interconnected entanglement of geographies and finance” (Pani and 
Holman 2013: [19]). Despite the very large range of topics explored under the ‘banner’ of 
financialisation, it is striking to note that some areas remain much less explored. At the level 
of firms, notably, much of the work considering financialisation has focused on large 
multinational firms and only on the equity side of capital markets, i.e. on how these firms have 
their equity publicly traded and what effects this has through the concept of shareholder value 
and the metrics used to measure it. Although there has been very relevant work done in 
economic geography and regional studies focusing on the difficulties experienced by smaller 
and medium-sized firms in accessing capital (Pollard 2003; Appleyard 2013), the processes of 
capital provision at the level of SMEs generally and their implications through the debt side of 
the capital market have been much less explored to date and constitute a clear gap of the 
geographies of finance literature. 
Among the questions to be considered when asking why firms finance themselves the way 
they do, the availability (or lack of availability) of certain form of finance as compared to other 
forms of finance (such as bank loans, state subsidies or internal capital) needs to be 
considered. The question needs to be considered both from the angle “does the firm have 
access to capital market finance” and from the angle “does the firm have access or difficulties 
in accessing other forms of finance”. SMEs, for example, are traditionally thought to have 
difficulties in obtaining bank loans and may try to mitigate this through alternative sources 
such as community development finance institutions (sometimes benefiting from state 
guarantees) in the UK (Appleyard 2013) – it is questionable whether capital market finance as 
such can be considered as a practical (as well as affordable and reliable) alternative to bank 
finance for SMEs. Various theories will have various expectations about the potential or 
probable effects of financialisation on regional development. As a principle, it can be assumed 
that a direct or indirect connection with the capital market affects a firm’s activity and 
development prospects, internal functioning and external relationships. Using examples given 
by Coe et al. (2013) and adding further points, such effects may include, for example, 
• an increased focus on shareholder value as a tool of management; 
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• specific metrics used by capital market actors to assess the corporate performance of 
the firms they finance through equity or debt; 
• the need to obtain ratings and credit scorings from rating agencies; 
• the resulting necessity to adopt specific regulatory and accounting standards and 
transparency in publishing information; 
• new organisational structures or management devices that may result from this; 
• the access or non-access of the firm to certain markets; 
• the firm’s inclusion into or exclusion from certain production networks; 
• outsourcing to other firms that are not subject to the same constraints (e.g. of 
collective pay agreements);  
• a change in work conditions and labour management/employment relationships 
within the firm (Thompson 2013); 
• “increasing externalisation of manufacturing activity, a focus on fewer high volume 
suppliers, and intensified auditing and monitoring of supply networks” (Coe et al. 2013 
regarding Gibbon's (2002) study of the UK clothing sector) ; and  
• restructurings, relocations, developments or closures/divestments at the level of the 
firm’s production sites. 
Embeddedness	and	its	Implications	on	Firm	Governance	
Clark and Wójcik (2007: 31) provide a definition of corporate governance citing Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997: 738): “corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance 
to (the) corporation assure themselves return on their investment” and the OECD (1999: 1): 
“a set of relationships between a company’s board, its shareholders and other stakeholders”, 
but an even more relevant definition of governance for the purpose of this study might be the 
‘authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human 
resources are allocated and flow within a chain’ (Gereffi 1994: 97). A distinction is made 
between ‘closed governance’ where ownership of the firm is concentrated in a small number 
of controlling owners and ‘open governance’ where ownership is dispersed and shareholders 
have an arm’s length relationship with managers. While open governance is prevalent in the 
US and the UK, closed governance seems to be otherwise prevalent in Continental Europe. 
There is debate as to (i) whether there is a convergence with Continental Europe shifting 
towards open governance and (ii) what the perceived benefits of one model over the other 
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are (Clark and Wójcik 2007: 33). The literature also discusses the governance implications of 
publicly listing a firm’s equity as including shareholder’s rights and duties, takeover defences, 
disclosure and board structure and functioning (Clark and Wójcik 2007: 43). According to 
Zingales (2000), corporate governance is the study of the way firms are financed. Zingales 
(2000) argues that the nature of corporate governance is changing because the nature of the 
firms is changing, from the traditional, asset intensive and highly vertically integrated business 
corporation that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century to more fluid and looser 
forms of cooperation (as evidenced in global production networks) which change the nature 
and form of corporate governance. This clearly evidences that the question through which 
sources a firm is financed (and what geographically relevant factors come into play here) 
directly impacts the way its governance is organised.  
In the view of economic geographers, the potential implications on a firm’s activity vary not 
only between equity, debt and own resources as discussed above: differences may for 
example also exist between different types of equity, i.e. different types of owners. There is a 
widely held view in the literature that the degree to which firm owners focus on short-term 
as opposed to long-term profitability of the firm depends at least partly on the owner’s type 
and geographic origin. Equity invested through Anglo-Saxon capital markets, for instance, is 
considered as focusing on short-term results, while German investors are viewed as ‘patient 
capital’ (Dill et al. 2016). Recent research on German firms suggests indeed that foreign-
owned firms are more likely to focus on short-term profits than domestic-owned firms and 
that, even more so, the probability of focus on short-term profit appears to increase with the 
physical distance between the firm and the owners (Dill et al. 2016). Assumed reasons 
therefore are (i) the information disadvantage faced by the foreign investors as to the local 
conditions of the firm and (ii) a potential connection to Anglo-Saxon capital markets (Dill et al. 
2016). Potential implications of such a focus on short-term profit might be on human 
resources management, investment and R&D for example (Dill et al. 2016).  
Particular attention has been given by economic geographers to the implications of capital (in 
particular but not only equity) raised through the capital markets on a firm’s operation and 
development strategies, as a result of the specific expectations and perspectives of capital 
market actors (such as asset managers, equity analysts, institutional investors, rating agencies, 
the business press etc.) in terms of assessing a firm’s operations. Empirical case studies 
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included, for example, the impact of investor relations (and in particular the relationship with 
equity analysts) on the international expansion (and divestment) strategies of a large retailer 
like Tesco (Wood et al. 2016) or the closure of an old brewery in Sunderland (Pike 2006). 
Recognising the importance of “understand[ing] firm finances […] as integral to our 
understandings of firm behavior, governance and strategy” (Pollard 2003: 442), this is 
sometimes more broadly conceptualized as one of the many aspects of ‘financialisation’, here 
understood as “the growing influence of capital markets, their intermediaries, and processes 
in contemporary economic and political life” (Pike and Pollard 2010: 30). 
Lee and Brown (2016) provide an excellent overview of debates and literature concerning 
geographies of finance and regional financing gaps. Much of the earlier work explicitly 
focusing on geographies of finance focused on the governance implications on large 
international firms of raising equity from institutional investors through global capital 
markets, i.e. focusing exclusively on firms that have their equity publicly traded (Clark and 
Wójcik 2007). Much of this focus was also on the equity side only, giving little attention to the 
debt side as a source of capital establishing a power relationship with a third party capital 
provider. Patterns of finance at the level of individual firms and their implications on local and 
regional development (which is the focus of this study) received less attention during that 
period although there already was beginning research on “the relationship between regional 
financial flows and regional industrial development” (Pollard 2003: 431) as well as regional 
financial markets and their implications in the provision of credit to firms (Dow 1992; Dow and 
Rodríguez-Fuentes 1997) (cf. also Boschma (2005) for further development on the importance 
of proximity, without however considering finance and credit directly).8 
Research	Gaps	and	Research	Questions	
This chapter has reviewed three separate yet related bodies of research to formulate a 
conceptual framework for this study: variegated capitalism, global production networks and 
geographies of firm finance. While all three areas provide significant insight to a better 
understanding of how firm finance unfolds in the context of firms that are embedded both in 
territories and in networks production, as is the case for car component manufactures in 
                                                        
8 Regarding cross-regional and cross-border corporate ownership in Europe and within Germany in particular, 
and the relevance of spatial proximity for corporate ownership cf. Wojcik 2002a and Wojcik 2002b as cited in 
(Clark and Wójcik 2007: 66) 
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Hungary and Eastern Germany, material gaps persist in all three areas, particularly in respect 
of the research topic of this study: the literature on varieties of capitalism and variegated 
capitalism yields significant insight into the reasons and effects why capitalism unfolds 
differently in different contexts, but it remains insufficiently developed particularly with 
regards to the variegations of capital prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe. The literature 
on global production network has made important contributions to better understanding the 
implications of firms being integrated in such global networks of production, particularly with 
regards to local and regional development, but it has to date only insufficiently taken into 
account the implications of finance in these networks and for these firms. Finally, geographies 
of finance is strong in identifying the difficulties (and resulting implications) of certain types 
of firms struggling to obtain certain types of capital, and the implications of firms using certain 
types of capital, but further research remains necessary to understand why certain types of 
firms use certain types of capital more than others, and what implications this has on their 
governance and on local and regional development. The following research questions 
therefore serve as guidance to the empirical part this study in respect of a sample of car 
component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany: 
• What are the main sources of capital used by these firms and which structural patterns 
can be observed? 
• How can these patterns be explained by geographical factors concerning both firms 
and capital providers, as well as their respective institutional context? 
• What is the potential impact on the firms’ governance and on local and regional 
development more broadly? 
The overall objective of these questions is to critically explore and understand how 
geographical factors such as the embeddedness of firms within both regions and global 
production networks affects the way they source capital (and vice-versa) and the implications 
thereof on firm governance and local and regional development outcomes. The methodology 
chapter that follows explains how these questions are addressed empirically.  
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Chapter	3 Methodology	
The conceptual framework of this study formulated through the literature review of Chapter 
2 links theory on variegated capitalism, global production networks and geographies of firm 
finance and evidences gaps in current research regarding institutional infrastructures of 
capital provision in variegated capitalism and the role of finance in global production 
networks. The three research questions defined at the end of the preceding chapter serve as 
guidance of this study’s empirical part to address these research gaps. In methodological 
terms, answering these research questions requires contextualised empirical research 
identifying in a first step which sources of capital car component manufacturers use in practice 
and establishing how patterns of capital sourcing differ between Hungary and Eastern 
Germany. This requires the collection and analysis of quantitative data for a sample of firms 
to identify which sources of capital they actually use and how patterns differ depending on 
the firm’s typology and location, i.e. looking into the ‘black-box’ of firm finance (Pollard 2003) 
rather than simply making assumptions in this respect. In a second step, answering the 
research questions requires an understanding of reasons why firms use capital in the way they 
do and implications thereof on their governance and local and regional development. This 
requires the collection of qualitative data to contextualise and help interpret, ‘make sense of’ 
the quantitative data collected.  
The methodological needs of this study thus identified, this chapters presents the 
methodological approach used to address the research questions. It is organised in three 
sections: after presentation of the research design, methodological approach and its 
justification and the sample of firms studied (3.1), the second section sets out how relevant 
quantitative and qualitative data was collected and analysed (3.2). The third section discusses 
reflexivity issues and research ethics (3.3). 
3.1 Methodological	Approach	and	Research	Design	
Among the large range of quantitative and qualitative methodologies available to the 
academic researcher and customarily used in economic geography, this study uses a mixed 
quantitative-qualitative methods approach and a comparative study to answer the research 
questions.  
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3.1.1 Research	Design	
Once the conceptual framework and research questions were identified, the empirical 
research was structured in three phases as follows:  
Phase Stage of Research 
Phase I Preparation of empirical research 
• Formulation of methodological approach (Section 3.1.2) 
• Selection and justification of research subjects (Section 3.1.3) 
Phase II Data collection  
• Quantitative data collection (Section 3.2.1) 
• Qualitative data collection (Section 3.2.2) 
Phase III Data analysis (Section 3.2.3) 
• Quantitative data analysis 
• Qualitative data analysis 
Figure 9 Research design 
Source: author 
In a first phase, the empirical research was prepared through identification of an appropriate 
methodological approach, among the range of methodological approaches available to the 
researcher in economic geography. Given the characteristics of the research topic at hand, it 
was determined that a mixed methods approach and a comparative study would be the most 
appropriate, as discussed in more detail in Section 3.1.2. This phase also comprised the 
identification and selection of an appropriate research subject among the range of possible 
types of industries, global production networks and regions in which patterns of capital 
sourcing as well as their reasons and implications could be studied. For the reasons developed 
further in Section 3.1.3, the choice was made to study the capital sources of a sample of car 
component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany. 
Once the methodological approach confirmed and the research subjects selected, the second 
stage of the research consisted in the collection of quantitative and qualitative empirical data 
to constitute a database containing firm-level data on the firms’ size, location, ownership and 
capital sources. Please refer to Section 3.2.1 for a more detailed discussion of how this was 
undertaken. As a complement to the collection of quantitative data, qualitative data was 
collected as further discussed in Section 3.2.2. In the third and last stage of the research, the 
quantitative data collected was analysed and contextualised with the help of qualitative data 
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collected, as discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.3.  The overall methodological framework 
eventually retained for the empirical research can thus be summarised as follows: 
Methodology Component Methodological Approach 
Research Background Variegated capitalism Global production 
networks 
Geographies of firm 
finance 
Theoretical Framework Variegated firm finance and global production networks 
Case Studies Car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany 
Units of Analysis Firms and their capital providers (shareholders, banks, capital markets) 
Geography Hungary and Eastern Germany 
Study Focus Institutional 
infrastructures of 
capital provision 
Ownership relations 
between GPN firms 
Capital sources used by 
GPN firms 
Method of Analysis Qualitative Analysis Quantitative/Qualitative 
Analysis 
Quantitative Analysis 
Method of Research Step 1: database analysis of primary quantitative data 
Step 2: qualitative analysis of secondary data 
Figure 10 Methodological framework 
Source: author, following a scheme proposed by Thrower (2018) 
3.1.2 Justification	of	Methodological	Approach	
In contrast to other academic disciplines (including in the social sciences), economic 
geography is characterised by a strong pluralism in methodological approaches, even between 
and within closely related strands of research (Pike et al. 2016). While concerns have been 
expressed for more rigour and dialogue about the relationships between different 
methodological approaches and between theory, concepts and methods, there is a growing 
consensus in certain sub-disciplines in favour of plural methodologies in order better to 
engage with complexity and evolution in the research subject (Pike et al. 2016). More 
specifically, it is increasingly being recognised that quantitative and qualitative approaches 
(which often coexist in more or less explicit opposition on related research topics) are not 
necessarily exclusive of each other but can in certain contexts be usefully combined (cf. 
references in Pike et al. (2016) and in Barnes et al. (2007)). While quantitative approaches are 
strong in “tightly defining conceptual categories; specifying and theorising their relationships; 
articulating and testing formal hypotheses; developing robust methods, research designs and 
data sources; and, measuring and mapping the incidence of associations, patterns and 
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regularities of […] change across space and time”, they tend to be weak on “identifying 
appropriate proxy indicators for fuzzier but important concepts […]; inter-relating its different 
levels of analysis; contextualising its studies in their economic, social, political and institutional 
settings; securing required levels of availability and comparability of data across space and 
especially time for historical and longitudinal analyses; establishing the extent and nature of 
causation amidst association and correlation; and, drawing out its implications for policy” 
(Pike et al. 2016: 133). Qualitative approaches, by contrast, are able to work with “looser and 
less tightly defined concepts, undertake[…] comparative analysis between different 
geographical settings, provide[…] rich empirical studies capturing the diversity, variety and 
heterogeneity of […] change, and […] identify explanatory causal relations, mechanisms and 
processes”, but they are weaker on “translating qualitative data into consistent categories to 
enable systematic comparison and analysis across time and space, rigorously interrogating 
empirical findings beyond compare and contrast frameworks, developing a cumulative, robust 
and credible body of knowledge, and engaging with public policy” (Pike et al. 2016: 133). 
Combining a quantitative with a qualitative approach therefore yields the potential to gain in 
explanatory power on a given research object.  
While most GPN-related research in the past focused on qualitative methods with much 
insight (Coe 2012), a mixed methods approach combining quantitative and qualitative data 
collection and interpretation methods appears as the most appropriate for this study given 
the nature of the research questions. Similar to the approach taken by critical accounting 
(Froud et al. 2006) for example, there is potential purchase in “integrating quantitative 
analyses of indicators with qualitative interpretation of their discursive interpretation and 
articulation by actors” (Pike et al. 2016: 134). By combining a quantitative research method 
with a qualitative research method, this project uses “between-method triangulation” (Denzin 
1970; Wood et al. 2016) to mitigate the limits of a single-method approach and gain 
explanatory power in exploring which factors influence the capital sources of firms and what 
impact this may have on the firms’ governance and local and regional development. 
Answering the research questions formulated with this approach in mind requires in a first 
step the collection and analysis of empirical data about the capital sources of a sample of 
firms, and in a second step its contextualisation, interpretation and explanation to understand 
potential reasons and implications of patterns identified. In this study, the collection and 
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analysis of quantitative data, mainly from publicly available annual statements, is combined 
with a qualitative analysis in the form of secondary qualitative data. While the quantitative 
data helps identify patterns of firm finance across the sector, the qualitative analysis helps 
shed light as to the potential reasons and implications of the patterns identified. 
The collection of empirical quantitative data about capital sources of a sample of firms could 
in principle be done by asking firms to provide this information via questionnaires or 
interviews. Questionnaires however are known to have very low response rates, and 
interviews would reach only a small number of firms. In addition, this approach was already 
retained usefully and insightfully by others (cf. e.g. Bečicová and Blažek (2015) on firms in the 
Czech periphery applying for bank loans). An alternative approach could be to use public 
databases such as Echo or Amadeus, but the limitation here is that data is imposed in pre-
defined categories and aggregated, with a limited possibility for the researcher to analyse and 
put it into perspective with other variables such as the firms’ location, size or ownership. 
Furthermore, some of these databases are available only for very large firms or for a limited 
typology of firms. Neither of these two approaches was therefore retained for this study. The 
alternative approach retained instead for the collection of quantitative data is based on the 
fact that firms in both Hungary and Germany are legally obliged to publish online their annual 
statements every year, and these documents contain a detailed breakdown of the capital 
sources used by the firm. The firm’s annual statements therefore constitute a data source 
which is systematically publicly available, at no cost, and enables the identification of the 
financing sources used (and other relevant economic and financial firm-level information) by 
every firm in any given year. It should be noted that non-public/confidential information is 
deliberately and explicitly excluded from this study given the sensitivity of financial 
information for firms: such confidential information could neither be accessed nor used within 
the scope of this research project. Given the limitations of the other approaches mentioned 
above and the availability of annual statements, it was therefore decided to construct a unique 
dataset using the annual statements for a group of car component manufacturers in the two 
regions studied. This enabled a firm-level analysis of capital sources and identification of 
patterns using further variables collected at firm level such as their location, size and 
ownership. The key benefit of this approach is that it allowed the identification of actual 
financing patterns of a group of firms and to work with these concrete findings, rather than 
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having to ‘assume’ how the firms are financed inside the ‘black-box’ (Pollard 2003): this 
constitutes the main strength of the methodological approach retained for this study and a 
major innovation compared to previous work undertaken in this field. 
The quantitative work alone however would be insufficient to answer the research questions 
and uncover underlying relationships and causalities, as would be possible by the qualitative 
in-depth studies that traditionally constitute the strength of economic geography (Pike et al. 
2016). The quantitative approach of this study therefore needed to be complemented by 
qualitative work helping to explain (rather than merely describing) the financing patterns 
observed. It is indeed essential to both describe and explain: simply describing without 
explanation is unsatisfactory. But by the same account, attempting to explain why things are 
without previously describing how they are is unsatisfactory as well as it risks remaining 
theoretical and normative (based on an assumption of how things are, might be or should be) 
rather than truly explanatory (based on a close look at how they actually are). Semi-structured 
corporate interviews would have been the ideal solution to discuss the statistical findings from 
the quantitative data collection with representatives of the analysed firms to understand why 
the firms finance their activities the way they do in the light of their specific characteristics 
and situations, and how they view the advantages and disadvantages of different capital 
sources. These interviews would have “provide[d] a qualitative context that amplifies and 
enriches the meanings derived from [the quantitative data collected]” (Schoenberger 1991: 
181). The quantitative findings would have guided the conduct of the interviews, and the 
interviews’ findings could illustrate, further explore, explain or potentially question the 
statistical findings. While such semi-structured interviews constituted the initial plan in terms 
of qualitative data collection, it appeared however during the study that they were not 
practicable for reasons further developed below, and qualitative data was instead gathered 
through secondary sources. 
3.1.3 Selection	and	Justification	of	Research	Subjects	
The diversity, differentiation and heterogeneity of situations in the economic landscape calls 
for comparative case studies allowing to corroborate, triangulate and interrogate data across 
different contexts, to enhance insight and to challenge conceptual frameworks in their rigour 
and robustness (Pike et al. 2016). Such a comparative approach was also retained for this 
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study. In order to select an appropriate group of firms to be analysed, the following selection 
process was applied: 
Scope Criteria and Justification Selection 
Geography Criteria: two regions which share a common 
post-socialist past but have gone through 
different paths since  
Justification: provides scope for an analysis 
considering variegations of capital among regions 
with a common past  
Hungary and Eastern Germany 
Industry Criteria: a capital intensive sector with certain 
firms being large international firms 
Justification: increases the likelihood that firms 
use different forms of external capital, thereby 
allowing the analysis of diverse capital sources 
Car component manufacturing 
Firms Criteria: a sample of small, medium-sized and 
large firms representing a range of different 
ownership forms 
Justification: provides scope to analyse how 
capital sourcing differs between firms based on 
their size, location and ownership.  
160 Hungarian and 160 Eastern German 
car component manufacturers selected 
among two relevant associations of car 
component manufacturers 
Figure 11 Selection of empirical research subjects 
Source: author 
Selection	of	the	Case	Study	Regions	and	Justification	of	Comparative	Approach	
Given that one aim of this study is to assess how post-socialist contexts in Central and Eastern 
Europe illustrate specific forms of variegated patterns of capital sourcing by firms integrated 
in global production networks, the study analyses the financing patterns of car component 
manufacturers in two different regions of Central and Eastern Europe, each with its own 
historical, political, economic and social contexts. One of these regions is Eastern Germany, 
because it presents a unique case where a region formerly part of one (state-socialist) variety 
of capitalism was almost ‘overnight’ absorbed into another (capitalist) variety of capitalism, 
by being absorbed by the German Federal Republic with its fully fledged capitalist legal and 
socio-institutional environment and by becoming part of the European Union (then still the 
EC) as early as 1990. It could therefore be expected that an analysis of firms in Eastern 
Germany would yield interesting findings as to how such absorption influenced the capital 
sourcing for local firms integrated in global production networks, with one complementary 
question being whether the transition from Rhinish to Anglo-Saxon Capitalism is being 
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accelerated by what happened in the New Länder after the reunification. The other region 
retained is Hungary, because this country switched from state-socialism to capitalism in 1990, 
but joined the EU only in May 2004. In the 15 years between these dates, Hungary experienced 
and experimented its own transition of systems and therefore had a different path evolution 
than Eastern Germany. It therefore represents an interestingly contrasting case when 
compared with Eastern Germany. A relevant question here was whether transition 
economies, as they were moving toward a market system, have been more susceptible, or 
less, to financialisation and global changes in capital sourcing mechanisms. 
By studying different types of car component manufacturers across two regions, the project 
also uses “within-method triangulation” (Denzin 1970; Wood et al. 2016) to gain comparative 
power by contrasting feedback from different types of firms in different locations. Using 
different types of firms also allows to explore “variegated governance effects of relationships 
with finance providers […] across organisations with different ownership structures” as called 
for by Wood et al. (2016: 24). For a justification of and a call for stronger comparative 
methods, cf. Pike et al. (2015), Barnes et al. (2007) or Gertler (2010) as well as Pike et al. (2015: 
189) citing Farole et al. (2011: 60) according to whom “work in economic geography has been 
strong on explaining and documenting ‘complexity, context and difference’ but weaker in 
specifying more generalised analytical and explanatory frameworks applicable to different 
geographical contexts internationally, identifying consistent and comparable conceptual and 
analytical categories, analysing larger empirical samples, and systematising and generalising 
its findings”. The analysis of a comparatively larger group of firms in this study (which could in 
principle be extended following the same approach to other sectors and regions) aims to 
respond to this call. 
Selection	of	the	Group	of	Firms	
Once the methodological approach formulated and the decision made to analyse the capital 
sources of a sample of car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany, it was 
necessary to identify the concrete list of firms to be analysed. In theory, the eligible group of 
firms included all those firms that operate car component production sites in Hungary and 
Eastern Germany, whether their headquarters are also located in these regions or elsewhere. 
By the nature of their activity, these firms are an integral part of global production networks: 
some of these firms are owned by larger firms in the same industry (one form of integration 
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in global production networks) but all depend on other suppliers or on final assemblers as 
their main, and sometimes exclusive, clients (another form of integration in global production 
networks). Capitalistic relationships and dependencies exist between these firms and other 
institutions and the analysis of economic and financial information at the level of such 
interconnected firms can help answer the research questions of this study. In practice 
however, it was neither feasible (as no official list exists identifying which firms are part of this 
industry) nor necessary to collect firm-level data for all these firms within the scope of this 
research project. The study therefore focused on a limited but diversified sample of 
interconnected firms within the industry to assess how the location, size and ownership 
relationships of a firm within a global production network influence its capital sources and 
vice versa. The sources available to establish a list of firms to analyse were the member’s list 
of various professional associations. The decision of a firm to become a member in one and/or 
another of the existing professional organisations relevant for a car supplier may reflect how 
it positions itself in the industry, what types of relationships it wishes to emphasise and how 
it wants to communicate about itself to clients and competitors. Some professional 
associations have a local emphasis (expressing the “localness” of its members and its relations 
with local actors) while others may have a more international aspiration. Some organisations 
are dedicated to Tier-2 and Tier-3 suppliers (i.e. explicitly not including the larger and more 
powerful firms of the industry), while others involve firms from ‘across the global production 
network’ with both OEMs and all tiers of suppliers.  
Among the listings available to identify car component manufacturers in Eastern Germany, 
the website www.automotive-index.com lists over 1,300 automotive suppliers in Germany, a 
number relatively close to the aggregate number of about 1,340 firms indicated by Eurostat 
for C29.3 companies (manufacturing of parts and accessories for motor vehicles). The member 
list of the German association of the car industry (Verband der Automobilindustrie, “VdA”) on 
the VdA’s website appeared incomplete as it includes only 600 members. Neither of these lists 
provides a geographical breakdown between Eastern and Western Germany so it would have 
been necessary to check for each potential candidate whether it is based in or has a 
production site in Eastern Germany. A third source therefore appeared more useful to identify 
Eastern German firms for this study: the association of Eastern German car component 
manufacturers ACOD (Automotive Cluster Ostdeutschland GmbH, www.acod.de). ACOD 
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define themselves as an association of “active automobile manufacturers, suppliers, service 
providers, research institutes, associations and other institutions in the five East German 
States” and provide a publicly available list of 281 members at the time it was retrieved for 
this study. Some of these firms are also a member of regional organisations such as the 
association of Thuringian automotive suppliers (automotive thüringen e.V. “at”) dedicated to 
suppliers from only one of the five East German Länder.  
The website www.automotive-index.com also lists about 112 Hungarian firms, which is only a 
third of the about 340 listed in the C29.3 category according to Eurostat - likely missing mainly 
the small ones that employ less than 10 people. Another source for Hungarian firms is AHAI, 
the Association of the Hungarian Automotive Industry (www.gepjarmuipar.hu) with a list of 
35 members, representing only the large and medium-sized automotive companies in 
Hungary including the 4 OEMs, and only 24 large Tier-1 and Tier-2 suppliers. As the purpose 
of this study is to focus not only on the large firms but also on the small and medium-sized 
ones, these sources were not suitable to select the Hungarian firm sample. By contrast, the 
association of Hungarian automotive component manufacturers Majosz (Magyar 
Járműalkatrészgyártók Országos Egyesülete, www.majosz.hu) provides a nominative list of 
211 members based in Hungary, which appears suitable for the purpose of this study. Majosz 
seems to be dedicated to Hungarian Tier-2 and Tier-3 companies, not including the larger Tier-
1 companies and OEMs. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that only two of these firms 
are also a member of the Association of the Hungarian Automotive Industry (“AHAI”, or 
Magyar Gépjárműipari Szövetség, “MGSZ” in Hungarian). The 35 members of AHAI include all 
4 OEMs that are active in Hungary as well as some of the largest Hungarian Tier-1 and Tier-2 
suppliers.  
A nominative list of car supplier firms in Hungary and Eastern Germany was thus constituted 
by using the membership lists of ACOD for Eastern Germany and Majosz for Hungary. The 
sample of firms analysed in this study thereby consisted in a ‘self-selecting’ group of almost 
500 potentially relevant Hungarian and East German car supplier firms. Out of these 500 
candidates, data was collected for about 160 Hungarian (i.e. about 80% of the sample) and 
160 German firms (about 56% of the sample) in both cases randomly selected out of the total 
pool, including firms of all sizes (small, medium-sized and large) and ownership types (local 
individuals, local corporates or foreign corporates).  
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3.2 Data	Collection	and	Analysis		
The collection and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data as the constituent 
empirical parts of this study’s mixed methods approach are described in more detail in this 
section. 
3.2.1 Collection	of	Quantitative	Data	
The core of the quantitative data used in this study consists in firm-level economic and 
financial firm-level information, i.e. a form of (pre)constructed data from non-official sources 
(cf. Cloke et al. (2004), chapter 3). This section presents the scope and type of quantitative 
data that was collected and compiled into a single database. 
Data	Sources	
For each firm analysed, the same publicly available documents providing economic and 
financial firm-level information were collected. The main type of document collected (and the 
most systematically available and standardized as far as its content is concerned) are the firms’ 
annual statements (a source usefully used in a slightly different Czech context by Rugraff 
(2013) for example) and official commercial registers, both a crucial source of information 
providing a large amount of useful relevant data. Annual statements were collected for about 
160 Hungarian firms and 160 Eastern German firms for the years 2016 or 2017. There is some 
difference between Hungary and Germany in the way information is presented in the annual 
statements (and care was given to identify and take into account these differences when 
comparing data between the two countries). While these documents have their limits because 
of the way some of the information is presented or is missing (according to applicable 
accounting rules), they do enable significant analysis.  
The access and collection of annual statements was relatively straightforward once a firm’s 
name was identified: firms registered in both Hungary and Germany have a legal obligation to 
publish their annual statements every year, and these are accessible publicly and free of 
charge online. For Germany, the website www.unternehmensregister.de (available in German 
and in English) provides not only access to the complete annual statements of all firms (in 
German only), in most cases for every year since 2006 but also to the commercial register (also 
in German only) with useful corporate information (either free of charge or for an 
administrative fee of a few euros per document). This information includes the official 
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identification number of the firm, registered address, date of incorporation (or of its 
privatization in the early 1990s), legal form (GmbH, AG etc., indicating the way the equity is 
contributed and traded between shareholders), shareholders names both current and 
previous, showing whether a firm is owned by a family or by another GPN firm, by private 
equity investors, when it changed hands (unless it is a joint stock company and the equity 
traded on the stock market) and sometimes the address of branches, i.e. of production sites. 
The exploitation of these documents was not problematic as the author speaks German 
fluently. 
For Hungary, the websites www.e-beszamolo.kim.gov.hu and www.e-cegjegyzek.hu (both 
available in Hungarian only) provide the equivalent access free of charge for all Hungarian 
firms and for years in some cases ranging back as far as 2001. Another official website9 
provides company information for a fee of about 50 HUF (i.e. 0.16 EUR) per company, but it 
did not appear that this site would contain any useful information in addition to the one that 
could be accessed free of charge through the other websites and this site was therefore not 
used. The documents that can be downloaded from these websites were in each case only in 
Hungarian (i.e. no English version available). Although the author speaks Hungarian only to a 
limited extent, the balance sheet (mérleg) and the profit and loss statement 
(eredménykimutatás) were easily manageable as their form and content is rigorously 
standardized and the vocabulary used therefore very limited. The appendix to these 
documents (kiegészítő melléglek) which provides further useful information was a bit more 
challenging because its form is less standardized and they tend to comprise more text. 
However, the issues dealt with in the appendices are relatively recurrent between one firm 
and another so the exploitation of the information required for the purpose of this study was 
manageable.  
The use of further sources of quantitative data such as corporate databases and official firm 
level statistical data (such as used insightfully by Pavlínek and Ženka (2011) for example with 
respect to Czech car component manufacturers) was originally considered but finally not 
retained because either unavailable for the geographies or data types required for this study 
or not practicable (e.g. because being too costly). Commercially operated corporate databases 
                                                        
9 www.ceginformaciosszolgalat.kormany.hu 
  Methodology 
 
 
 
86 
such as Orbis, Amadeus (used by Rugraff (2013) for example), Thomson Reuters, Centre for 
Management Buy-Out Research database, Datastream or Dun & Bradstreet could contain 
further potentially useful firm-level information but the very high cost of full access and use 
of these databases (which can only be assumed by commercial firms doing this for business 
purposes) proved blocking for a research project like this one. It also appeared as not 
necessary as the data publicly available in the form of annual statements and commercial 
register extracts provided sufficient quantitative information for this study. 
Data	Collected	
Out of the range of data available in the firms’ annual statements and commercial register 
extracts, including a detailed account of the firm’s assets and liabilities as well as further 
information, only a limited number of variables was collected. These include (i) the context 
variables firm size, location and ownership type and (ii) financial indicators consisting in the 
main capital sources present in the firm (equity, debt or retained earnings). 
In terms of context variables, the firms’ size was systematically assessed. According to official 
EU classification and German accounting rules, firms are usually categorised into small, 
medium-sized and large firms based on the size of their balance sheet, their annual turnover 
and their number of employees. In Germany, paragraphs 267 and 267a of the Code of 
Commerce (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB) determine the size of German firms as follows:  
Size Category Balance Sheet (Euro) Annual Turnover (Euro) Average Employees 
Micro Up to 0.35 million  Up to 0.70 million  Up to 10 
Small Up to 4.84 million  Up to 9.68 million  Up to 50 
Medium Up to 19.25 million  Up to 38.50 million  Up to 250 
Large Over 19.25 million  Over 38.50 million Over 250 
Figure 12 German firm size categories according to HGB 
 Source: §§ 267 and 267a of HGB 
A firm falls into a size category if it fulfils at least two of the three conditions. The impact of 
this classification is directly relevant for this study: the degree of detail in which German firms 
are legally required to publish their financial statements depends on their size. Micro and 
small firms, for example, publish a simplified balance sheet and are required to provide neither 
a profit & loss statement (with annual turnover etc.) nor the further specifications (with the 
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number of employees etc.). While there is no formal definition of the term ‘Mittelstand’ often 
used in the context of German firms, this roughly corresponds to small and medium-sized 
firms that are owned by German families (i.e. with an ownership that is both domestic and 
individual). At EU level, the Commission’s recommendation N°2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 
provides a classification using the same criteria but different thresholds:   
Size Category Balance Sheet (Euro) Annual Turnover (Euro) Average Employees 
Micro Up to 2 million  Up to 2 million Up to 10 
Small Up to 10 million  Up to 10 million  Up to 50 
Medium Up to 43 million  Up to 50 million  Up to 250 
Large Over 43 million  Over 50 million  Over 250 
Figure 13 EU firm size categories  
Source: Recommendation N° 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 
The EU definition is slightly less restrictive than the German one, meaning that some of the 
firms categorized as ‘medium-sized’ in Germany still qualify as ‘small’ by EU standards etc. The 
widely-used concept of small- and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) encompasses the 
micro, small and medium categories of the table above. A simplified approach was retained 
for this study using only the size of the balance sheet and firms were classified on this basis 
into small firms (balance sheet less than 5 million euro), medium-sized (between 5 and 20 
million euro) and large firms (over 20 million euro). These thresholds are based on German 
accounting rules as they determine the degree of detail German firms must state in their 
annual statements. Note that the exercise was done for the Hungarian firms according to same 
principle as the German firms, i.e. according to the balance sheet size thresholds of the 
German classification rules to maintain a coherent approach between the two regions. 
Among the issues encountered when collecting these documents were the following: 
• Some firms do not publish their annual statements. While it is possible that some 
refrain from publishing them in spite of their legal obligation to do so (cf. also the 
absence of ownership information for a number of firms mentioned below), the more 
typical case is the one of firms that are part of a group: under certain circumstances, 
these subsidiaries are exempted from publishing their annual statements if the group’s 
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holding firm publishes a group statement encompassing the assets and results of the 
subsidiary. 
• Some firms publish their balance sheet but provide neither a profit and loss statement 
nor further specifications. As a result, the size of their balance sheet could be identified 
but neither their turnover nor their number of employees. This is fully explained by the 
fact that micro and small firms do not have the obligation to publish profit and loss 
statements and further specifications (and therefore in general do not publish them). 
All sample firms in this case have a balance sheet of less than EUR 4.84 million, which 
confirms they are micro or small firms to be categorized as such. This is the main 
reason why the size categorisation was done exclusively based on the firms’ balance 
sheet size. 
The second context variable collected was the firms’ location, assessed as the place where the 
firm’s headquarters (in most cases identical to the location of the firm’s only production site) 
are located. To obtain a coherent and robust data set regarding the firms’ locations, addresses 
of the firms’ headquarters were in a first stage identified through official sources. The 
documents used to collect the address of each firm’s headquarters are for German firms the 
official commercial register extract (Handelsregisterauszug) available for an administrative fee 
of 4.50 euros per document from the German company register’s website 
(www.unternehmensregister.de) and for the Hungarian firms the appendix to the annual 
statement (kiegészítő melléglek) available (for free) on the Hungarian company register’s 
website (http://e-beszamolo.kim.gov.hu/kereses). Once the addresses were collected for 
each firm, first a high-level analysis was performed based on NUTS1 categories using 
Eurostat’s correspondence table between post codes and NUTS regions, and then the full 
addresses were converted into GPS coordinates using an online geo-locator tool to enable 
analysis of their locations more precisely including production of maps through the GIS-tool 
ArcMap. This enabled analysis of patterns both in absolute terms (country, region etc.) and in 
relative terms (in the centre or periphery relative to hubs and clusters of capital provision, car 
component manufacturing and car assembly) across regions and regional clusters. The 
relevance of this aspect when looking at patterns of financing relates to the question whether 
geographical location (near or far from major cities and financial centres, in prosperous or 
poor regions etc.) plays an identifiable role in the way firms access capital and the conditions 
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under which they access it. One question, for example, is whether or not an increased distance 
to prosperous regions and financial centres means that it may be more difficult and/or more 
costly for a firm to access capital for investments. Addresses of the firm’s production sites (if 
different from the headquarters) were not collected, both because there seems to be a 
divergence only in very few cases and because this type of information is not systematically 
contained in the type of documents collected for this study.  
The third and last context variable assessed was the firm’s ownership (as one key form of 
integration of a firm into a global production network when it is corporately owned, alongside 
the other key form of integration which is the customer-supplier relationship): 
individual/family-owned or corporate (as a subsidiary of another GPN firm), and in either case 
domestic or foreign, or owned by private equity investors or having its stock traded on the 
stock market. This is relevant for questions such as whether it is more difficult and more 
expensive for firms that are family owned to access capital than for firms that are owned by 
other firms (in particular regarding equity), or whether firms that are family owned are 
exposed to less pressure to generate and distribute dividends to shareholders (and more 
generally to generate ‘shareholder value’) and can therefore more easily retain and reinvest 
profits made. The distinction between the forms of ownership is not always self-evident or 
clear-cut, such as when founding families hold significant portions of shares of a firm traded 
on the stock market (as is the case of the controlling share in VW and Porsche held by the 
Piëch and Porsche families, for example) or when industrial firms hold shares in other firms as 
part of their ‘financialisation strategy’ rather than as part of a strategy of production chain 
integration. These ‘grey zone examples’, however, are relatively marginal and the distinction 
seemed clear in an overwhelming majority of the firms analysed as part of this study. It was 
possible to identify the firms’ owners (and in most cases also their respective share in the 
ownership) for most but not all of the  firms in the sample.  The identity of the owners of a 
German firm is generally disclosed in the list of shareholders (Liste der Gesellschafter), a 
document that firms are normally required to submit to the company register 
(Unternehmensregister) and that can be downloaded from that register’s website 
(www.unternehmensregister.de) for an administrative fee of 1.50 euros per document. 
Unfortunately, this does not seem to be done by firms systematically and it was not possible 
to gather ownership information for 44 (28%) out of the 157 German firms of the sample. The 
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identity of the owners of a Hungarian firm is almost systematically disclosed in the appendix 
to the annual statement (kiegészítő melléklet), which can be downloaded for free from the 
Hungarian electronic company register (www.e-beszamolo.kim.gov.hu). Only 17 (10%) out of 
the 164 Hungarian sample firms did not disclose their ownership. When available, the 
ownership of each firm was categorised according to their type and location as follows: 
• Individual: many firms are owned directly, either wholly or partly, by one or by several 
individuals. These are generally either the founder(s) of the firm or their heirs, often 
still strongly involved in the daily management of the firm (e.g. by also acting as CEO 
or directors of the firm). In some cases, they have delegated the daily management to 
appointed third parties and only intervene for certain strategic decisions (which may 
include the decision to use certain forms or financing rather than others, or the 
dividend distribution policy).  
• Corporate: in many other cases, the direct owners of a firm are not individuals but 
firms. Here it would be relevant to distinguish between those firms that are 
‘substantive firms’ (with an economic activity, employees, customers etc. of their own) 
and those that are ‘shell firms’ (whose sole activity consists in owning the firm on 
behalf of another, ultimate, shareholder). The substantive firms are often larger GPN 
firms having created or purchased the firm as a subsidiary for expansion into a new 
market. Many shell firms are owned by individuals (such as the founding/managing 
family of the underlying firm) while others are owned by other GPN firms. In both 
cases, the existence of the shell firm is likely to have regulatory reasons but no 
economic relevance on its own. Consequently, the shell firm should be in principle be 
disregarded in the analysis and the relevant firm considered to be owned by the 
underlying individuals or GPN firms, depending on the case at hand. This distinction 
was however not made within the scope of this study and remains to be done by future 
research. 
• Public: some (very rare) firms are owned by a public entity (state, region or 
municipality). This is a fundamental change to 25 years ago, when virtually all firms in 
Eastern Germany and in Hungary where owned by the state. 
In terms of location, distinction was made only between domestic and foreign ownership, 
without considering the exact location (city, region etc.): 
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• Domestic: when the individual or corporate owning the firm has a registered address 
in the same country as the firm, ownership was considered to be ‘domestic’. No 
distinction was made between Western and Eastern Germany (so ownership of an East 
German firm by a West German firm or individual was considered to be ‘domestic’), 
although it would be interesting to introduce this distinction to evidence capital from 
the ‘West’ invested in what used to be regions of the formerly state-socialist East. 
• Foreign: all other cases are considered ‘foreign ownership’. Here it is interesting to 
look at in which country exactly the owning entity is located, as this already hints at 
whether the firm is a substantive firm or a shell firm: while firms in the USA, the UK, 
France, Germany etc. (i.e. countries with a strong automotive industry) are likely to be 
substantive firms, firms incorporated in Cyprus, Switzerland, the Cayman Islands etc. 
(in short: countries that are known less for their automotive industry than for their 
advantageous regulatory systems) are much more likely to be shell firms. 
The firm-owned firms’ ultimate ownership was not determined but it might be interesting to 
do so in follow-up research by taking a closer look at the corporate owners and their own 
shareholders: this may lead to reallocate some firms between categories and increase the 
relevance of the ownership information given that what matters is not who technically/legally 
owns the firm, but rather who economically owns it (and can therefore impose strategic 
decisions regarding financing, capital sourcing and dividend distribution). It is the economic 
ownership that may have an impact on the financing patterns of a firms and its potential 
implication into circuits of financialisation.  
Other types of relationship (e.g. of debtor/creditor or supplier/client) were not to possible to 
be identified on a systematic basis. On the customer/supplier side, questions that could have 
been explored include the extent to which firms that are dependent on a single client/off-
taker have different capital sourcing behaviours than those who have a diversified client base, 
and whether those that have a single client are supported by that client in raising the capital 
needed for investments (e.g. through corporate guarantees). Further context criteria such as 
the corporate structure (with simple or multiple locations) of the firms, their activity (including 
their tier position) or history (foundation prior or after 1989, by local individuals or by foreign 
corporates) were not considered explicitly for practical reasons, although they would be of 
relevance for future research. The firm’s activity and position within the GPN (i.e. its functional 
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location within the global production networks and its tier positioning) in particular has been 
evaluated in GPN and GVC research on the automobile industry before, cf. Pavlínek and Ženka 
(2011), but it was not possible to conduct this on a systematic basis within the scope of this 
study (except when it corresponds to ownership, i.e. one firm being owned by another). This 
‘functional location’ aspect is important and would enable questions such as whether firms at 
certain positions within the production process and within a global production network (with 
the power relationships that this implies) have easier and cheaper access to capital. Similar to 
Pavlínek and Ženka (2011), trends for industrial upgrading (as a means to assess regional 
development prospects) could be assessed considering primary indicators such as turnover 
per employee, factor productivity, wages and salaries per employee and R&D intensity and 
secondary indicators such as capital intensity, value added in production, labour productivity, 
capital productivity and R&D employment, but this was beyond the scope of this study and 
remains to be done by future research. Another question could be whether firms can impose 
certain financing terms on lower-tier GPN firms (such as relatively delayed payment terms for 
the goods delivered) and thereby reduce their own need for working capital by increasing the 
need for working capital within the lower-tier firms (which must then find a way to raise that 
capital for the interim period in which they have delivered the good but have not yet been 
paid). This however was not covered within the scope of this study and remains an area to be 
covered by future research. 
Once the context variables collected for a firm from the commercial register extract, the 
annual statement was used to identify the sources of capital present. Capital sources were 
considered as follows: 
• capital contributed by shareholders (directly or through the capital market) 
• reserves accumulated (trough retention of profits from earlier periods) 
• provisions (for pensions, taxes etc.) 
• bonds (liabilities to investors that are neither shareholders nor banks) 
• amounts owed to credit institutions (bank loans) 
• amounts owed to affiliated companies (intra-group loans with other GPN firms) 
• trade payables (including debt to suppliers, i.e. to the smaller GPN firms) 
Each of these elements was assessed not in absolute terms, but rather as a percentage of the 
total balance sheet, thereby eliminating the problem of nominal and real values for change 
  Methodology 
 
 
 
93 
over time as well as the problem of exchanges rates between currencies (Euro in Germany 
and Forint in Hungary). It should be noted that for this study, funds contributed by the owning 
firm were considered as ‘equity’ regardless whether contributed in the legal form of equity or 
(as often the case) as shareholder loans. While the distinction between equity and shareholder 
loans is relevant for accounting, tax and regulatory reasons, the aggregation of the two seems 
more relevant for this study as the focus here is on the relationship between capital providers 
and capital users. It is therefore more relevant to consider who contributes the capital 
(exercising control and influence over the firm) rather than the legal form of its contribution.  
The firm-level data thus collected was compiled into a single database to enable a systematic 
analysis. The database was compiled in the form of an Excel file and contains the same type 
of individual data elements for each firm of the sample. Each data point is associated to a 
specific firm and to a specific year (usually 2016 or 2017) so that structures can be analysed in 
a meaningful manner across firm categories. Given the large number of data points compiled, 
doing this fully manually (i.e. copying each figure individually from the relevant source and 
into the relevant place in the database) would have been tedious, time-consuming and prone 
to errors of manual recopying. Therefore, the compilation process was automatized to the 
largest extent possible by using macros written in VBA and AppleScript code searching for the 
relevant data in the source documents (generally in PDF format) and copying them into the 
relevant place in the Excel database. An important aspect of this process was to make sure no 
errors occur through the automatic compilation: this was done through (i) automatic sanity-
checks (for example calculating whether the sum of individual balance sheet items matches 
with aggregate balance sheet size) and (ii) manual sanity checks (comparing randomly selected 
data points between the database and the source document). 
Legal	form	of	the	firms	
One complementary data element collected for all firms in the sample is their legal form. A 
vast majority of the firms is incorporated as the German or Hungarian equivalent of a private 
company limited by shares (“Ltd.”): 203 (or 70%) of the German firms are organized as a 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (“GmbH”); 169 (or 81%) of the Hungarian firms are 
organized as a korlátolt felelősségű társaság (“Kft”). In comparison, the other two main forms 
of incorporation are much less common in the sample but still represent a certain proportion 
of it: 34 (or 12%) of the German firms are a Kommanditgesellschaft (“KG”) and 8 (or 4%) of 
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the Hungarian firms are a betéti társaság (“Bt”), which are both the equivalent of a limited 
partnership (“LP”) with at least one shareholder with unlimited liability. However, all German 
KGs are in fact “GmbH & Co. KGs”, where the unlimited partner is not a private person but a 
GmbH. As a result, they closely resemble a GmbH in terms of shareholder liability and 
governance control. Only 16 (or 6%) of the German firms are an Aktiengesellschaft (“AG”) and 
20 (or 10%) of the Hungarian firms are a részvénytársaság (“Rt”), i.e. the equivalent of a public 
company limited by shares (“plc”). However, all Hungarian Rts are not Rts whose shares have 
actually been offered to the public (nyilvános részvénytársaság,  “Nyrt”) but rather Rts whose 
shares have been offered only to its founders (zártkörű részvénytársaság, “Zrt”), so they are 
not traded on the stock market and resemble more a private Kft in many ways. The difference 
between a Kft and a Zrt lies more in the rules applicable to its establishment and operations 
(e.g. minimum capital requirements etc.) and therefore less relevant for the purpose of this 
study. The remaining 36 German and 11 Hungarian firms (12% and 5% of the respective 
national sample) are organised as neither of these customary legal forms and include 
academic and other research institutions, associations, individual entrepreneurs etc. The legal 
form in which a firm (or rather its owner) elects to incorporate the firm has a significant impact 
on the way the firm is organized, the legal and other obligations it is subject to, the modes of 
financing it will use, etc. As an example, only an AG/Rt is able to raise capital in the form of 
equity on the stock market, by publicly issuing new shares subscribed by a large number of 
investors that do not necessarily have a direct relationship with the firm. By contrast, a 
GmbH/Kft’s equity is provided by the closed group of the firm’s existing shareholders, often a 
very small number of long-term investors with strong historic ties to the firm (such as the 
founding family for example). The decision to transform a GmbH/Kft into an AG/Rt and to 
‘float’ its equity on the stock market through an initial public offering (IPO) is sometimes done 
as part of a firm’s strategy to grow and expand, aiming to raise additional equity on the stock 
market to fund its acquisitions and developments. An alternative way for a GmbH/Kft to 
increase the equity available for its development is to be taken over by another larger (and 
often foreign) firm operating in the same sector, which may have more capacity than the 
original shareholders to provide the firm with additional equity to fund investments and 
developments. On the other hand, the ownership of a GmbH/Kft is likely to be more stable 
than the one of an AG/Rt, especially if the shares of the latter are traded on the stock market. 
Unless the GmbH/Kft is foreign owned, its ownership is also likely to be more “local” than the 
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one of an AG/Rt. Unless an AG/Rt is not traded on the stock-market (which may sometimes 
be the case, and which is the case for the sub-group of Rts which are the Zrts), its ownership 
is basically floating among a potentially very large and constantly changing number of 
shareholders with little or no durable spatial or organizational relation to the firm. By contrast, 
the shareholders of a GmbH/Kft typically consist of a very small group of long-term owners, 
often the founding family or in some cases a foreign firm that has acquired the GmbH/Kft as 
part of its geographic expansion. A GmbH/Kft may also count private equity firms or venture 
capitalists among its shareholders: while their involvement is likely to be less long-term than 
the one of a founding family or of a foreign firm operating in the same sector, it is still 
significantly closer to a firm and its operations than the one of an AG/Rt shareholder who may 
consider his investment more as a ‘financial asset’ rather than a ‘say’ in the management of 
the company. An AG/Rt whose equity is traded on the stock market is likely to be directly 
exposed to pressures of shareholder value (and a permanent, short-term assessment of the 
share price and firm’s financial performance by institutional investors, asset managers and 
rating agencies). This is by definition not the case for a privately held GmbH/Kft, although such 
a GmbH/Kft can be indirectly exposed to these pressures either through its shareholders or 
through its clients if these are the equivalent of an AG/Rt whose equity is traded on the stock 
market. The identification of a firm’s shareholders and clients allow to identify (i) those firms 
that are directly linked to the stock market, (ii) those that are indirectly linked to the stock 
market (through shareholders and/or through clients) and (iii) those that appear to be ‘very 
far’ from the stock market because neither their clients nor their shareholders have their own 
shares traded on the stock market. This helps understand whether and how these pressures 
actually materialize for each of these groups of firms. The high proportion of GmbHs and Kfts 
(75%) and the low number of AGs and Rts (7%) in the firms sample of this study, as well as the 
absence of any Nyrt among the Hungarian companies reflects the fact that these are mainly 
small- and medium-sized Tier-2 and Tier-3 suppliers, as opposed to OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers 
where the proportion of AGs and Rts could be expected to be higher.  
3.2.2 Qualitative	Data	Collection	
While the quantitative data collected as described in the preceding section allowed to 
establish empirically which capital sources the firms use (rather than having to assume which 
ones they use), one limitation of this approach is that it does not provide any explanation of 
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the causes of the patterns: it tells little as to the reasons and implications of the patterns 
observed. Why do firms finance their activities the way they do and what does this mean for 
their governance and local and regional development? Qualitative information is therefore 
needed to complement the quantitative analysis by helping contextualise and interpret the 
data. This section first presents the original plan of collecting qualitative data for this study 
and explains why this route was eventually abandoned. It then sets out what type of 
qualitative data was eventually collected and how this data was used to contextualise and 
interpret the quantitative data collected.  
Original	Plan:	Semi-Structured	Interviews	
The original intention of this study was, once sufficient publicly available information on the 
industry in general and on the selected sample of firms in particular had been collected and 
analysed to develop a solid knowledge of the sector enhancing the author’s capacity to discuss 
in a meaningful way with actors within the industry (Schoenberger 1991), to then enhance 
this understanding through semi-structured interviews with firm representatives (such as 
conducted with car component manufacturers in other regions e.g. by Pavlínek (2002) in the 
Czech Republic). The aim was to conduct interviews with representatives of about 20 firms in 
each of the two regions, ideally focusing on a sub-sector of the industry (such as, for example, 
producers of a specific group of components, or of a certain activity) covering firms of all sizes 
(large, medium-sized and small) and types (local or foreign, individual or corporately owned, 
different tiers). Without aspiring to be in any way representative of either (i) the entire 
automobile supplier industry or even (ii) of the targeted sub-sector, such a heterogeneous 
sample could have helped capture and illustrate the diversity of firm types and financing 
practices within a certain sub-sector of the automobile supplier industry. Within this sample 
of firms, the main target group of people to be interviewed consisted in those firm 
representatives that are in charge of the firm’s financing operations, i.e. ‘sourcing’ equity or 
debt on behalf of the firm and that are involved in the relevant decision making processes. 
This is typically the firms’ chief financial officer (CFO) or other directors of the finance 
department when firms are sufficiently large to have one. In small family-owned firms, this 
may in some cases be the firm’s owner himself. It was envisaged to start with a ‘pilot’, a small 
group of companies to test the approach and organisation of the interview process, to be then 
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rolled out to the larger group once the approach had been tested and potentially amended to 
work better. 
In addition to obtaining the interviewee’s acceptance to participate in the interview, it would 
also be important to motivate them to do so in an engaged and active manner. Schoenberger 
(1991)’s recommendations in this respect regarding corporate interviews provided useful 
guidance, including but not limited to (i) good preparation on part of the author (evidencing 
that their business was well understood) and (ii) integration of “problem-solving” elements in 
the interview such as asking them to compare with peer firms that could stimulate the 
interviewee’s interest in participating. The observations of Cormode and Hughes (1996) and 
Cormode and Hughes (1999) as well as Ward and Jones (1999), Hughes (1999) and Mullings 
(1999) regarding specificities and difficulties encountered in interviewing elites (such as, in 
particular, positionality, and in the present case, the author’s being a foreign academic 
external to the car industry) would also be relevant considering the type of interviewee that 
was targeted.   
When this plan was rolled out in practice by a campaign of both e-mail and phone calls to a 
number of firms starting in Hungary, it quickly appeared that this route was not practicable: 
the response rate to e-mails was close to zero, and the response to phone calls was a polite 
but firm refusal to engage in any kind of discussion regarding the firm’s financing strategy. A 
willingness to conduct an interview was signalled in only 2 cases, not sufficient to collect 
significant firm-level qualitative data for this study through this method. This very low success 
rate of the attempted organisation of interviews can be put into perspective with the 
experience of Gentile-Lüdecke and Giroud (2009) who had a response rate of 16% on their 
mail survey of Polish car component manufactures regarding the transmission of knowledge, 
and Harzing (2000) according to whom response rates for mail surveys of car component 
manufacturers tend to be around 20% on average (based on a survey of 22 European 
countries) but tend to be lower the further away the surveyed firms are geographically (and 
culturally) from the location of the researcher. The quasi 0% response rate to the e-mail 
campaign of this study therefore likely reflects the relative distance in particular of the 
Hungarian firms from the researcher’s location in the UK, very likely exacerbated by the fact 
that finance is considered by the firms as a particularly sensitive topic on which the motivation 
to discuss with an external researcher is particularly low. It is also coherent with the notorious 
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difficulty in engaging with small firms, in particular on sensitive topics, as confirmed by the 
literature such as Ram and Holliday (1993) for example. The seemingly contrasting of 
examples of Bečicová and Blažek (2015) who managed to conduct interviews with 36% of the 
Czech car component manufactures contacted to discuss their perception of a credit gap in 
the periphery (even though, as the authors admit, sometimes only after considerable effort 
by the researchers) and of Pavlínek and Ženka (2010) with a 35% response rate to their survey 
seems to confirm the importance of geographical and cultural proximity for the success of 
interviews and surveys as identified by Harzing (2000) in respect of mail surveys. As the 
interviews eventually turned out not to be practicable within the scope of this study (and 
therefore remain to be done through future research), the study progressed without them 
and was finalised with the data that the author was able to access otherwise. 
Secondary	Qualitative	Sources	
In the absence of interviews as described above, other publicly available qualitative sources 
were used to help interpret the quantitative data. This included general information on the 
automotive supplier industries in Eastern Germany and Hungary which provided a necessary 
empirical context for the quantitative firm-level data. Such information was taken mostly from 
available secondary sources such as existing academic research articles, reports by 
professional organisations and research networks. Many academic publications concerned 
with the automotive supplier industry in Eastern Germany and Hungary (including from a GPN 
perspective) are available and a certain number of analytical reports specific to the 
automotive supplier industry and or relevant financial practices are available from sources 
such as public international organisations (e.g. OECD, IMF, ECB, EIB), public national 
organisations such as development agencies, market research/consulting firms (e.g. PWC, 
E&Y, BCG, Nielsen Consulting), financial institutions and financial business associations such 
as Euromoney (with its handbooks on Securitisation and Structured Finance, international and 
national automotive (supplier) business associations (e.g. ACEA, OICA, VdA, OESA which is the 
OEM’s supplier association or CLEPA the European Association of Automotive Suppliers), trade 
unions such as IG Metall, car-focused research networks such as the Paris-based Gerpisa and 
trade journals (such as Automotive News and its Market Data Books). 
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Industry-wide statistical data was also available from both general and industry specific 
sources (with a focus on NUTS2 level whenever possible). There is a wide range of statistical 
data available although not all sources were of use for this project: 
• Data published by Eurostat and the national statistical offices of Germany and Hungary 
• Statistical data published by public and private and international organisations, 
business associations and research networks mentioned above 
• BACH, the database of the European Commission’s Bank for the Accounts of 
Companies Harmonised was of limited use for this project given that it currently covers 
only 8% of German companies and no Hungarian companies.  
• Databases operated by BvD (Bureau van Dijk): the FAME database is limited to UK and 
Irish companies, but BvD offers equivalents in other countries (such as Dafne for 
Germany but none for Hungary) as well as a pan-European database (Amadeus). 
• the fDi Markets database (an online database maintained by fDi Intelligence, itself a 
specialist division of the Financial Times), with sector categories such as ‘automotive 
components’ and ‘automotive OEM’;  
• UNCTAD numbers on FDI flows at country level;  
• the Euromonitor database; and 
• finance sites such as Yahoo Finance or Google Finance, the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
This publicly available qualitative data was used to help interpret, to the extent possible, the 
quantitative data collected to understand why the financing patterns look the way they do 
and what implications this may have on the firms’ governance and on local and regional 
development, as well as on the role the firm’s agency plays therein. 
3.2.3 Data	Analysis	
The quantitative and qualitative data collected was analysed using the conceptual framework 
discussed in Chapter 2 and the methodological approach discussed earlier in this chapter.  
Analytical	Framework	
The quantitative information gathered with regards to the capital sources of a firm was used 
to establish for each firm which ‘suppliers’ of capital (as the term is used in Figure 7) are 
present in each of the firms. Rather than taking the presence of capital for granted or 
considering only certain capital sources (such as the capital markets) without establishing 
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whether they are actually present, this enabled an analysis of the actual capital sources 
present in the firms and hence which types of relationships the firms have to deal with as part 
of their firm governance framework as discussed in Section 2.3.2. This analysis was also a 
preliminary condition to evaluating whether or not the sample of firms analysed as part of this 
study might support the pecking order theory (as discussed in Section 2.3.2). This part of the 
analysis relied primarily on the quantitative data collected. 
In a next step, the sources of capital empirically identified were put into perspective with the 
firm’s location and size, to assess for example to which extent regional equity or debt gaps 
affecting in particular smaller and peripheral firms as discussed in Section 2.3.1 could be 
identified. This introduced a spatial dimension into the analysis to allow for an analysis of the 
data from a geographical perspective. The data was then put into perspective with the firm’s 
ownership, to assess more particularly from a GPN perspective as discussed in Section 2.2.3, 
to the extent firms were identified to be owned by other GPN firms, raising the question 
whether these firms would tend to access capital in a significantly different way than the firms 
that are integrated into global production networks through their commercial relations but 
not through their ownership. While the data available did not permit the identification of 
commercial relationships between the firms, the ownership relation between two GPN firms 
is very common particularly in Hungary and, as evidenced by the results of the analysis, has a 
significant impact on the way the firms source their capital. 
Finally, the results obtained from this quantitative analysis were contextualised through the 
qualitative data collected, in particular with respect to the institutional infrastructures of 
capital provision in the two regions studied. The aim here was to establish to which extent the 
diverse patterns of capital sourcing identified among the firm sample through the quantitative 
data, with certain tendencies apparent depending of the firms’ size, location (both between 
Hungary and Eastern Germany, and in more or less peripheral regions of each of these regions) 
and ownership (by GPN firms, by local individuals or others) might be explained or understood 
through the relevant local variegations of capital (as discussed in Section 2.1), as these 
translate into specific institutional infrastructures of capital provision for the firms. 
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Quantitative	Data	Analysis	
More specifically with respect to the quantitative data collected, once the quantitative 
indicators mentioned above collected, they were analysed to establish whether any 
regularities could be identified between the size, location and ownership of a firm on the one 
side and its sources of capital on the other side. It could be expected, for example that larger 
firms have access to a wider range of financing sources (including the capital market) than 
smaller firms. The indicators established for each firm were thus aggregated to analyse and 
identify patters across regions. The patterns thus identified would show an uneven degree of 
connectedness to financial actors, an uneven access to capital and an uneven stability of 
financing for firms depending on their locations, size and ownership relations. 
Once the headquarters’ addresses for each firm (including the relevant post codes) collected, 
a first high level locational analysis was done by looking at how locations are distributed across 
NUTS1 regions in Germany and Hungary. This was facilitated by a correspondence table 
retrieved from the Eurostat website10 indicating the NUTS (level 1, 2 or 3) region for every 
postcode. The locational analysis by NUTS regions (even at the more precise NUTS2 or NUTS3 
levels) is only a high level one and does not allow a precise locational analysis. Such precise 
locational analysis is only possible using GIS-tools such as ArcMap. This requires the 
conversion of addresses into coordinates (degrees, minutes and seconds of latitude and 
longitude), which was done using Google’s geocoding tool11 available for free online. As an 
example, the headquarters of the firm BORBET Thüringen GmbH located at the address ‘Am 
Fliegerhorst 17, 99947 Bad Langensalza’ translate into the coordinates “Latitude: 51.12557; 
Longitude: 10.629840000000058” (minutes and seconds being expressed as decimals of the 
degrees). Once the addresses converted into coordinates, these were used to produce an 
overview mapping of the firms in ArcMap, displaying the data geographically by using 
ArcMap’s XY display function for latitudes and longitudes and combining the result with base 
maps (for country borders etc.) found in the ArcMap resources.   
The data was not analysed through advanced quantitative methods such as regression 
analysis, principal component analysis (PCA) or cluster analysis (cf. Carballa Smichowski et al. 
                                                        
10 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/correspondence-tables/postcodes-and-nuts  
11 http://www.geocoderpro.com/en/resources/free-online-geocoder/ 
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(2016)) using statistical software such as SPSS or eView. This would have allowed to evaluate 
more precisely potential relationships between one dependent variable (e.g. the proportion 
of retained earnings) and a set of independent variables (e.g. the location in Hungary or 
Eastern Germany, and within each region in the centre or the periphery, the size or ownership 
of the firm) but remains to be done through future research. Instead, the structural patterns 
identified were visualised through various means to make them more perceptible and 
facilitate their interpretation. Depending on the nature of each specific pattern or trend to be 
visualised, the visualisation was done through maps or charts. The visualisation of structural 
patterns through maps (produced with the help of ArcGIS software) revealed a complex 
landscape of capital sourcing patterns across regions.  
3.3 Reflexivity	
This section discusses some of the reflexivity, ethics and positionality issues of this study, both 
as they result from the research design and as they appeared during the research, mainly 
concerning the systematic collection of information on the firm’s activity, commercial 
relationships and tier-positioning.  
Ethical considerations of this project were in respect of working with people (through the 
interviews originally planned) and with firm level data concerning specific corporates 
(throughout the entire duration of the project). Another specificity of the project is that much 
of its empirical work concerns firms that still operate today, and which (just like any other 
corporate) consider some of the information regarding their business and strategy which are 
not already publicly known as confidential and not to be disseminated. The approach retained 
was not to use any such information for this study (and no confidential information was 
obtained in the absence of interviews): any information concerning a specific firm was taken 
from public, non-confidential sources. If any confidential information had been obtained 
(through interviews with individuals working inside the relevant firm) and if it had constituted 
a useful complement for this project, this could in theory have been done in two, potentially 
combined, ways: 
• Corporate Consent: if the concerned firm had consented to the utilization of a specific 
piece of confidential information in this study, this could have been done. However, 
this also meant that the firm was likely to request a say not only regarding which piece 
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of confidential information was used, but also how it was used, i.e. how it was 
contextualised within the paper. More generally, explicit collaboration with firms 
could potentially have increased the author’s ability to access confidential information 
(potentially subject to the signature of a confidentiality agreement) and potentially 
enhanced the potential relevance of the study also from the corporate’s point of view. 
However, it would also have meant that the corporate’s say on the paper would have 
increased at the expense of the independence of the author’s own analysis, and was 
therefore not a preferred route. 
• Anonymisation/Pseudonyms: in some cases, confidential information could have 
been used (again with the consent of the concerned corporate) on an anonymised 
basis or with the utilization of pseudonyms (and with no direct quotations) rather than 
the actual names of the corporates, see Czaban and Henderson (1998) for such an 
example. Potential issues here would have been the questions (i) to what extent 
information given under pseudonyms does not weaken the relevance and 
generalizability of the overall analysis and (ii) whether the use of pseudonyms 
constitutes a sufficient protection for anonymity in a sector with only a limited number 
of actors. This was therefore likely to be an option only for those parts of the GPN with 
a sufficiently high number of actors (i.e. tier-two and tier-three suppliers). 
In any case, as eventually no confidential information was obtained and used in this study, the 
above considerations could rather serve as a guidance for follow-up research pursuing the 
route of the corporate interviews.  
The overall methodological approach having now been presented, the next chapter sets out 
the empirical context of the study. 
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Chapter	4 Car	Component	Manufacturing	and	Financing	in	Hungary	
and	Eastern	Germany	
Following the formulation of the conceptual framework and methodology in the preceding 
chapters, this chapter presents the empirical context of the study: the car component 
manufacturing industries in Hungary and Eastern Germany generally and, more specifically, 
the sub-set of firms in both regions analysed as part of this study. The objective is to provide 
the empirical context for the subsequent findings chapters to facilitate the understanding of 
how the firms source their capital (Chapter 5), why they do it this way and what impact this 
might have on their governance as well as on local and regional development outcomes 
(Chapter 6). The first section (4.1) provides a brief overview of car component manufacturing 
in general before focusing on the specificities of Hungary and Eastern Germany. The second 
section (4.2) summarizes certain characteristics of the sub-set of about 320 firms split among 
both regions that was selected and analysed within the scope of this study, with focus on the 
firms’ location, size and, very importantly, ownership. The third section (4.3) discusses 
institutional infrastructures of capital provision in Hungary and Eastern Germany and evolving 
modes of firm finance in the post-socialist contexts of these regions. 
4.1 Car	Component	Manufacturing	Sector	Overview	
Since the introduction of the moving assembly line by Henry Ford in 1913, the “machine that 
changed the world” (Womack 1990) evolved from being a technological innovation into a 
commodity which is an essential component of hundreds of millions of households around the 
world, with about 70 million vehicles sold every year (OICA 2018a) and almost 1.3 billion 
vehicles in circulation in 2015 (OICA 2018c). At the same time, cars are a very complex 
commodity with a capital intensive production process involving global networks of firms 
connecting a relatively small number of assembling firms with a large number of component 
manufacturers. The car component manufacturing industry is therefore a very good (and well 
researched) example of global production networks, the theoretical framework presented in 
Section 2.2.1. The following section first gives a brief overview of the history and structure of 
the car component manufacturing industry generally (mainly following Dicken (2011)) before 
focusing on Hungary and Eastern Germany. 
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4.1.1 Car	Component	Manufacturing:	Supplying	‘the	Industry	of	Industries’	
Car manufacturing, once called ‘the industry of industries’ (Drucker 1946: 149) was one of the 
major drivers of industrial development until the 1970s and still constitutes one of the key 
industrial sectors today, employing 8 million workers worldwide (up to 20 million counting 
also those involved in the selling and servicing of cars) (Dicken 2011). Car manufacturing today 
is an assembly industry with complex relationships between a small number of very large 
assemblers of vehicles and a complex network of large and small suppliers of components: 
 
Figure 14 The automobile industry 
Source: Dicken (2011) 
The suppliers of components are organised in tiers, with the first-tier supplying the most 
complex and important components directly to the assemblers and assuming research and 
design tasks on their behalf, while the second-tier produces components based on design 
provided by the assemblers or tier-one suppliers and the third-tier produces the most basic 
components (Dicken 2011). While car manufacturing originated in the US and in Germany in 
the early 20th century, it has in the last 40 years become a global industry that remains strongly 
concentrated geographically, with about two thirds of global production today concentrated 
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in only seven countries: Japan, China, Germany, the US, South Korea, Brazil and France, but 
production also growing in other regions such as Eastern Europe among others (Dicken 2011). 
Car	manufacturing:	from	mass	to	lean	production	and	the	rise	of	non-US	giants	
The first phase of car manufacturing on an industrial scale was based on mass production as 
introduced through Henry Ford’s moving assembly line in 1913, producing a small range of 
highly standardised models in very high volumes by a highly specialised workforce in order to 
obtain economies of scale allowing to reduce unitary production costs (Dicken 2011).  This 
changed significantly in the early 1970s when Japanese car manufacturer Toyota introduced 
lean production, a highly efficient and cost-competitive production system which soon came 
to replace mass production (just like mass production had replaced craft production in the 
early 20th century) and became the new global norm adopted by car component 
manufacturers worldwide:  while under mass production each vehicle model was produced 
on its own production platform, lean production introduced the sharing of production 
platforms between different vehicle models, allowing the use of common components in 
different type of vehicles and the production of a larger range of models with a limited number 
of production sites (Dicken 2011). Other car assemblers followed suit: VW for example 
reduced the number of platforms used from 16 to 4, General Motors from 25 to eight and 
Nissan from 24 to five, with platforms in most cases being used to produce several vehicle 
models (Dicken 2011). Lean production further introduced the principle of modules (groups 
of physically adjacent components that constitute a coherent unit within the vehicle) and 
systems (groups of components located throughout the car but operating together to provide 
a specific function, such as braking systems, electrical systems and steering systems), which 
have become the norm in car manufacturing today (Dicken 2011).  
While car manufacturing in the first half of the 20th century was very fragmented (with many 
nationally based assemblers in every car producing country: over 80 in the US, over 150 in 
France and over 40 in the UK) and increasingly concentrated (with General Motors and Ford 
alone representing more than 50% of global car production by the 1960s), it is today still a 
highly-concentrated industry but no longer dominated by the US firms, with a small number 
of also Asian and European firms leading the group:  
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Rank Company Headquarters Cars produced in 2016 
1 Toyota Japan 10,213,486 
2 Volkswagen Germany 10,126,281 
3 Hyundai South Korea 7,889,538 
4 GM US 7,793,066 
5 Ford US 6,429,485 
6 Nissan Japan 5,556,241 
7 Honda Japan 4,999,266 
8 Fiat Italy 4,681,457 
9 Renault France 3,373,278 
10 PSA France 3,152,787 
Figure 15 World’s top car manufacturers (2016) 
Source: OICA (2018b) 
Today’s situation is the result of many years of acquisitions and mergers in the industry (but 
also of the organic growth of some producers): a very early example was the acquisition of 
German car manufacturer Opel by US firm General Motors in 1929, but the landscape changed 
the most dramatically in the 1990s when for example GM acquired Saab, Ford acquired Jaguar, 
Land Rover and Volvo, BMW acquired Rover, Renault acquired a material stake in Nissan and 
German Daimler-Benz acquired the US firm Chrysler and then DaimlerChrysler acquired a 
material stake in Mitsubishi and a similar process of concentration was observed among the 
major car component manufacturers with the growth of (respectively GM and Ford spin-offs) 
Delphi and Visteon for example (Dicken 2011). This process proved not irreversible however, 
with the breakup of Daimler with Chrysler (eventually merged with Fiat) in 2007 and 
divestments around the crisis of 2008 such as for example Saab and Hummer by GM, Jaguar-
Land Rover and Volvo by Ford and GM almost (but eventually not) selling Opel for example – 
consolidation continued, however, for example with VW acquiring a stake in Suzuki (Dicken 
2011) and PSA acquiring Opel and Vauxhall in 2017. The prime example of a firm having 
reached a top position through (almost) exclusively organic growth is Toyota (Dicken 2011). In 
addition to these numerous capitalistic relationships between the world’s major car 
component manufactures, there is also an important number of collaborative agreements 
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between the firms consisting in both technical and marketing cooperation, such as for 
example the partnership between Daimler, Renault and Nissan (Dicken 2011). 
More recently, another technological revolution has been in the making which is expected to 
again fundamentally transform the automotive industry and lead to big structural changes 
(including ramifications in the component supply chain) in the coming years: the development 
of electric vehicles (originally pioneered by Tesla but since taken on by all major traditional 
OEMs), the shift to autonomous vehicles and the rise of mobilities services. While a majority 
of cars produced today are still based on traditional combustion engines and require a human 
driver, the high expectations of the sector with regards to the coming structural shift is 
illustrated by the joint venture capital fund announced in January 2018 by Nissan, Renault and 
Mitsubishi and which is expected to invest 1 billion USD into electric vehicle technologies, 
autonomous systems and other transport innovations (Hering 2018a). As early as 2019, 
General Motors intends to commercialise self-driving cars with no traditional controls like 
steering wheels or pedals (Hering 2018b). This being said, certain barriers and resistances to 
the structural shift remain (Berkeley et al. 2017), and some car manufacturers such as BMW 
cautiously ensure their current investments in future production sites will provide the 
flexibility to produce both cars with traditional combustion engines and with electric batteries 
to allow adjustment to what the actual demand for the various models will be (Wilson 2017).  
Car	component	manufacturing:	changing	relationships	and	constitution	of	networks	
Very soon in the history of car production, car manufacturers started outsourcing the 
production of components and concentrate on the assembly of the final product. One of the 
knock-on effects of the introduction of lean production was therefore an increased pressure 
by car assemblers on component manufacturers to deliver components quickly (‘just-in-
time’), at low cost, on a continuous basis and in high quality - leading to tier-one suppliers 
taking on some of the research, design and development of component modules and systems 
(and the risks associated thereto) and a pressure for suppliers to locate geographically close 
to the car assembler’s sites of car assembly (Dicken 2011). A further knock-on effect of this 
was a consolidation among car component manufacturers similar to the one observed among 
car assemblers: over a period of only ten years, the number of car component manufacturers 
in the US declined from around 30,000 in 1990 to 10,000 by the year 2000  (and significantly 
further since) and all major car assemblers significantly reduced the number of their suppliers 
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(e.g. Peugeot-Citroën from 900 to less than 500 or BMW from 1400 to 600), with a similar 
reduction of tier-two firms as suppliers to the tier-one firms, in particular following the crisis 
of 2008 (Dicken 2011). One of the effects of this increasing concentration of suppliers is that 
they are increasingly becoming functionally segmented in four main groups including raw 
material suppliers (which supply raw materials such as steel blanks, aluminium ingots or 
polymer pellets to the car assemblers or their suppliers), component specialists (that design 
and manufacture components tailored to a production platform or vehicle such as stampings, 
injection moulding or engine components), standardisers (setting standard on a global basis 
for a specific component or system, such as tyres, anti-lock braking systems ‘ABS’ or engine 
control units ‘ECU’) and integrators (designing and assembling entire modules or systems for 
a car, such as interiors, doors or the chassis for example) (Dicken 2011). While raw material 
producers and component specialists often represent the lower tiers in the hierarchy and can 
have a local, regional or global presence depending on the context, standardisers and 
integrators have significant research and design responsibilities, are often tier-one, very close 
to the car assemblers (with ‘organisationally close’ long-term relationships) and usually 
operate on a global scale (often opening production sites close to the production sites of their 
clients and sometimes even ‘co-locating’ in ‘industrial condominiums’ or ‘supplier parks’ by 
being physically installed within or next to the car assemblers’ plants) (Dicken 2011). A 
distinction therefore emerged between a small group of powerful tier-one manufacturers of 
complex modules and systems (powerful because the car assemblers no longer have the 
capacity to produce these modules and systems themselves) with Robert Bosch, 
headquartered in Stuttgart, ranking number one under car components manufacturers 
worldwide (Automotive-News 2018), with over 200 production and developments sites in 28 
countries and employing over 140,000 people, and a much larger group of much less power 
full tier-two and tier-three manufactures of less complex and standardised components 
(whose main differentiation lies in the cost and that can therefore easily be substituted by 
others). The importance of the relationship between the car assemblers and a small number 
of globally present tier-one suppliers is also highlighted by Humphrey (2000) for example.  
In parallel to the development of a car supplier industry, the globalization of car 
manufacturing started as early as the 1920s (often with the aim to overcome protective 
barriers around national markets as well as high transportation costs for assembled vehicles), 
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became a central strategy of many manufacturers in the 1980s and further accelerated in the 
1990s, particularly into Central and Eastern Europe (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). Historically, 
GM and Ford were the first car producers to internationalise their production, first to Canada 
and then to Europe with the construction of Ford’s first European manufacturing plant in 
Manchester in 1911 and the acquisition of Vauxhall by GM in 1925 before their expansion into 
France and Germany with the acquisition of Opel by GM in 1929 (Dicken 2011). Japanese car 
manufacturers followed suit only much later (initially exporting cars that continued to be 
produced in Japan or elsewhere in Asia), with Honda leading the charge with a production 
plant opened in the US in 1982, Nissan opening one in Europe in 1986 and Toyota opening 
their first European plant only in 1992. The internationalisation of Japanese car manufacturers 
on a global scale has since increased significantly (to levels far beyond the one of US 
producers) (Dicken 2011). European manufacturers (such as VW, Renault or Fiat for example) 
often remained strongly concentrated within Europe (initially in Spain but with an increasing 
emphasis on Eastern Europe such as the Czech Republic or Slovakia) but also expanded into 
Brazil, Mexico and China as well as Japan and South Korea in the case of Renault and Peugeot-
Citroën (Dicken 2011). The last 30 years have also witnessed the increasing role and 
internationalisation of car assemblers from South Korea (with Hyundai today operating plants 
in China, India, Turkey, the US and the Czech Republic), India (with the acquisition of Jaguar-
Land Rover by Tata in 2008) and more recently also China (with the Shanghai Automotive 
Industrial Corporation SAIC and the Beijing Automotive Industrial Corporation BAIC for 
example) (on FDI in China’s automobile industry cf. also Liu and Dicken 2006; Dicken 2011). 
This process of car assembler’s globalisation also materialised in the constitution of regional 
networks of production, component supply and distribution within respectively North 
America, Europe and Asia (Dicken 2011). In Europe, with a comparatively complex car 
production network as a legacy of formerly national automobile industries (still dominated in 
terms of production volume by Germany, France, Spain and the UK), the landscape was 
profoundly shaped by the two major political and economic transformations that were the 
creation of the Single Market in 1992 and the fall of the Iron Curtain with the political and 
economic integration of the formerly state-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(cf. also Bernaciak and Scepanovic 2010; Dicken 2011). While the presence of US assemblers 
Ford and GM in Europe is almost 100 years old, Japanese firms Toyota, Nissan and Honda 
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arrived from the 1980s onwards (Dicken 2011) with a strategy markedly different than the one 
they had pursued in the US: while in the US they worked mainly with Japanese suppliers that 
followed them from Japan, in Europe Japanese car assemblers worked with existing local 
suppliers to a larger extent and practicing just-in-time production without necessarily being 
linked to spatial clustering (Hudson and Sadler 1992; Sadler 1994). The indigenous car 
assemblers in Europe often remain strongly embedded in their respective national contexts 
with only VW having a truly regional footprint across Europe with a focus on Germany, Spain 
as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia but also Poland and Hungary (Dicken 2011). Major 
car component manufacturers in Europe even appeared less dependent on their home 
markets compared to the European car assemblers, with some starting to internationalise 
their distribution even before the 1990s (Sadler 1999). Eastern Europe has been the main area 
of change in European networks of car production since the 1990s, with several car assemblers 
either taking over pre-existing local firms or building new plants themselves, such as GM 
establishing a presence in Poland and Russia, Toyota establishing a joint-venture with 
Peugeot-Citroën in the Czech Republic, and Peugeot-Citroën themselves relocating 
production from the UK to Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Hyundai operating a plant in the 
Czech Republic and Renault operating  plants in Romania and Slovakia (Dicken 2011; for a 
study of employment practices by foreign firms in the Czech automotive sector, cf. e.g. Meardi 
et al. 2013).  
This shift of car assembly to Central and Eastern Europe was accompanied by an increased 
shift of components production into this region as well, with affiliates of foreign suppliers 
establishing local production to follow their car assembler clients (or in some cases acquiring 
pre-existing local suppliers) but also by indigenous (often formerly state-owned) suppliers, 
although these latter are often restrained to the production of low-value components and 
only peripherally connected into the car assemblers’ trans-national networks of production 
(on the privatisation e.g. of Czech car component manufacturers, cf. Pavlínek 2002; Dicken 
2011). This raised the question of the embeddedness of foreign car assemblers in networks of 
local car component suppliers (Sadler et al. 1993) which resulted to be unequal, and in the 
case of VW for example stronger in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia (Pavlínek and Smith 
1998). This is especially true for car components in Central and Eastern Europe, where 
industrial upgrading and tier-1 positions tend to be reserved to foreign-owned firms and not 
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achievable for locally owned firms, as evidenced by Rugraff (2010) in respect of the Czech 
Republic for example. Rugraff (2013) further highlights the fragile situation of locally owned 
car component manufacturers in the Czech Republic in term of linkages with foreign car 
assemblers. Still in a Czech context, Pavlínek (2003) highlights how foreign car assemblers link 
with locally owned car component manufacturers mainly for low-skilled low-cost products, 
with a risk that they move away to even cheaper locations (such as Poland or Slovakia in 
respect of the Czech Republic). According to Humphrey and Memedovic (2003), car 
assemblers increasingly prefer to bring their own tier-one suppliers to the regions into which 
they expand, leaving little place for car component manufacturers in the host countries to 
achieve ‘industrial upgrading’ and a higher tier-position. More opportunities exist in the lower 
tiers where the production of less sophisticated components can be assumed by local car 
component manufacturers. Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck (2013) highlight the importance of 
geographical, cultural and relational proximity between car assemblers and car component 
manufacturers in Europe and the different strategies pursued by firms in this respect. 
It remains to be seen to which extent the coming structural transformation of car 
manufacturing as discussed above (with electric vehicles, autonomous vehicles and mobilities 
services) will affect and potentially transform the car component manufacturing industry in 
Central and Eastern Europe (such as for example the rise of battery suppliers for electric 
vehicles), depending on the way in which the local firms will be able, or not, to adapt to these 
new circumstances.  
4.1.2 The	Contrasting	Examples	of	Hungary	and	Eastern	Germany	
The car component industries in Hungary and Eastern Germany are an integral part of this 
global evolution, however with their own specificities due to their respective local context, 
reflecting particular variegations of capitalism as discussed conceptually in Chapter 2. The way 
in which the car component industries are structured in these two regions is the combined 
result of a common state-socialist past and a different trajectory taken by the two regions 
since (Eastern Germany having been absorbed virtually overnight in the existing capitalism of 
Western Germany, and Hungary taking its own way of privatisations and foreign direct 
investment). As a result, the structure of the car component industries (including in particular 
the ownership structures) differs between Hungary and Eastern Germany, and both are 
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different from what can be found in the UK or in the US for example – reflective of the different 
variegations of capitalism prevalent in these regions. 
Car	production	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe:	transformations	and	contrasts	
In Central and Eastern Europe, several countries started producing cars as early as the first 
decades of the 20th Century. Under state socialism, most of these countries (in particular the 
GDR with the Trabant, Czechoslovakia with Škoda and Romania with Dacia) maintained their 
national car manufacturing industries, with only limited cross-border manufacturing and 
quasi-monopolistic but small domestic markets, hence only limited economies of scale and a 
reduced speed of technological development (Czaban and Henderson 1998). Hungary was a 
notable exception with no domestic car production since the 1930s although it did produce 
car components and buses (Czaban and Henderson 1998). After the collapse of state socialism 
in 1989/1990, the automotive production industries in Central and Eastern Europe underwent 
a radical process of transformation, with high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
strong implications on the workplace and regional development, as analysed for example by 
Swain (1996) in the case of Hungary and Eastern Germany. The privatization of the domestic 
car manufacturing industries (largely sold to foreign investors) was seen by the new 
governments as an opportunity to sell at a good price, maintain or even increase employment 
levels, direct additional resources and technologies into the country and open new markets 
while, at the same time, maintaining the dominance of domestic firms within the domestic 
markets (Czaban and Henderson 1998). Foreign investors, on their side, were attracted by 
prospects of new markets (and more specifically, of monopolistic positions of production 
within markets where import tariffs remained high), a cheap but skilled workforce, 
comparatively weak unions and cooperative governments (Czaban and Henderson 1998) 
characteristic of the variegations of capitalism prevalent in these regions at that time. Among 
the numerous foreign investors acquiring state-owned manufacturers in Central Europe was 
Volkswagen, with the acquisition of Škoda in Czechoslovakia in 1991. In other cases, foreign 
investors made greenfield investments, directly building their own manufacturing sites rather 
than acquiring pre-existing structures. Foreign lead firms generally played an important role 
in transforming the Central European automotive industries after 1990 through foreign direct 
investment and the acquisition of formerly state-owned assets (Sadler and Swain 1994; 
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Pavlínek et al. 2009). This is an illustration of how global production networks can participate 
in the transformation of variegations of capitalism as discussed in Chapter 2.2.2 (Lane 2008).  
In 1990, Volkswagen was one of the first to establish a presence in Eastern Germany to benefit 
from production costs that were lower compared to their traditional bases in Western 
Germany with an engine production site in Chemnitz, a cylinder head production site in 
Eisenach (Sadler et al. 1993) and a car assembly plant in Mosel near Zwickau established 1994. 
General Motors established a car assembly plant in Eisenach (Thuringia) as early as 1992 
(Sadler et al. 1993). More generally, a significant portion of total FDI into Eastern Germany in 
the early 1990s was related to the automotive industry (with USD 4 billion invested by 1993) 
(Sadler and Swain 1994).12 
While there had been car production in the GDR (Trabant), no cars were assembled in Hungary 
between the 1930s and the 1990s. Hungary however hosted the state-socialist COMECON’s 
main manufacturer of buses, Ikarus Karosszéria és Jármügyár (Bartlett and Seleny 1998) and 
specialized in the production of car components. The first foreign car manufacturer to 
(re)enter Hungary in 1990 was Ford with its components plant in Székesfehérvár, followed 
later in 1990 by GM/Opel with an auto assembly and engine plant in Szentgotthárd, Suzuki in 
1991 with a car assembly plant in Esztergom and VW/Audi in 1992 with an engine production 
and (later) car assembly plant in Győr (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). Today, Hungary remains 
specialized in the production of car components (particularly engines, transmissions and 
steering systems) and became the second largest exporter of car engines in Europe after 
Germany (Pavlínek et al. 2009). Ford’s strategy to develop a presence in Hungary pre-dated 
the end of state socialism and was initially shaped by the Hungarian import restrictions then 
in vigour, obliging foreign companies wishing to import finished goods into Hungary to offset 
these through exports from locally based subsidiaries (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). Ford 
therefore negotiated with the Hungarian government in the late 1980s to form a wholly 
owned local subsidiary (Ford Hungária) and to construct a plant in Székesfehérvár which was 
to produce car components. These car components would be exported out of Hungary, 
allowing Ford to import finished cars into Hungary in exchange. These import restrictions were 
however abolished by the outgoing state-socialist government soon after construction of the 
                                                        
12 Cf. also Swain (2002) on the privatisation of the East German automobile industry. 
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Székesfehérvár plant started in 1990, and Ford reoriented its Hungarian subsidiary as 
dedicated first-tier supplier of electronic parts to Ford’s assembly plants in Western Europe 
(Bartlett and Seleny 1998). While Ford initially tried to develop commercial relationships with 
local Hungarian suppliers, it had only four under contract by 1996 and significantly reduced 
efforts thereafter once it had obtained duty-free status for imports from Western Europe that 
year (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). By contrast, General Motors/Opel started looking at Hungary 
after the regime change and from the start sought to develop a local subsidiary (Opel Hungary) 
based in Szentgotthárd to offer low-cost, high-volume engine production for its assembly 
plants in Western Europe and final assembly of a car model (the Opel Astra) for the local 
market (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). As a European-based company, it was very early-on not 
obliged to comply with local content requirements, had a well-developed supplier network in 
Western Europe and therefore only very limited incentives to develop commercial 
relationships with local suppliers in Hungary (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). The assembly of the 
Opel Astra was done in CKD (“completely knocked down”) mode, with kits produced and 
packaged in Germany and sent by rail to Szentgotthárd for assembly (Bartlett and Seleny 
1998). Due to the small size of the local market, Astra production in Hungary remained limited 
as opposed for example to Poland, where the significantly larger amount of Astras assembled 
(up to 100,000 each year) led to a stronger development of commercial relationships with 
Polish supplier firms (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). 
The strategy of Volkswagen/Audi, Europe’s biggest car manufacturer, was initially similar to 
the one of GM and its Hungarian subsidiary (Audi Hungária) in Győr was from the start in 1993 
(Sadler and Swain 1994) set up to produce engines and supply them to the group’s assembly 
plants in Western Europe, as part of a wider effort to develop a complete production network 
in Eastern Europe (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). From the start, VW developed only limited ties 
with local suppliers because it had strong relationships with geographically not too distant 
suppliers in Germany and Austria and (as an EU company) could import components from 
these into Hungary with no particularly high taxes (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). VW’s plant in 
Győr was a hybrid acquisition/greenfield investment where VW purchased part of the existing 
Rába site and fitted it out with modern equipment to build engines in high volumes (Bartlett 
and Seleny 1998). In the later 1990s, VW also moved the assembly of its Audi TT (a sports car 
targeting wealthy clients in Western Europe) to the Győr plant (Bartlett and Seleny 1998).  
  Context 
 
 
 
116 
Suzuki, the fourth international car assembler to develop a presence in Hungary after 1990, 
negotiations with the Hungarian government having started as early as 1986 (Sadler and Swain 
1994), had a significantly different stance than the three others. Suzuki’s Hungarian subsidiary 
(Magyar Suzuki) developed a car assembly plant in Esztergom assembling the Swift model for 
both local sales and export into Western Europe. By 1996, the assembling capacity had 
reached 50,000, 40% of which were targeted as exports (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). Being both 
very far from its traditional supplier network in Asia and, as a non-European firm, obliged to 
comply with local content requirements, Suzuki was strongly incentivized to develop 
commercial relationships with local suppliers and modernize their production processes 
(Bartlett and Seleny 1998). Magyar Suzuki was supported by the Hungarian government to do 
so (through “tax holidays”, subsidies, free land and grants), an example of how the state 
supports the implementation of global production networks on its territory (Smith 2015). 
Magyar Suzuki took several measures (including the sharing of capital equipment with 
Hungarian suppliers) and, by 1995, had concluded supplier contracts with 38 local firms 
(Bartlett and Seleny 1998).13 
Car	component	manufacturing	in	Hungary	and	Eastern	Germany14	
Whether foreign car manufacturers chose to enter the market through the acquisition of 
domestic manufacturers or through greenfield investments, a crucial question (regarding the 
way global production networks developed and functioned thereafter in interaction with the 
local variegations of capitalism) was whether these foreign investors (i) brought in their own 
first- and second tier suppliers, (ii) imported components from other countries or (iii) relied 
on domestic suppliers and, in that latter case, whether they provided these domestic suppliers 
with the knowledge and resources (including capital) to improve processes and quality 
(Czaban and Henderson 1998), i.e. to ‘industrially upgrade’ to use GVC terminology. When 
lead firms brought in their own first tier suppliers, local component manufacturers often only 
became second tiers suppliers within global production networks in the best case (Czaban and 
                                                        
13 Cf. Swain (1998) on the impact of foreign direct investment by foreign car assemblers in Hungary on working 
conditions and local and regional development. 
14 Cf Humphrey and Memedovic (2003) also for an analysis of how the car component industry of Hungary 
changed in the 1990s and Crouch et al. (2009) for a comparison of car manufacturing in Hungary and Eastern 
Germany. 
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Henderson 1998). In the early 1990s, many foreign automotive component producers 
established production sites in Eastern Europe with the aim to integrate the region into their 
production systems (Sadler et al. 1993). Today, the supplier industry in Central and Eastern 
Europe is still dualistic, with affiliates of foreign companies following car assemblers on the 
one hand and ‘indigenous suppliers’ (often successors of formerly state-owned enterprises) 
on the other hand (Dicken 2003). Due to their “socially conditioned history of under-
development and limited technological applications” (Sadler et al. 1993: 342), the latter, to 
the extent they have survived and not been replaced by foreign companies tend to be 
restricted to low-value, low-technology operations (Dicken 2003). 
Even though, as mentioned above, Hungary had no car manufacturing industry under state 
socialism, it did have several major component producers (in particular Rába, Taurus and 
Csepel Autogyár) which supplied car manufacturers in other state-socialist countries (Russia, 
Poland and Yugoslavia) with car components (Sadler and Swain 1994; Bartlett and Seleny 
1998). When the large international car manufacturers entered Hungary, their decision to 
develop commercial relationships with these existing suppliers or to use their own suppliers 
in other countries depended on several factors, including their legal obligation to comply with 
local content rules, the geographical proximity of their existing suppliers in other countries 
and applicable taxes for importing components from other countries. For this reason, Suzuki 
was the only car manufacturer that invested considerably in developing commercial 
relationships with the existing Hungarian supplier industry (Sadler and Swain 1994; Bartlett 
and Seleny 1998). Although General Motors made some efforts to develop commercial 
relationships with local suppliers in the 1990s by offering technical support and advice to 
upgrade local production, it did not offer financial support – this however would have been 
important given that modernization of production (and hence industrial upgrading as 
discussed in Section 2.2.1) would have necessitated important capital investments in 
machinery and technology (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). Given that lead firms generally offered 
no financial support to local suppliers, that the state’s resources were limited and domestic 
bank credit was costly, local suppliers struggled to achieve the production modernization that 
would have been necessary to enable effective integration into the lead firms’ global 
production networks (Bartlett and Seleny 1998). Whereas in Hungary, Volkswagen developed 
only very limited links with local supplier networks, it strongly supported the development of 
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an indigenous supplier network in Eastern Germany, including the arranging of conferences 
and the creation of training centres in Zwickau and Chemnitz to assist local companies (Sadler 
et al. 1993).  
There is no such thing available as a comprehensive nominative list of all firms operating as 
car component suppliers in Hungary and Eastern Germany, but it is possible to estimate the 
number of existing firms that fall into this scope. The estimation is relatively straightforward 
in Hungary: according to Eurostat, about 500 companies in Hungary fall under the NACE Rev. 
2 category C29. Out of these, about 50 fall under category C29.1 (manufacture of motor 
vehicles), about 110 belong to category C29.2 (manufacture of bodies, trailers and semi-
trailers) and about 340 belong to category C29.3 (manufacture of parts and accessories for 
motor vehicles). The C29.3 group probably corresponds most closely to a generic definition of 
car component manufacturers, although firms in groups C29.1 and C29.2 could also be 
considered as being part of this industry. These 500 companies employ about 66,000 people 
but this workforce is very unevenly distributed: the majority of companies (about 280) are 
small and employ less than 10 people each, about 90 companies employ between 10 and 50 
people, about 80 companies employ between 50 and 250 people and less than 60 companies 
employ more than 250 people each (this predominance of small firms is confirmed by the data 
collected within the scope of this study as shown hereafter). These 500 companies operate 
about 540 ‘units’ (or production sites) in Hungary, meaning that most companies operate only 
a single site but some of them operate on two or more sites. Eurostat also provides a 
geographical breakdown of these production sites at NUTS2 level.  
The exercise is a bit trickier in Germany as both Eurostat and the German statistical office 
Destatis provide aggregate data comparable to those available for Hungary, but some of these 
data are provided only for Germany as a whole without a breakdown for Eastern Germany, 
i.e. the sub-set that concerns this study. In addition, there seems to be a methodological 
divergence in the presentation of data between Eurostat and Destatis (and even within 
Eurostat between years): Eurostat considers that about 2,900 companies in Germany belong 
to NACE category C29 while Destatis only counts about 1,000 as belonging to Destatis category 
WZ08-29 (which is defined in a way very similar to NACE C29). Interestingly enough, however, 
both Eurostat and Destatis consider that their respective group of companies employs about 
780,000 people so they seem to capture the same scope of ‘reality’ but maybe have different 
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ways of counting firms e.g. by counting a pure holding-company as a separate firm, or not – 
this would need to be determined by further analysis of their methodology. Neither Destatis 
nor Eurostat provide a geographical breakdown of the number of firms between Western and 
Eastern Germany, but Destatis do so for the firms’ turnover and both do so for the number of 
production sites. At the level of the production sites, however, the challenge again seems to 
be a significant methodological divergence: while Destatis consistently estimates the number 
of production sites across Germany at around 950 over the last years (out of which about 180 
in Eastern Germany), Eurostat’s estimation evolved around 1,400 until 2009 (out of which 
about 280 in Eastern Germany) but then suddenly jumped to over 6,000 since 2010 (out of 
which about 1,200 in Eastern Germany). This is certainly due to a change of methodology that 
would still need to be analysed. Somewhat reassuringly in this context, both Eurostat and 
Destatis seem to agree that the number of people employed in this sector in Eastern Germany 
has consistently been between 50,000 and 70,000 since 2005, and the annual numbers form 
both sources even seem to be matching exactly (e.g. 51,283 people in 2006).  
4.2 Characteristics	of	the	Firm	Sample	Analysed	
The firms analysed in this study are part of the car component manufacturing industries in 
Hungary and Eastern Germany as described in the preceding section. As mentioned in Section 
3.13.1.3, data was collected for about 160 Hungarian and 160 Eastern German firms, 
representing a diverse, albeit not necessarily representative, sample of car component 
manufacturers in these regions. The following provides a breakdown of the characteristics of 
this firm sample in terms of location, size and ownership – characteristics that are then in 
Chapter 5 put into perspective with the patterns of capital sourcing identified for these firms. 
4.2.1 Diversified	Locations	and	Firm	Sizes	
In terms of location and size, the analysed sample of firms represents a diversified group 
spread all over Eastern Germany and Hungary, albeit with some regional concentrations, and 
of all sizes, but with a predominance of small firms. 
Location	
A breakdown of the 157 Eastern German firms in this study’s sample by NUTS1 region (Figure 
16) shows that it contains firms in each of the six Länder of Eastern Germany, though with 
some concentration in Thuringia where almost 4 out of 10 firms are located:  
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Figure 16 Firm location by NUTS1 Region 
Source: author 
This pattern is consistent with the Thuringian cluster of car component manufacturing well 
identified in the literature, e.g. Swain (1996), and reflects the spatial proximity of many car 
component manufacturers with the car assembly plants in this region: PSA/Peugeot-Citroën’s 
(formerly GM’s) Opel and Vauxhall plant in Eisenach and Daimler’s factory for Mercedes-Benz 
engines in Kölleda within the limits of Thuringia, as well as VW’s (Leipzig, Chemnitz and 
Zwickau) and BMW’s (Leipzig) plants located in Saxony but near the border with Thuringia. 
Interestingly, there seems to be no concentration of car component manufacturers in Saxony 
(with only 11% of firms in the sample located there) even though in addition to the four plants 
near the Thuringian border mentioned above, this region also has a VW plant in Dresden. By 
contrast, a comparatively high number of firms (22%) is in Sachsen-Anhalt where no car 
assembly plant is located. A map overview of the location of the firms (Map 1) yields some 
further insight: the concentration of 58 firms in Thuringia can be clearly recognised although 
they do not seem to be particularly clustered around Opel’s plant in Eisenach but rather 
spread all over the region.  
Virtually all 18 firms in Saxony are located on a relatively narrow axis between VW’s car 
assembly plants in Dresden, Chemnitz and Zwickau, but only very few around BMW’s and 
VW’s plants in Leipzig. The data collected does not reveal which car component manufacturers 
work with which car assemblers, so further research would need to assess whether or not the 
reason of all firms in Saxony being located on the axis between the three VW plants is that 
they are suppliers to these plants, and whether BMW has no suppliers located nearby because 
it does not work with local suppliers – but clearly BMW does not seem to have any co-locations 
or industrial condominiums as mentioned in Section 4.1.1 whereas VW seems to have car 
component manufacturers located in very close vicinity of most of its assembly plants. 
Firms	by	location	(sample	by	country)
Eastern	Germany Firms % Hungary Firms %
Thüringen 58 37% Közép-Magyarország 68 41%
Sachsen-Anhalt 35 22% Dunántúl 51 31%
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 11 7% Alföld	és	Észak 45 27%
Brandenburg 17 11%
Sachsen 18 11%
Berlin 18 11%
Total	Eastern	Germany 157 100% Total	Hungary 164 100%
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Map 1 Overview of sample firm locations 
Source: author 
Many of the 35 firms in Sachsen-Anhalt are concentrated around the regional capital 
Magdeburg, seemingly without particular spatial proximity to any OEM’s car assembly plant 
in Eastern Germany – however, relatively close to the headquarters (and production site) of 
VW in Wolfsburg, which is located in Lower Saxony just outside of Sachsen-Anhalt. This very 
likely explains these component manufacturers’ presence (and suggests a likely integration in 
the global production network of VW) although, like in the case of the firms in Saxony, this 
remains to be confirmed empirically. The 11 firms in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern are spread 
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all over this Land which has no car assembly plant: the 7% of firms located in this region seem 
to suggest that spatial proximity is not necessarily a determining factor at least for some car 
component manufacturers in Eastern Germany. Most interestingly however, Map 1 reveals 
that almost all of the 17 firms in Brandenburg are actually located very close to Berlin: together 
with the 18 firms located inside Berlin, this group represents an aggregate 22% of German 
firms in the sample and forms a cluster with is spatially close to Daimler’s Mercedes-Benz plant 
in Ludwigsfelde in central Brandenburg just outside of Berlin.  
An alternative way of looking at the location of the Eastern German car component 
manufacturers in the sample (complementary to their distance to OEMs as discussed above) 
is in terms of distance from the main financial centres of the region, and in particular of the 
headquarters of the German Landesbanken which are the main providers of credit to German 
firms both directly and through the network of savings banks (Sparkassen) they are associated 
with. While there were 11 independent Landesbanken in Germany before the crisis of 2007, 
including two which had their headquarters in Eastern Germany (Landesbank Berlin and 
SachsenLB in Leipzig), several institutions were merged thereafter, only six remain 
independent today and only one of them has its seat in Eastern Germany (Landesbank Berlin). 
As a consequence, with the exception of Berlin, the networks of savings banks (which are the 
main providers of local credit to SMEs) in all regions of Eastern Germany are today associated 
to a Landesbank which has its headquarters outside the region: Helaba (Landesbank Hessen-
Thüringen) with its headquarters in Frankfurt am Main covers Thuringia and Brandenburg, 
LBBW (Landesbank Baden-Württemberg) with its headquarters in Stuttgart covers Saxony 
(since its acquisition of SachsenLB in 2008), NordLB (with its seat in Hannover, but also a 
secondary seat in Magdeburg) covers Sachsen-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Put 
into perspective with the location of the car component manufacturers in this sample, this 
means that only the firms in and around Berlin as well as those in Sachsen-Anhalt are located 
in real proximity to their relevant Landesbank, whereas all others, and in particular the ones 
in Saxony and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern are located at a relatively long distance. In a similar 
manner, the only firms located close to any (even regional) capital market are the ones in 
Berlin (close to Börse Berlin) and, to a lesser extent, those in Thuringia (with the stock 
exchange of Frankfurt am Main located not too far away). Whether or not, and if so then how, 
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this may impact the capacity or willingness of the firms to obtain bank loans and/or use the 
capital market to source capital is something Chapter 5 tries to assess.  
In Hungary, a breakdown of the 164 firms by NUTS1 region (Figure 16) reveals a strong 
concentration, with over 4 out of 10 firms, in the central region (Közép-Magyarország) which 
is by far the smallest of the three regions but also the economically strongest one containing 
in particular the capital Budapest. The other two regions (Dunántúl covering the western half 
of the country and Alföld és Észak covering the eastern half) each represent a bit less than a 
third of the Hungarian firms in the sample. A look at the map (Map 1) clearly shows the 
concentration in and around Budapest, but also a relatively even distribution of firms all over 
the entire territory of the country, in other words no particular clustering other than in 
Budapest and firms located also in the periphery of the country. In terms of relative distance 
to the assembly plants of OEMs, the map interestingly shows not the slightest concentration 
of firms around the four OEM production sites in the country, with VW’s Audi Hungária plant 
in Győr and Suzuki’s Magyar Suzuki plant in Esztergom (both near the border with Slovakia), 
Daimler’s Mercedes-Benz plant in Kecskemét halfway between Budapest and the border with 
Serbia and PSA’s (formerly GM’s) Opel plant in Szentgotthárd on the Austrian border. This 
landscape contrasts starkly with the situation in Eastern Germany, where a clustering around 
the OEM plants in and near Thuringia as well as near VW’s Wolfburg is clearly perceptible. 
Based on the locational data of this study, spatial proximity therefore does not seem to play 
an important role for the firms in Hungary. This might be a first indication about the nature of 
the Hungarian car component manufacturers in this study’s sample: given that spatial 
proximity (with co-location and industrial condominiums) is important mainly for the higher 
tier firms that have a strong and close relationship with the OEMs (cf. Section 4.1.1), the 
absence of such spatial proximity in Hungary likely suggests that many Hungarian firms are 
indeed lower-tier firms with weak links to the OEMs, in line with what would be expected 
based on the literature. 
In terms of distance from financial centres, however, the situation is very different: 68 
Hungarian firms (i.e. over 4 out of 10 in this study’s sample) are located in and around 
Budapest, i.e. in or very close to the country’s only financial center where all major banks of 
the country (in particular OTP Bank, K&H Bank, Erste Bank, Budapest Bank, CIB Bank and MKB 
Bank) are headquartered and where the country’s only stock exchange (the Budapest Stock 
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Exchange) is located. Conversely, however, this also means that 96 firms (i.e. almost 60% of 
the sample) are located further away from this financial centre in more peripheral regions. 
Whether and how this influences the way the firms source their capital (from banks or other 
sources) is again something that Chapter 5 aims to explore.  
Firm	Size	
In terms of size, Figure 17 (categorising firms according to the balance sheet size thresholds 
of the German accounting rules) shows a diversified sample with representatives in all 
categories, although with different focus between Hungary and Eastern Germany. 
 
Figure 17 Firm breakdown by size category 
Source: author 
In Germany, the dominant group are the 79 small firms, representing half of the firm sample 
and the 42 medium-sized ones representing over a quarter of the sample: taken together, 
these firms are part of the German ‘Mittelstand’, i.e. the family-owned small-and medium-
sized enterprises considered as the backbone of the German economy. However, there is also 
a significant group of 36 large firms representing almost a quarter of the German firms in the 
sample. These are likely the higher-tier component manufacturers with higher-value add 
components and stronger ties to the OEMs. The predominance of small and medium-sized 
firms is even stronger in Hungary, with 99 small firms (i.e. 60% of the sample) and 44 medium-
sized firms (27%). As a consequence, only 21 firms (or 13%) of the Hungarian firm sample are 
large firms. This is another indicator about the likely nature of the firm sample in Hungary: just 
like the absence of spatial proximity to the OEMs’ production plants as seen above, the 
predominance of small firms suggests that many of these are lower-tier manufacturers 
producing simpler components at the lower end of the value-add chain.  
As a consequence, the sample of firms selected for this study allows to explore the capital 
sourcing patterns of firms in all size categories in both regions, but it also reflects the structure 
of the industry with a predominance of Mittelstand firms (as well as a presence of larger, likely 
Firms	by	size	(sample	by	country)
Eastern	Germany Firms % Hungary Firms %
Small 79 50% Small 99 60%
Medium 42 27% Medium 44 27%
Large 36 23% Large 21 13%
Total	Eastern	Germany 157 100% Total	Hungary 164 100%
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higher-tier component manufacturers) in Eastern Germany and an even more marked 
predominance of especially small but also medium-sized (likely lower-tier) firms in Hungary.  
4.2.2 Ownership:	Contrasting	Structures	
In terms of ownership, it was possible to identify the ownership type within the sample of 
firms as follows: 
 
Figure 18 Firms by ownership type 
Source: author 
Predominance	of	Firms	Owned	by	Domestic	Individuals	
In Eastern Germany, the largest group by far, representing over a third of the sample, are the 
55 firms owned by private individuals, usually families having established the firm and still 
being involved in their management, assuming the roles of CEO and often also those of all 
other key management positions. A related group are the 16 ‘home mixed’ firms, which are 
firms that are owned partly by domestic individuals and partly by a domestic firm. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, these shareholding firms are likely not substantive corporates but rather entities 
through which individuals hold another portion of the firms (for reasons linked for example to 
the easier transferability of the shares to successors within the family). Although this was not 
empirically assessed within the scope of this study (and should be done by further research), 
this was assumed to be reasonably likely and therefore the firms in the ‘home mixed’ category 
are combined with the firms in the ‘home individual’ category for the analysis of capital 
sourcing patterns in Chapter 5. Another significant group of German firms are the 25 (16%) 
‘home corporate’ firms owned by other German firms. Some of these will also be mere 
shareholding entities for individuals (meaning that they should in fact be counted with the 
group of firms owned by domestic individuals), while others are owned by other car 
component manufacturers. No distinction was made here between Western and Eastern 
Germany although it would be interesting to do so in follow-up research because in many 
Firms	by	ownership	(sample	by	country)
Eastern	Germany Firms % Hungary Firms %
Home	Individual 55 35% Home	Individual 76 46%
Foreign	Corporate 8 5% Foreign	Corporate 35 21%
Home	Corporate 25 16% Home	Corporate 9 5%
Home	Mixed 16 10% Home	Mixed 9 5%
Other 9 6% Other 18 11%
Unknown 44 28% Unknown 17 10%
Total	Eastern	Germany 157 100% Total	Hungary 164 100%
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cases the German owner of an East German firm is likely to be a firm located not in Eastern 
but in Western Germany.  
None of the firms within the sample is directly owned through the capital market, i.e. has its 
equity traded on the stock market. Such firms would represent the most direct connection to 
capital markets and principles of shareholder value. As can further be seen from Figure 18, it 
was not possible to establish the ownership for all firms in the sample. The figure was 
particularly high in Eastern Germany with 44 firms, that is over a quarter of the sample, not 
listing their list of shareholders on the official websites. These firms were nevertheless kept in 
the sample to include them in the patterns of capital sources collected. 
Only 8 of the 157 firms in Eastern Germany (i.e. 5% of the sample) are owned by foreign 
corporates, but it is worth having a closer look at these:  
• Truck-Lite Europe GmbH, based in Eisenach and originally a Thuringian family owned 
business founded in 1868, was nationalized in 1948 and re-privatised in 1990 by sale 
to Stuttgart’s Robert Bosch GmbH, one of the largest car component suppliers 
worldwide, having its equity listed on the Stuttgart stock exchange but still almost 
entirely owned by the founding Bosch family. In 2002, the Eisenach firm was sold to 
US car component manufacturing group Truck-Lite, itself owned by private equity. 
• Autotest Eisenach GmbH, based in Eisenach, has an interesting history of evolving 
ownership: registered in 2005, the firm was in 2007 purchased by the EDAG-Group, a 
global car component developer based in Wiesbaden (Hessen) operating in 17 
countries and having its equity traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange. In 2011, EDAG 
sold the firm to Italian car component manufacturer Autotest AG (based in South 
Tyrol), originally also a family owned business founded in 1983 but itself purchased by 
German private equity firm Ceterum Holding in 2016. Ceterum Holding is based in 
Wernigerode in Saxony-Anhalt and invests primarily in small and medium-sized firms 
of the automotive, electronics and medical sectors. This means that Autotest Eisenach 
GmbH is actually not ultimately owned by a foreign car component manufacturer, but 
rather a very rare example of a firm owned by a Germany private equity firm – and 
what is more one that is headquartered in Eastern Germany. 
• Boryszew Kunststofftechnik Deutschland Gmbh (formerly Altmärkter Kunststoff 
GmbH, AKT), based in Gardelegen in northern Sachsen-Anhalt was originally founded 
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in 1991 and acquired by the Boryszew group after it went insolvent in 2011. Boryszew 
is a Polish car component manufacturer founded in 1911, nationalized under state-
socialism, re-privatised in the early 1990s and has its equity listed on the Warszaw 
stock exchange since 1996. Boryszew acquired the firm in Gardelegen in 2011 as part 
of its globalization that started in 2010 with investments not only in Germany but also 
in Italy, France, Spain, Brazil, China, India and Mexico. 
• Novero Dabendorf Gmbh (formerly Funkwerk Dabendorf GmbH), located in 
Dabendorf near Berlin, was originally part of the Funkwerk AG group which was 
founded in 2000 with its seat in Kölleda in Thuringia and listed its equity on the 
Frankfurt and Munich stock exchanges. The Dabendorf firm was sold in 2012 to 
Novero, a Düsseldorf-based car component manufacturer formed in 2008 through a 
management buy-out of Nokia’s automotive business – and Novero was itself 
purchased in 2015 by Laird plc, a global UK-based electronics group listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. 
• Alupress Berlin GmbH, is owned by the family-owned Alupress AG based in Italy (South 
Tyrol). 
• ARKAL Automotive GmbH, based in Auengrund in Thuringia is owned by Israeli car 
component manufacturer Arkal founded in 1997. 
• Nemak Europe GmbH, based in Wernigerode in Sachsen-Anhalt is owned by Nemak, 
a global automotive component manufacturer based in the Monterrey area of Mexico 
and having its shares publicly listed but owned mainly (75%) by Mexican industrial 
conglomerate Alfa (itself publicly listed) and a stake of about 5% also held by Ford. 
• Oberaigner Automotive GmbH, based in Laage in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern was 
founded in 2011 by Firma Oberaigner GmbH, an Austrian family-owned business 
founded in 1977. 
It was not possible to analyse the ownership of all firms in the sample in the same details as 
done for the eight firms above (in particular for the 35 Hungarian firms owned by foreign 
corporates and the 25 German and 9 Hungarian firms owned by domestic corporates), but 
what the above illustrates is the sometimes complex and evolving history of ownership by car 
component manufacturers once they are in the circuit of ownership by other car component 
manufacturers, whereas firms owned by individuals often remain in the hands of the same 
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family for many years. The above also suggests that firms owned by foreign corporates as 
identified in this study are indeed generally owned by other car component manufacturers 
and therefore integrated in global production networks not only through their commercial 
relationships but also through their ownership. It finally evidences that whereas none of the 
firms in the sample were found to have their equity directly traded on the stock market or 
owned by private equity, most of those that are owned by foreign corporates are in fact 
indirectly related to stock markets and private equity as this is what owns most of the foreign 
car component manufacturers owning firms that are part of the sample of this study. Chapter 
5 tries to assess whether this translates into any particular ways of sourcing capital for these 
firms.  
The Hungarian firm sample has a very different composition in terms of ownership than the 
Eastern German one: 76 of the Hungarian firms, i.e. with 46% almost half of all firms are 
owned by Hungarian individuals (i.e. domestic family owned businesses), a much higher 
proportion than the 35% of Eastern Germany. Furthermore, 35 firms (21%) are owned by 
foreign corporates, again a significantly higher proportion than the 5% in Eastern Germany. 
By contrast, the other categories (home corporate, home mixed, other and unknown) 
represent only 31% in aggregate (whereas the aggregate proportion of these four categories 
is 60% in the Eastern German sample). This is another indicator that the dichotomy of 
Hungarian car component manufacturers as identified in the literature (Dicken 2003) between 
locally owned lower-tier suppliers and foreign-owned higher tier suppliers is well reflected in 
the sample of firms of this study. 
The foreign owners of Hungarian firms include firms from as diverse a geographical spectrum 
as Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey, 
the UK and the US. It was not analysed for these firms to which extent they are substantive 
firms (i.e. GPN firms having established or purchased the firm as a subsidiary) or shell firms 
(merely holding the firm on behalf of an ultimate shareholder) and to which extent they are 
themselves owned by private equity or via the capital markets. However, the result of such an 
analysis would expected to be in essence similar to the one of the 8 foreign corporate firms in 
Germany, i.e. generally these would expected to be larger car component manufacturers 
themselves owned via the stock market or by private equity.  
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Strong	German	Mittelstand	vs.	Dichotomy	of	Component	Manufacturers	in	Hungary		
When combined with the information about the firms’ size as discussed above (Figure 19), the 
pattern appears even more clearly. Setting apart the significant number of firms for which 
ownership could not be established (this remains to be done by future research), it very clearly 
appears that the smaller firms in Germany are overwhelmingly owed by domestic individuals 
(especially if the ‘home mixed’ firms are considered as ultimately fully owned by domestic 
individuals as well), whereas corporate ownership predominates for the large firms and the 
situation is balanced in the medium-sized firms. This evidences that most of the firms in this 
study’s sample are indeed part of the German Mittelstand, i.e. small or medium-sized firms 
owned by domestic families or individuals. 
In Hungary, the situation is even more contrasted with the vast majority of small firms being 
owned by domestic individuals, whereas most of the medium-sized and large firms are owned 
by foreign corporates, confirming indeed the dichotomy of the sector as was expected based 
on the literature. It is interesting to note that domestic capital seems to play only a very limited 
role in Hungary – or when it does, it is materialised by individuals (hinting at a rather small 
scale industry) rather than by domestic firms (which could represent a larger scale industry). 
There are some exceptions however, with a very small number of individually owned medium-
sized and large firms being individually owned, such as Videoton Holding Zrt, for example, 
which defines itself as the ‘largest Hungarian industrial group being in local private ownership’ 
with almost 9,000 employees in 11 locations and is owned by three individual business men. 
Knowing whom a firm belongs to, who its shareholders are and where they are located is key 
when assessing the potential implications of a firm’s geography (with locations and relations) 
for the way the firm finances its activities. On the one hand, shareholders are themselves one 
of the main sources of capital through the equity they inject at inception of the firm or during 
its life, such as, for example, for the financing of significant investments, the acquisition of 
other firms, the expansion into new markets etc. The availability (and conditions) of such 
capital to a firm is very unequal depending on who its shareholders are: for the individuals 
owning an SME, this firm will often constitute a significant portion of their wealth, and they 
are likely not to have the financial resources to inject further significant amounts into the firm. 
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Figure 19 Firms by size and ownership type 
Source: author 
By contrast, a large GPN firm owning the firm as a subsidiary probably has the capacity to 
generate profits, or to borrow capital at its level, and to inject these amounts as equity into 
the firm to finance significant investments. On the other hand, shareholders have significant 
power over strategic decisions taken in the firm, regarding the distribution of profits, the 
utilisation of other sources of capital and so on. The expectations and time horizon, in terms 
of profitability and dividend distribution are likely not to be the same between a family owning 
an SME founded by one of their ancestors, a GPN firm operating the firm as a subsidiary in an 
expanding market and an asset manager managing the shares as a financial asset on behalf of 
institutional investors. As a result, the ownership type of the firms is likely to have a significant 
impact on the firms’ financing patterns, access to both equity and other forms of capital and 
further financial behaviour such as profit distribution, as explored in Chapter 5. 
Geographical	patterns	of	ownership	and	size	
Combining the firms’ location, size and ownership into one combined view, an interesting 
landscape emerges. In Eastern Germany (Map 2), most of the larger firms (mostly owned by 
other German firms, green squares) tend to be located relatively ‘centrally’ (i.e. closer to the 
OEM’s manufacturing sites) in Thuringia, on the VW axis in Saxony, in Berlin or in the Saxony-
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Anhalt vicinity of VW’s headquarters in Wolfsburg, suggesting that they likely are higher-tier 
suppliers with a closer relationship to the OEMs. There are, however, also many small firms 
located within the OEM crescent (bordering the edges of Eastern Germany from the Sachsen-
Anhalt zones bordering Wolfsburg, including Thuringia and VW’s axis in Saxony) and the Berlin 
area. The 8 firms owned by foreign corporates (red triangles) are almost all located close to 
the border with Western Germany or in Berlin i.e. relatively ‘centrally’ – with the exception of 
the small Oberaigner Automotive GmbH with its very remote location in the middle of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 
 
Map 2 Location, size and ownership of German firms 
Source: author 
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By contrast, most of the firms located outside the OEM crescent and Berlin are small firms – 
suggesting that just like their counterparts in Hungary, these are individually owned (blue 
circles) lower-tier suppliers with less strong ties to the OEMs. This is particularly striking in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern where almost all of the 11 firms (with only one exception) are 
small and, to the extent this could be identified, domestic family owned businesses. With the 
exception of the very peripheral situation in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern however, the 
situation in Eastern Germany is relatively balanced with firms of all sizes and ownership types 
co-existing in all regions where there is a strong presence of car component manufacturers. 
 
Map 3 Location, size and ownership of Hungarian firms 
Source: author 
The picture in Hungary (Map 3), by contrast, looks very different. The map shows far fewer 
corporately owned firms (green squares, mostly large or medium-sized) and firms with 
unknown ownership (grey circles). The landscape is really dominated by the dichotomy 
between mostly small locally owned family businesses (blue and purple circles) and mostly 
medium-sized or large firms owned by foreign corporates (red triangles). There is also a clear 
tendency for the locally owned firms to be located either extremely centrally in Budapest or 
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very peripherally all over the country, whereas most of the foreign owned firms are located 
not inside Budapest but rather in its region and the surrounding areas or central Hungary (only 
some of which however in any perceptible vicinity to the OEM’s plants in Győr and Esztergom, 
and none near Szentgotthárd or Kecskemét). 
The sample of firms in this study therefore includes two groups of small, family-owned firms 
(identified as the lower-tier suppliers with weak ties to the OEMs and at the lower end of the 
value chain in the literature): those in a very central location in Budapest (i.e. close to banks 
and potentially other financing sources) and those located in the periphery, far away from the 
OEMs and any financial centre. Chapter 5 explores whether there is any difference in the way 
these two groups of family business source their capital, as well as whether the situation is 
any different for the foreign owned firms, whether they be located rather centrally or more in 
the periphery as is the case for some of them. 
4.3 Capital	 Provision:	 Institutional	 Infrastructures	 in	 Hungary	 and	 Eastern	
Germany	
After having discussed the structure of the car component manufacturing industries in 
Hungary and Eastern Germany and the characteristics of the firm sample analysed with its 
distinct ownership structures reflecting one aspect of the specific variegations of capitalism in 
these two regions, this section discusses institutional infrastructures of capital provision in 
these regions.  
As shown in Section 2.1.2, capitalism unfolds in different forms in different regions depending 
on the institutional context prevalent therein. Hall and Soskice (2001b) and Crouch et al. 
(2009) recall that geographical variegations in the way firms access capital impacts corporate 
governance and shapes the activities of the firms. This section explores how the way firms in 
Hungary and Eastern Germany obtain capital from different types of sources depends on the 
institutional infrastructures of capital provision in these regions as conceptualised within the 
theoretical framework of variegated capitalism presented earlier. It looks at the geographical 
foundations (Clark and Wójcik 2007: 57-58) of capital markets and private equity/venture 
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capital, banking and foreign direct investment through global car component manufacturers 
in these regions.15 
Institutional	and	State	Policy	Context	
Capital provision to car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany by 
different types of capital providers is framed by the institutional and state policy context of 
capital provision prevalent in these regions. This context cannot be dissociated from the fact 
that these regions underwent a fundamental system change from state socialism to market 
economies in the 1990: both institutions and state policies were deeply transformed, and 
through these policies the new governments played a crucial role in framing the extent to 
which foreign capital providers were enabled or even encouraged to enter and invest capital 
into these regions. According to Drahokoupil (2009), most post-communist governments in 
the region originally pursued internally oriented reform strategies focused on privileging 
domestic sources of investment, but by the end of the 1990s state policies had shifted towards 
externally oriented strategies focused on promoting the economy’s competitiveness by 
encouraging foreign direct investments. While the reasons and exact circumstances for this 
policy shift (and resulting dominance of foreign capital in most countries) differ from country 
to country, Drahokoupil (2009) highlights three connected factors providing a general 
explanation and context: the original internally oriented strategies being exhausted by the 
end of the 1990s, foreign investors becoming active in the region after an initial period of 
hesitation, and the important role played by the connection of domestic actors with foreign 
capital, fostering the necessary political, social and institutional support for state policies more 
favourable to opening up the economy to non-domestic investment.  
With respect to the original internally oriented strategies, these were originally pursued by 
most governments in the region to explicitly avoid foreign direct investment, aiming to foster 
the development of national capitalism and national capitalists instead (Drahokoupil 2009). 
The one most notable exception was Hungary which pursued an externally oriented, FDI-
reliant strategy from the very beginning of the 1990s (Swain 1996). As Drahokoupil (2009) 
notes, the initial reluctance of most other governments to foster FDI was in contrast to what 
                                                        
15 For further context on the financial systems in these regions, cf. also the FESSUD reports on Germany and 
Hungary (Detzer et al. 2013; Szikszai et al. 2013; Detzer et al. 2014; Detzer and Hein 2014; Badics and Szikszai 
2015) 
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most Western analysts would have expected (and recommended) at the time: since the mid-
1980, international financial institutions such as the World Bank had been promoting FDI as a 
tool of economic development, FDI was widely seen as the more effective strategy compared 
to inward oriented strategies, and FDI had effectively increased substantially across the globe 
since the late eighties. This view was not shared by most governments of Central and Eastern 
Europe, however, resulting in an initial phase where (with the exception of Hungary) the 
institutional context and state policies were not favourable to capital provision by foreign 
actors.   
With the exception of Hungary therefore, where car component manufacturers like Ford, GM 
and Suzuki made significant direct investments as early as 1990 and 1991 (cf section 4.1.2), 
only very little FDI was actually attracted into Central and Eastern Germany in the early 1990s, 
and FDI was even virtually absent from Slovakia in the mid-1990s (Smith and Ferencikova 
1998). Over the course of the 1990s, however, an increasing number of foreign companies 
expanded into a range of sectors in Central and Eastern Europe, including but not limited to 
car and car component manufacturing. The reason for this later than expected but eventually 
very clear opening up of the region to foreign capital was a combination of foreign investor’s 
increased knowledge and therefore comfort in the region, fostered by an increasingly 
supportive context of state policies that by the end of the 1990s had shifted towards clearly 
supporting foreign direct investment and explicitly attracting foreign investors in most cases 
(Drahokoupil 2008). One key reason for this shift in state policies, as Drahokoupil (2009) notes, 
is the role played by the development of domestic actors connected to international capital, 
i.e. rather than the direct transmission of foreign practices into domestic policy, their 
transmission via domestic ‘coalitions of social actors’ (Drahokoupil 2008: 197) which had the 
required political, social and institutional domestic leverage to push for a change in domestic 
policy. The result of these processes was the development of particular varieties or 
variegations of capitalism in these transition economies, as discussed in further detail by 
Myant and Drahokoupil (2011). 
A concrete example of such a transmission of foreign practices via an ‘investment promotion 
community’ connecting actors from both outside and inside the country is given by Sellar and 
Pastor (2015) in respect of Italian foreign direct investment into Italy. As a corollary to these 
FDI-supporting policies leading to foreign companies investing in Central and Eastern Europe, 
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foreign banks expanded into the region as well, as illustrated by the study of Sellar (2015) on 
Italian banks following their textile and clothing manufacturing clients into Central and Eastern 
Europe as these increased their outsourcing of production into the region. Given the sectoral 
industrial differences between the garment sector and car component manufacturing, the 
implications may differ in particular with regards to the role played by the banks in terms of 
‘cultural intermediation’ and knowledge transfer observed by Sellar (2015) in his study, but 
the presence of foreign-owned banks accompanying their clients in their expansion and 
outsourcing of activities into Hungary in particular is a phenomenon that could be observed 
in car manufacturing as well.  
Capital provision in these regions thus ended up being strongly shaped by foreign institutions 
(both industrial firms doing foreign direct investment and banks establishing a local presence 
to provide loans to firms) as a result of deliberate government action and state policy creating 
the correspondingly supportive institutional context of capital provision. The ‘success’ of these 
strategies is well illustrated for example by the dominance of foreign direct investment both 
in the Hungarian car production (as discussed in section 4.1.2) and among Hungarian car 
component manufacturers (as discussed in section 4.2.2), and by the dominance of foreign-
owned banks in the Hungarian banking landscape (cf. later in this section). It is much less 
apparent in Eastern Germany, likely as a result of the very different path taken by this region 
compared to other Central and Eastern German economies: having been absorbed practically 
overnight into the pre-existing market economy of Western Germany, the focus of state policy 
there was on the integration between the two parts of the country, rather than on foreign 
direct investment or the promotion of foreign banks. The role played in Hungary by foreign 
direct investment and foreign banks was thus in Eastern Germany largely assumed by the 
investment of Western German capital and the expansion of Western German banks into 
Eastern Germany. 
Capital	Markets	and	Private	Equity/Venture	Capital	
The degree to which firms in Hungary and Eastern Germany seek to finance investments 
through capital markets strongly depends on the geography and the relevant institutional 
infrastructure of capital provision. In terms of raising capital for investments for example, 
Germany is traditionally very much debt focused while the UK is more equity focused: while 
the average equity rate (including both external equity and retained earnings) of UK firms 
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since the early 1980s has been around 50%, it has been below 20% in Germany (Klagge and 
Martin 2005). While there is a relatively high number of publicly listed companies in Western 
Germany, there is, for historic reasons, only a very small number in Eastern Germany (Klagge 
and Martin 2005). The following summarises the context of capital markets in both Hungary 
and Eastern Germany as well as private equity and venture capital in these two regions. 
Opened in the summer of 1990 as the first post-communist stock exchange in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Budapest Stock Exchange is today one of the largest stock exchanges in 
the region. It covers all capital market transactions on the Hungarian market as well as a 
significant share of transactions from other issuers in the region. As of September 2018, the 
Budapest Stock Exchange listed the shares of 41 companies and bonds of ten companies 
(some of which also have their equity listed). This list appears very small compared to the over 
2,000 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange or the over 2,400 companies listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange. Virtually all of the companies listed on the Budapest Stock 
Exchange are Hungarian. The private or public offering of securities (i.e. stocks, bonds or other 
instruments through which capital is raised through the capital market) on the Hungarian 
capital market is governed by various regulations, which foresee a certain number for 
eligibility criteria a firm needs to fulfil if it wants to list its equity or bonds on the Budapest 
Stock Exchange. These criteria do not include any requirement of a minimum size (except for 
listing on the prime equity market) so SMEs are not formally prohibited from raising capital 
through the capital market. However, firms that do so on the BSE tends to be larger and there 
must be other criteria making it more difficult or less attractive for small and medium-sized 
firms to raise capital through the capital market. As a result, even though the capital market 
exists in Hungary in the form of the Budapest Stock Exchange, it is very small in comparison 
with capital markets in the US, the UK or even Germany and not a customary source of capital 
for car component manufacturers in this region. 
The situation is a little different in Germany which is less centralized than Hungary and has not 
only one but several local capital markets - even though the largest one, the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, represents 85% of turnover and is therefore largely dominant. Out of the other 
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seven regional stock exchanges located in Germany only one16 is based in Eastern Germany: 
Börse Berlin is a trading place for a very large number of mostly international issuers and for 
example trades almost all NASDAQ securities but also companies from China and South Africa. 
It is also, however, the ‘home’ market for about 45 companies for whom Berlin is the first (and 
sometimes only) place where their equity or bonds are listed. Most of these firms are German 
but interestingly the list also includes 7 non-German companies from Malta, the UK, 
Switzerland and Austria. None of these firms, however, are car component manufacturers. 
Among the conditions for trading equity on Börse Berlin, the relevant regulatory and legal 
context would need to be considered and potential conditions could be firm size for example, 
publication of annual accounts under certain standards, or others. Another factor to be kept 
in mind is investor appetite, i.e. the extent to which investors prefer to invest through one 
capital market (which they know well) rather than through another (which they know less).  
The above focuses only on the capital markets located within Hungary and Eastern Germany 
respectively, but firms operating within these regions can in principle access capital markets 
in other regions, and it is therefore necessary to also consider this. The Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange is a very open and international stock exchange (and of course located in the same 
country as Eastern Germany), with almost 500 companies having their equity listed there. 
Most of these companies are German but almost 60 are from other countries, mostly 
European but also including the USA, Russia and China. None of these companies however is 
Hungarian and only very few of the German ones are based in Eastern Germany: interesting 
to note that the geography of firms using the Frankfurt Stock Exchange as a source of capital 
seemingly reaches across the globe, but does not include the geographically much closer 
regions of Hungary and, even more strikingly, Eastern Germany. In addition, the accessibility 
of the capital market as a source of equity capital is generally higher for larger firms than for 
SMEs, but SMEs are not by definition completely excluded. The Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
introduced a dedicated segment for the equity of traditional SMEs (very much the type that 
can be found among car component manufacturers) in 1999 but this was closed in the early 
2000s, so that, today, there is a lack of dedicated structures supporting the provision of public 
                                                        
16 Leipzig is sometimes listed as home to one of the local exchanges but this is the European Energy Exchange 
(EEX), a trading platform specialised in energy related contracts and derivatives and as such not a ‘capital market’ 
on which a company can raise capital in the form of equity or bonds. 
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equity to German SMEs (Klagge and Martin 2005). Other relevant questions include how 
global financial markets act as standard setters (for disclosure, corporate governance 
standards, internal accountability, external transparency, cf. chapter 7 of Clark and Wójcik 
(2007)), how the cross-listing of companies may lead to the diffusion of standards between 
jurisdictions, whether the relationship between home and host corporate environment is 
important for decision to cross-list, potential reasons why firms list their equity on certain 
stock exchanges rather than others or whether cross-listing could be seen as a means to 
submit oneself to stricter corporate governance standards. According to Clark and Wójcik 
(2007: 133-134), "US cross-listing is a form of access to global capital markets and increases 
firm-level incentives for good corporate governance” and "at the heart of corporate 
governance lies the risk that corporate managers will misuse or even steal the capital 
entrusted to corporations". Most companies, if listed, cross-list on more than one stock 
exchange (Clark and Wójcik 2007: 144). 
Given that newer and smaller firms traditionally struggle to raise equity through the stock 
market, private equity / venture capital firms aim to address this gap since the late 1980, 
particularly in the US and the UK but also in countries like Germany (Klagge and Martin 2005). 
However, like the capital markets, this source of capital concerns only a small portion of firms 
and even in these firms only a small portion of the equity. There has been some geographically 
interested research in this area, in particular regarding a potential ‘equity gap’ regarding 
venture capital for firms located in peripheral regions (cf. e.g. Martin et al. 2005; Wray et al. 
2011). In many cases, the capital used by private equity to invest in firms combines equity 
contributed by the investors the private equity firm manages with a bank loan taken on by the 
private equity firm, hence the term ‘leveraged buy-out’ (Scheuplein and Teetz 2014), and this 
debt is then pushed down after the acquisition, hence increasing the indebtedness of the firm 
(to sometimes potentially less sustainable levels weakening the firm as such). This means that 
a private equity take over cannot only modify the equity relationships in a firm but also impact 
the firm’s other sources of capital (replacing retained earnings by bank loans).17 Private equity 
tends to aim less for high yield (dividends) during the limited time that they hold shares in the 
firm but rather to achieve a high profit when they on-sell the shares after a certain number of 
                                                        
17 Scheuplein and Teetz (2014) provide a more general characterization of private equity and its mechanisms. 
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years (Scheuplein and Teetz 2014). This is why private equity firms tend to exercise a strong 
influence on the firm’s management and operations during their holding period. They are 
‘activist owners’ rather than ‘coupon cutters’ (Scheuplein and Teetz 2014: 6). 
The venture capital market could be a potential mitigant to the difficulty of SMEs in accessing 
the capital market but still remains marginal for German SMEs. German policy focuses less on 
the increase of public capital provision to SMEs than on the creation of ‘innovative private 
equity instruments’ (Klagge and Martin 2005: 411) driven by the KfW (Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau) and the associated Mittelstandsbank (Klagge and Martin 2005). There has also 
been an effort to develop ‘hybrid’ financial instruments (mezzanine finance) qualifying as 
equity under EU/Basel-rules but at the same time addressing the traditional resistance of SME-
owners to yielding control to external shareholders. The German association of private equity 
firms (Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften, BVK) has over 120 
members. Most of them are based in Frankfurt or Munich, but hardly any of them invest in 
Eastern Germany. According to Scheuplein and Teetz (2014), almost 200 German firms were 
taken over by private equity firms in 2013, so private equity is not as marginal in Germany as 
one could think although only very little of this activity concerns Eastern Germany. Why do a 
firm’s shareholders sell all or part of their shares to private equity firms? Apart from 
shareholders that are private equity firms or other financial investors (and where the on-sale 
forms part of the original strategy), Scheuplein and Teetz (2014: 40) mention the following 
main motivations: succession (Nachfolgeregelung), growth, restructuring, monetization or 
change in group strategy leading to a spin-off of part of the firm’s activities. 
Although private equity and venture capital started to develop in Hungary as early as 1990 
and Hungary quickly rose to be the most developed private equity market in Central and 
Eastern Germany by 2000 (Szikszai et al. 2013), Hungary today ranks among the European 
countries with the lowest presence of private equity (measured in terms of proportion of GDP) 
alongside Germany but also Italy and other Eastern European countries such as Poland or the 
Czech Republic, while the high end of the spectrum is occupied by the UK followed by the 
Nordic countries Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Bedu and Montalban 2014). Most aspects of 
private equity (such as the legal environment, types of actors and types of structures) in 
Hungary are similar to those found in Western Europe, but investments are mainly made into 
larger companies with only very limited investment in small and medium-sized companies 
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(Szikszai et al. 2013). The rate of private equity and venture capital investments in Hungary 
has significantly declined since the crisis in 2008 and only little activity can be evidenced today, 
for reasons such as the small size of the Hungarian economy, the end of privatization (i.e. the 
lower number of large firms being sold by the state) and the unpredictability of economic 
policy (Szikszai et al. 2013). 
Overall, the institutional context of capital provision to firms in Hungary and Eastern Germany 
through capital markets and private equity / venture capital evidences a comparatively less 
developed presence than in comparatively more capital-markets driven economies such as 
the US or the UK. 
‘Patient	Capital’:	Banks	and	Foreign	Direct	Investment	
Just like the capital market and private equity, the structure of the banking sector in Hungary 
and Eastern Germany has its specificities which are briefly discussed below. The literature 
considers jurisdictions such as Germany to be characterised by a strong and often long-lasting 
relationship which is built between firms and their ‘house banks’ (Hausbanken) while others 
(such as Anglo-Saxon contexts in particular) are understood to be very different in that the 
relationship between firms and banks is more transaction driven and less relationship based. 
In Germany, banking is traditionally marked by a strong relationship between the banks and 
the firms. Usually these German banks are domestic (such as, for example, Deutsche Bank, 
Commerzbank and the regional banks such as Helaba, Bayerische Landesbank, HSH, LBBW 
etc.). There are no major foreign or foreign-owned banks that have a material stake of the 
aggregate loans granted to commercial firms in Germany. Firms in Germany tend to have one 
‘relationship bank’ (their ‘Hausbank’ or ‘home bank’) with which a relationship is built over 
the years and where individuals from the bank and the firm know each other well. The 
personal relationship between key actors within the bank and the firm means that the firm 
will get most or all its bank loans from that bank over many years (Handke 2011 ). 
The situation in Hungary is very different to the one in Germany. While the privatisation of the 
Hungarian banking sector started only in 1994, i.e. comparatively late compared to the Czech 
Republic or Poland (Szikszai et al. 2013), most major banks present in Hungary today are 
foreign or foreign-owned, such as, for example, Erste Bank and Raiffeisen (both Austrian) and 
Unicredit Bank (Italian). The only major Hungarian bank with a domestic ownership is OTP, 
  Context 
 
 
 
142 
although the current Hungarian government aims to bring more large Hungarian banks back 
into domestic ownership (such as for example MKB, formerly owned by the German BayernLB, 
which was recently sold to a consortium of Hungarian and foreign equity funds). While the 
indebtedness of Hungarian firms (i.e. the degree to which they use bank loans as a capital 
source) increased markedly in the first decade of the 21st century, indebtedness levels have 
been continuously decreasing since (Szikszai et al. 2013), meaning that the number of firms 
that use bank loans as a capital decreases and/or that the firms that use bank loans as a capital 
source do so in a smaller proportion compared to their aggregate capital sources. This marked 
decline in corporate lending in Hungary since the financial crisis is even stronger than in the 
other Central and Eastern European countries where corporate lending has decreased to a 
lesser extent or even increased (Szikszai et al. 2013).  
When trying to understand reasons why firms may or may not get loans from banks, it is also 
necessary to look at what the banks do with them, i.e. whether they keep them on their 
balance sheet once they have been made to the firms. Banks can, in principle, either keep 
them on their balance sheet or sell them on. One form of selling them on is to securitise them. 
i.e. sell them to a special purpose vehicle that finances this acquisition by issuing bonds 
subscribed by capital market investors: these investors then effectively end up being the 
(indirect) owners of the capital provided in the SMEs. The securitization of SME Loans is still 
relatively rare in Europe but much more common in the US, where it developed after 2008 
when banks significantly tightened their lending guidelines and reduced the number of loans 
they granted to SMEs. Securitising the loans is in this case seen as a way to ‘free up’ the banks’ 
balance sheet, enabling it to extend more SME loans or use its balance sheet otherwise. In the 
US, this had been done for a long time already with all types of loans, notably sovereign debt 
in the 1980s, as regulators wanted banks to clean up their balance sheets. Non-bank specialty 
finance companies seized this ‘opportunity’ and developed SME securitization during this 
period (S&P 2013). The securitization of SME loans consists in the sale of a series of loans 
granted by a bank or other financial institution to SMEs and then sold (partly or fully) to a 
vehicle which issues bonds subscribed by capital market investors, often insurance companies. 
While originally typically 100% of the loan was on-sold to the vehicle, regulatory requirements 
in the US and in Europe today require the originator to keep at least 5% to increase the 
alignment of interests between the originator and the investors. In many instances, the 
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‘attractiveness’ of the bonds for the investors is enhanced by the fact that either the 
underlying SME loans or the issued bonds are guaranteed by a public institution such as the 
state or a public institution (e.g. the SBA in the US, the EIF in Europe), meaning that if the 
loan/bond is not repaid by the SME at maturity, the investors get their money back from the 
guaranteeing institution. This reduces the probability that the investors do not recover all their 
capital at maturity, increases the ‘risk/reward’ for investors and will typically also reduce the 
level of remuneration requested by investors to invest in that transaction. 
As discussed in this chapter, car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany 
are a diversified group of firms of all sizes and ownership types, located in both central and 
peripheral regions of both countries, sometimes in close proximity to their shareholders and 
to financial centres with other types of capital providers, and sometimes at an important 
distance. The institutional context of capital provision in these two regions is particular and 
the reflection of these two regions’ own national and regional variegations of capitalism, with 
a comparatively low prevalence of capital markets and a role of banks that is markedly 
different between Hungary and Eastern Germany. Having thus presented the empirical 
context of this study in light of the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2, the study 
is now ready to proceed to a discussion of the empirical findings: this is done in the next two 
chapters, first discussing the variegated patterns of capital sourcing that have been observed, 
and then discussing, based on the information available, what reasons this might have – in 
particular with regards to the firm’s embeddedness in specific institutional infrastructures of 
capital provision – and what effects it might have – in particular with regards to the firm’s 
governance and local and regional development implications. 
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Chapter	5 Variegated	Patterns	of	Capital	Sourcing	
This chapter is the first of two that present and discuss the empirical findings of this study. It 
explores which capital sources car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern 
Germany primarily use and which patterns can be empirically observed in the prevalence of 
certain capital sources over others, depending on the firms’ characteristics such as location 
(evidencing aspects of national and regional variegations of capitalism), size or ownership (in 
particular by other GPN firms) analysed from a geographical point of view (highlighting 
potential regional capital gaps for example). Potential reasons and implications of these 
patterns are then discussed in the next chapter.  
The chapter is organised in two parts. The first part (5.1) illustrates the variegation in the 
patterns observed for the utilisation of long-term capital sources such as industrial equity 
(provided by individual owners or other car component manufactures, i.e. another GPN firm, 
owning the firm), bank loans and subsidies, and discusses the marked absence of any direct 
financial equity such as capital markets or private equity – highlighting certain characteristics 
of the relevant variegations of capitalism in Hungary and Eastern Germany. It further discusses 
the utilisation of short-term capital sources such as trade liabilities between GPN firms and 
short term bank loans. The second part (5.2) then focuses on retained earnings, as a source of 
capital produced by the firm itself over time. Retained earnings clearly emerge as an often 
overlooked but crucial source of financing, present in almost all firms (and sometimes their 
predominant or even exclusive source of capital) but to a degree that varies depending on a 
range of factors such as the firm’s location in more central or peripheral areas and on its GPN 
integration through ownership ties. This is a central finding of this study highlighting certain 
differences between the relevant variegations of capitalism, the impact of the firm’s 
integration (or not) through ownership ties in global production networks and the likely 
existence of regional capital gaps as discussed in Chapter 2. By exploring these variegated 
patterns of capital sources observed in the sample of firms, the chapter answers the first of 
the three research questions formulated in Chapter 2 (how are the firms financed and which 
geographical factors impact this the most) and thereby sets the stage for the remaining two 
research questions (why is that so and what effects this has) explored in the next chapter. It 
evidences (i) that there is variegation of capital sourcing depending both on the firm’s location 
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and GPN integration through ownership ties and suggests (ii) that such variegation also exists 
at a sub-national, regional level, supporting the argument for the existence of regional 
variegations of capitalism. 
5.1 The	Unequal	Utilisation	of	External	Capital	Sources	
External capital, as discussed in Section 2.3.2, is contributed by parties external to the firm 
and its utilisation therefore creates and maintains unequal relationships of power between 
the firm and a third party. As shown in Section 2.3.2, it is the type of capital most commonly 
considered in geographical research on firm finance and can originate from a range of 
different actors (such as individuals, industrial or financial shareholders, banks or public 
entities) and take different forms (equity, debt or subsidies). Each of these actor types and 
capital forms has specific implications for the type of relationship created between the firm 
and the capital provider, depending to a certain extent to the location of the capital provider 
in relation to the firm.  
When considering the sources of capital used by car component manufacturers, it is useful to 
keep in mind (as set out in more detail in Section 2.3) that capital is used for two very different 
purposes: on the one hand, to finance long term investments and acquisitions; on the other, 
to fund short term working capital needs. These two purposes are covered through different 
types of capital: while long-term financing needs are typically covered through equity, long-
term bank loans, debt raised through the capital markets and subsidies, short term needs are 
covered primarily through trade liabilities and short-term bank loans. 
5.1.1 Financing	Investment:	Long-Term	Capital	Sources	
As set out in Section 2.3.2, the main sources of capital typically used by firms for long-term 
purposes are (i) ‘industrial’ equity, i.e. equity provided either by the founding individual or 
family owners (typically located in close vicinity to the firm), or by other industrial firms 
operating in a related sector (typically located further away), (ii) long-term bank loans (from 
banks typically located in the relevant national or regional financial centres), (iii) subsidies 
(from institutions which may be either national or trans-national in the case of the EU) and 
(iv) ‘financial’ capital raised through the capital markets or other financial actors such as 
private equity or venture capital firms (which will typically be based in international financial 
centres such as London, but also in cities like Paris or Munich). The following section looks at 
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how each of these four major forms of external long-term capital can be empirically observed 
(or, significantly and perhaps sometimes surprisingly, not observed) in this study’s sample of 
firms and how these observations differ depending on the firms’ geographic location, size and 
ownership. 
Industrial	Equity:	marginal	yet	determining?	
As seen in Section 4.2.2, all firms in the sample for which the ownership could be determined 
have industrial owners in the sense that they are either the individuals or families that 
founded, still own and manage the firm (and will typically be based in close proximity to the 
firm), or larger (often foreign based) car component manufacturers that have founded or 
acquired the firms as part of their international expansion and production chain integration 
strategy, and which form part of their global production network. Does this mean that 
industrial equity is a primary source of capital for these firms? The answer strongly depends 
on who the firm is owned by, as illustrated by the following figures. 
 
Figure 20 Owner funds in firms owned by domestic individuals 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
Figure 20 shows the 71 Eastern German firms in the sample owned directly or indirectly by 
domestic individuals of families and their 85 counterparts in Hungary, in each case placed 
according to the size of their balance sheet (x-axis) and to the proportion which owner funds 
represent on their balance sheet (y-axis). For the purpose of this analysis, firms fully owned 
directly by domestic individuals (in blue) and those owned partly by domestic individuals and 
partly by domestic corporates (in purple) are represented here together as the latter category 
very likely consists of firms that are fully owned by domestic individuals with simply a 
corporate structure used as an intermediate. 
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The 66 small or medium-sized Eastern German Mittelstand firms (in the left and central 
sections of the left-hand chart of Figure 20) tend to be financed very little to not at all through 
owner’s funds: most have an owner fund ratio close to zero. The very small firms in Germany 
with a balance sheet of less than 1 million euro seem to have a slightly higher ratio, but this is 
likely due simply to the legal minimum capital firms are obliged to have and which represents 
a higher proportion of the balance sheet for these small firms. The situation of the five large 
individually owned German firms (in the right section of the left hand chart) is not materially 
different, with also very little to no capital provided by the owners. Only five firms have a 
markedly higher owner funds ratio: 
• Krüger & Gothe GmbH, with a balance sheet of about 20 million euro just at the limit 
between being medium-sized and large, a ‘mixed individual’ ownership and an owner 
funds ratio of 21%, located in Staßfurt (Sachsen-Anhalt) south of Magdeburg 
• EcoNautic Systems GmbH (10 million euro balance sheet i.e. medium-sized and 
individually owned) with an owner fund ratio of 24%, located in Dargun (Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern) 
• AE Group AG (58 million euro balance sheet i.e. large and ‘home mixed’ owned) with 
an owner fund ratio of 38%, located in Gerstungen (Thüringen) 
• Awab Umformtechnik und Präzisionsmechanik GmbH (2.7 million euro balance sheet 
i.e. small, ‘home individual’ owned) with an owner fund ratio of 56%, located in 
Oschersleben (in western Sachsen-Anhalt) and 
• Pestel PUR-Kunststofftechnik GmbH (1.2 million euro balance sheet i.e. small, ‘home 
mixed’ owned) with the highest owner fund ratio observed with 72%, located 
Chemnitz (Sachsen) 
What the above shows is that while some of the individually owned firms in Germany that are 
funded by owner’s equity to a comparatively higher extent are located in comparatively 
remote areas (such as EcoNautic Systems GmbH in particular), this is not the case for others, 
and it can therefore not be inferred from the data that individually owned firms in the Eastern 
Germany periphery might find it more difficult to get loans from banks and therefore fund 
their activities to a higher degree through equity, i.e. there is no clear indication of a regional 
equity gap at this level. As a general rule, it appears very clearly that firms that are owned by 
domestic individuals in Eastern Germany do not receive any material portion of their capital 
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from their owners regardless of their more or less central location: they rather rely on other 
sources of financing. 
The picture in Hungary is very similar in that respect, with the 85 firms owned directly or 
indirectly by domestic individuals showing an owner funds ratios close to zero in an 
overwhelming majority of cases, and only a very small number of exceptions. These exceptions 
include two medium-sized firms (Galvánplastik Kft and KUNPLAST-KARSAI Zrt) with an owner 
funds ratio of 27% and 35% respectively and located in medium-sized cities outside the central 
NUTS1 region, two small firms (Auguszt Vonóhorog Kft, AluWork Hungary Kft) with an owner 
funds ratio of 23%, 26% respectively and located in remote regions, three small firms (Armafilt 
RT, Elas Kft and KMGY Zrt) with an owner funds ratio of 27%, 40% and 49% respectively and 
located in Budapest as well as one firm (Autofer Zrt) with the highest owner funds ratio of 62% 
located remotely in Szeged. In other words, while some of the firms with a particularly high 
owner funds ratio are located in remote regions, this is not the case of others with some of 
the highest owner funds ratios found inside Budapest. Similar to Germany therefore, the data 
does not suggest that individually owned firms in the Hungarian periphery compensate a 
potential difficulty in obtaining bank loans by contributing a higher proportion of equity. As a 
general rule however, like their Eastern German counterparts, car component manufacturers 
owned by domestic individuals in Hungary are therefore virtually not financed by capital 
provided by their owners but rather rely on other sources of financing. Whether this might be 
by choice or necessity will be explored later in Chapter 6 but it appears likely that this is due 
to the comparatively limited financial resources at the disposal of the individuals and families 
owning the firms and, at first sight, it seems to confirm the pecking order theory (as discussed 
in Section 2.3) with regards to the ‘last resort’ nature of equity, at least for individually owned 
firms. 
The situation is very different among those firms that are owned by another car component 
manufacturer, especially those owned by foreign based firms which are generally larger GPN 
firms of the same sector (Figure 21). The eight German firms in this category are all financed 
to some extent through owner’s funds, in some cases even to a very large extent with 
proportions over 60% in two cases. A closer look at the data reveals that those foreign owned 
firms that were found to be ultimately owned by private equity (Autotest Eisenach GmbH and 
Truck-Light Europe Gmbh) tend to have a comparatively low owner funds ratio (with 14% and 
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38% respectively), those ultimately family owned (Alupress Berlin GmbH and Oberaigner 
Automotive GmbH) tend to be in the middle field (with 47% and 55% respectively) and those 
ultimately owned via the stock market (Boryszew Kunststofftechnik and Novero Dabendorf) 
tend to have the highest proportion of funds provided by the larger car component 
manufacturer that owns them with 60% and 66% respectively (although there are some 
exceptions to the rule such as the 75% of Israeli-owned ARKAL for which it could not be 
determined what type the ultimate ownership is and Nemak Europe ultimately owned via the 
Mexican stock market with its exceptionally low owner funds ratio of 22%). 
 
Figure 21 Owner funds in firms owned by foreign corporates 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
What this suggests is that where the ultimate owners are private equity, there might be a 
higher pressure to source capital through other (e.g. bank loan) sources, while when the 
ownership is ultimately a family business or a larger car component manufacturer owned via 
the stock market, there might be a tendency to fund the subsidiary more through capital 
generated (or maybe borrowed) by the owning car component manufacturer. 
The situation of the 35 Hungarian firms owned by foreign corporates is more diversified, with 
a few examples financed little to not at all through owner funds – however, owner funds do 
represent a material and sometimes dominant portion in a significant number of cases. 
Looking at some of the two extremes of the spectrum, the following picture appears: 
• ABB Kft (9% of owner funds) is part of the global Swedish/Swiss-based automation 
technology group Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), the ownership of which is traded on stock 
exchanges in Zurich, Stockholm and New York  
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• Phoenix Légrugó Technológia Kft (6%) owned by German ContiTech Vibration Controll 
GmbH is part of the German Continental Group headquartered in Hannover, one of 
the world’s largest car component manufacturers with its equity traded on stock 
exchanges (but 46% controlled by Schaeffler AG, another major German car 
component manufacturers also owned via the stock market) 
• IMPREGLON Kft (6%) is owned by Impreglon SE, another global car component 
manufacturer based in Germany (Lüneburg) and owned via the stock market 
• SALGGLAS Zrt (5%) is owned by two firms incorporated in Cyprus but a closer look 
reveals that these are not car component manufacturers but rather simply 
intermediate structures held by other shareholders not directly apparent in the 
structure. According to publicly available information, the firm was owned by global 
private equity firm Riverside from 1997 to 2007 and is currently owned by ‘investors 
from Germany and New Zealand’ – it is not disclosed who these investors are but it 
appears very likely that these are private equity investors rather than other car 
component manufacturers 
• Eckerle Automotive Kft (4%) is part of the family-owned German Eckerle car 
component manufacturing group based in Ottersweier (Baden-Württemberg) 
• S&T Consulting Hungary Kft (3%) is part of the technology group S&T AG based in Linz 
(Austria) and owned via the stock market with a material stake held by Taiwanese 
technology firm Quanmax 
• Kaeser Kompressoren Kft (3%) is part of the global Kaseser Kompressoren Group 
which is based in Germany (Coburt) and family-owned 
• Parafix Hungária Kft (2%) is part of the global family-owned Parafix group based in the 
UK  
• Innotec Magyar Kft (1%) is part of the Innotec group, a global car component 
manufacturer based in Michigan (US) which is family and employee-owned 
• Technospring Kft (0%) is owned by Hutter & Schranz, an Austrian industrial group, the 
ownership of which has been traded on the Austrian stock exchange since 1905  
• General-Plastics Kft (0%) is part of the Austrian Rejlek group, a likely family owned 
industrial group based in Vienna. 
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What this look at these 11 foreign-owned firms with a particularly low owner funds ratio (of 
less than 10%) seems to suggest is that many of them, in particular at the very bottom of the 
scale (with less than 5% of owner’s funds) are ultimately family owned – which seems 
coherent with the finding from the domestic firms where family owned firms have a very low 
owner funds ratio as well: just like their domestic counterparts, these firms ultimately owned 
by foreign individuals likely do not have the financial resources to inject significant amounts 
of equity in their Hungarian subsidiaries. However, this is not necessarily the case as a look at 
the other end of the spectrum shows, with the 10 foreign-owned firms in the Hungarian 
sample that have an over funds ratio above 40%: 
• Aunde Kft (44% of owner fund ratio) is part of the Aunde group, a family owned global 
car component manufacturing group based in Mönchengladbach (Germany) 
• Gedia Hungary Kft (50%) is part of the Gedia group, another family owned global car 
component manufacturing group based in Attendorn/NRW (Germany)  
• Musashi Hungary Kft (52%) is part of the Musashi group, a global car manufacturing 
group based in Japan and owned by various Japanese institutions 
• LEAX Hungary Zrt (55%) is part of the Leax group, a likely family owned car component 
manufacturing group based in Sweden 
• Warema Plastic Technology Hungary Kft (59%) is part of the Warema group, a global 
industrial group based in Bavaria (Germany) which is family owned as well 
• Stanley Electric Hungary Kft (60%) is part of the Stanley Electric group, a global car 
component manufacturer based in Japan and owned via the stock markets 
• Schneider Prototyping Hungary (66%) is part of the Schneider International group, a 
global car component manufacturer based in (Bad Kreuznach) Germany and family 
owned 
• MetoKote Hungary Kft (68%) is part of the US-based car component manufacturer 
Metokote, which was itself acquired in 2016 by another US-based industrial group PPG 
which is owned via the stock markets 
• Benteler Distribution (84%) is part of the Benteler group, a family-owned car 
component manufacturer based in Austria 
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• Tesa Tape Kft (88%) is part of the UK-based Tesa group, ultimately controlled by the 
Beiersdorf AG, a global industrial group based in Germany and owned via the stock 
markets 
The proportion of capital contributed by the ultimate shareholders is systematically 
significant, as illustrated by Figure 21 – however, as the above list shows, most of them are 
ultimately family owned, a stark contrast to the foreign-owned firms in Eastern Germany 
which, as seen above, are mostly owned by private equity or the stock markets. Consequently, 
some of the foreign (but ultimately family)-owned firms in Hungary do have a significant 
portion of the capital contributed by their shareholders, which means that an ultimate 
ownership by a family does not necessarily preclude a firm from being financed through equity 
to a significant extent. A potential (and seemingly plausible) reason for this is that when the 
firm’s owner is another (generally larger) firm (even if it is ultimately family owned), that firm 
may have more capital available or a more easy, cheaper and more direct access to the capital 
market or other forms of capital (such as bank loans in their country). In these cases, having 
capital contributed to the firm by the firm that owns it may be the most efficient and cheapest 
way to do so. Does this contradict the pecking order theory (cf. Section 2.3.2) for firms owned 
by other firms? Possibly or, more likely, it may reflect the fact that the decision-making power 
largely resides already with the owning firm that contributes the capital: while the pecking 
order theory predicts that firms will aim to avoid raising equity from third party investors that 
do not already control the firm in order to avoid transferring governance power to them, 
decision making power in firms owned by other car component manufacturers already resides 
with the (geographically remote) shareholders. Furthermore, the equity is contributed by that 
shareholder and not by another third party so there is no transfer of power between 
shareholders either.  
No clear pattern emerges in terms of owner fund ratio from the other categories of firms 
(Figure 22) such as corporately owned firms (green squares) and other firms (grey dots) - 
including those for which the ownership could not be identified but most of which are very 
likely owned by domestic individuals. Further analysis as to the ultimate shareholders of these 
firms would be necessary to interpret these figures further, but they are shown here to 
illustrate the range of other situations some of the firms in the sample are in (thereby 
providing some context to the firms above for which the ownership was identified).  
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Figure 22 Owner funds in other firms 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
It should be noted that, while a low owner funds ratio means the firm relies heavily on other 
sources of capital to fund its investments and operations, it does not mean the owners of the 
firm do not control it. Shareholders have a significant position in the firm’s governance 
regardless of how much or how little the firm is financed through equity (especially if the 
remainder is constituted of internal capital, i.e. retained earnings as set out below), but the 
more the firm is financed through other external sources, the more the shareholder’s position 
in the firm’s governance is diluted to the benefit of other capital providers. 
In summary, there does not seem to be a marked difference between the Hungarian and 
Eastern German variegations of capitalism in respect of capital provision by the firms’ owners, 
and there is no clear indication for the existence of regional equity gaps in either region. The 
main differentiating factors with regards to the provision of equity seems to be the firm’s GPN 
integration through ownership ties with another GPN firm: these are the cases where 
significant contribution of equity can most often be observed – in apparent contradiction to 
the pecking order theory but in reality highlighting that it only applies to equity provided by 
new external shareholders (to which governance power would be transferred if equity was 
provided by them) and not to existing industrial shareholders (who already hold the decision 
making power and the dominant position in the firms’ governance). 
Bank	Financing:	an	unequally	used	source	of	capital	
As discussed in Chapter 2, bank loans are a key source of financing for firms, but often difficult 
to obtain in particular for small firms and firms located in the periphery (with evidence for the 
existence of regional debt gaps). As a key actor of capital provision but with differing positions 
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in different institutional contexts, banks play a key but differentiated role in different 
variegations of capitalism (depending on their local embeddedness with presence 
concentrated in major urban centres or also in more peripheral cities, and on their relationship 
with banks which can be relatively stable and institutionalised as is typically the case in 
Germany, or less so as is the case in other regions such as Hungary for example). 
 
Figure 23 Bank loan ratio for firms owned by domestic individuals 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
The analysis of the empirical data for firms owned by domestic individuals (Figure 23) first 
illustrates a methodological obstacle encountered during the analysis, which is that small firms 
in Germany tend not to publish their capital sources in a detail which allows to identify their 
bank loans (simply because they are not legally obliged to do so). As a consequence, bank loan 
data is (with very few exceptions) available only for medium-sized and large German firms, as 
well as for firms of all categories in Hungary. For those where the data is available, a look at 
Figure 23 suggests two groups among the German firms: those (six) firms that use bank loans 
not at all or to a very limited extent (between 0% and 11%) and those (13) firms which use 
them to a relatively significant extent (between 25% and 50%). This finding is unsurprising and 
rather consistent with the understanding that firms in Germany rely heavily on their 
‘relationship banks’ (Hausbanken) (Handke 2011).  
In Hungary, the picture is a bit different than in Germany, with a significantly higher amount 
of (17) individually owned firms using bank loans not or only very little (not more than 11%) 
and those (68) that do, do so to a lesser extent than their Germany counterparts (often below 
20% and hardly ever above 40%. In other words, bank loans seem to be less prevalent among 
individually owned Hungarian firms and when they do get bank loans, German firms tend to 
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finance a higher proportion of the bank loans through this source. This recalls the findings of 
Bečicová and Blažek (2015) in the Czech Republic, pursuant to which some firms deliberately 
chose not to use bank loans.  
 
Map 4 Bank loan ratio for individually owned firms in Germany 
Source: author 
To assess whether this also echoes with the idea frequently found in the literature that 
individually owned firms in the periphery find it harder to get bank loans even if they want to, 
i.e. the existence or not of a regional debt gap, the following maps looks at the distribution of 
these firms in geographic terms. As far as the bank loan ratio for individually owned German 
firms could be identified (Map 4), there seems to be no significant difference in terms of 
geographical location between those firms (in red) that use banks loans only very little to not 
at all and those (in green) that use them to a significant extent.  
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What is striking is that the map only shows firms located in Thuringia and Sachen-Anhalt (as 
well as one exception in Mecklen-Vorpommern, which is also the only small firm for which the 
bank loan ratio could be identified): this does not necessarily mean that the firms in the other 
regions do not use bank loans but rather, as mentioned above, that they are mostly small firms 
and therefore do not report their capital sources in a detail which would allow to identify the 
bank loan ratio. There are also some (seven) medium-sized or large firms in this region that in 
principle have to publish their accounts in sufficient detail but the bank loan ratio could not 
be identified for other reasons. Based on the limited data available, however, the data of this 
study does not seem to suggest there is a credit gap for (at least medium-sized and large) 
individually owned firms in Eastern Germany with regards to their more central or peripheral 
location - at least with regards to the outcome of their negotiations with banks. The data does 
however not reveal whether the process is more difficult for the firms located further away 
from the financial centres. The data does show that most of the German firms do use bank 
loans to a significant extent (over 22%). 
By contrast, the situation for individually owned firms in Hungary (Map 5) looks very different. 
Most of the firms on the map are red, i.e. they use bank loans not at all or only to a limited 
extent (of up to 11%). In terms of regional variations within Hungary, the picture is a bit more 
nuanced: while a majority of the firms outside the metropolitan region of Budapest do not use 
bank loans, or only to a very limited extent, this is also the case of some firms within Budapest. 
Similarly, while some of the firms using bank loans to a significant (at more than 22%) extent 
are located within or near Budapest, this is also the case of some firms located in more remote 
regions such as Debrecen in the East of the country. Consequently, while the data suggests 
that many individually owned Hungarian firms in the periphery do not use bank loans (either 
because they chose not to or because than can’t), this is also the case for some individually 
owned firm in the center of the country – a credit gap is therefore not necessarily suggested 
from this data. One methodological issue encountered here is that the data is incomplete: it 
was not possible to identify the bank loan ratio for as many firms as the retained earnings 
ratio (as discussed below), which therefore seems to be a better indicator for the potential 
identification of a regional capital gap in Hungary. A further question is to which extent this 
lesser reliance on bank loans is a matter of choice or of necessity: Chapter 6 explores this in 
more detail.  
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Map 5 Bank loan ratio for individually owned firms in Hungary 
Source: author 
The picture is very different for firms owned by foreign corporates, i.e. by firms that are owned 
by other GPN firms located in other countries (Figure 24): virtually none of these in either 
Germany or Hungary use banks as a source of financing at all. There are only three exceptions 
in Hungary with over 20% of bank loans.  
 
Figure 24 Bank loan ratio for firms owned by foreign corporates 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
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This suggests that firms that are integrated in global production networks through ownership 
ties with another GPN firm tend to be less integrated with banks, which are the main local 
capital providers of their respective variegations of capitalism. The picture is more nuanced 
when looking at the other firms owned by domestic corporates or with an unknown ownership 
(Figure 25). To analyse this further, however, it would be necessary to identify their ownership 
or location in more detail. 
 
Figure 25 Bank loan ratio for other firms  
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
In summary, the empirical findings suggest that bank loans are an important, though far from 
prevalent, source of capital for individually owned firms in both Eastern Germany and 
Hungary, although Eastern German firms seem to rely more heavily and systematically on their 
banks than the Hungarians, suggesting a more important role played in the Eastern German 
variegations of capitalism than in the Hungarian variegations of capitalism. By contrast, firms 
owned by corporates, and foreign corporates (i.e. other foreign GPN firms) in particular, seem 
to almost completely refrain from getting bank loans. Chapter 6 endeavours to explore why 
that might be the case, although one possible explanation is that these firms likely access 
capital through their shareholders (which are larger firms with potentially better connections 
to international capital markets and other sources) at more favourable terms.  
Subsidies:	fading	away?	
For almost four decades following World War II, the role of the state in financing car 
component manufactures in Hungary and Eastern Germany was predominant and almost 
exclusive, with state ownership of most of the industry that existed under state socialism. 
State ownership ended (for all but a handful of firms) around 1989 and firms were privatised, 
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meaning that the role of the state as a capital provider in the institutional infrastructures of 
capital provision in Hungary and Eastern Germany, and thereby the variegations of capitalism 
in these regions, changed significantly. However, the support of the state (and more recently, 
of the EU) in the form of capital provided at preferential terms (i.e. subsidies) did not end 
there. Regional development support programmes in both regions aim to strengthen local 
firms through the granting of subsidies, with the objective of supporting firms located in more 
peripheral regions and therefore less able to obtain capital from other sources which are often 
located in the more central regions of the countries. 
 
Figure 26 Subsidy ratio for firms owned by domestic individuals 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
However, as Figure 26 shows, subsidies are found in a relatively small proportion of 
individually owned firms both in Hungary and in Eastern Germany. It comes with little surprise 
that only very few large firms in both countries benefit from subsidies, as the purpose of 
subsidies is arguably to strengthen the weaker small and medium sized local firms which have 
more difficulties in accessing other sources of capital. Somewhat more surprisingly, by 
contrast, is the finding that only very few small firms seem to benefit from subsidies: these 
seem to be used primarily by medium-sized firms in Germany, and in Hungary by firms that 
are just too small or too large to fall into the medium sized category but that are rather close 
thereto. A potential reason for this could be that the administrative burden for applying for 
and obtaining subsidies (and/or for reporting on performance while a subsidy is outstanding) 
is such that smaller firms find themselves discouraged and only medium-sized firms have the 
resources to go through the process. A potential link between the presence of subsidies and 
the more or less peripheral location of the firms was not explored within the scope of this 
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study, but would remain to be done through further research focusing more specifically on 
the geographies of subsidies and the question whether subsidies are able to materially 
mitigate regional equity or debt gaps that may exist in certain regions. 
 
Figure 27 Subsidy ratio for firms owned by foreign corporates 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
Foreign-owned firms (Figure 27) were not found to be using subsidies at all, with one 
exception in Hungary. It was not analysed within the scope of this study whether this might 
be due to a potential ineligibility of foreign owned firms to receive subsidies, or whether 
foreign-owned firms have easier access to other sources of capital which do not come with 
the constraints associated with obtaining and having subsidies in place (through which the 
public entity granting the subsidy enters the governance of the firm), and that they therefore 
may prefer to refrain from accessing subsidies in order to retain more autonomy in their 
governance. Among the other firms (Figure 28), some firms do use subsidies but a closer 
analysis would be required to identify their ownership and location. 
 
Figure 28 Subsidies ratio for other firms 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 1 10 100 1,000
%
 o
f B
al
an
ce
 S
he
et
Balance Sheet in Million EUR
German Firms
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 1 10 100 1,000
Balance Sheet in Million EUR
Hungarian Firms
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 1 10 100 1,000
%
 o
f B
al
an
ce
 S
he
et
Balance Sheet in Million EUR
German Firms
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 1 10 100 1,000
Balance Sheet in Million EUR
Hungarian Firms
   
 
 
 
161 
Future research could explore the distinction between subsidies granted by regional or 
national institutions on the one side and through EU institutions on the other side to 
understand whether there are regional variegations of capitalism with regards to the presence 
and role played by subsidy-granting institutions at various geographical scales.  
The	Big	Absentees:	Capital	Markets	and	Private	Equity	
Much of the academic literature on geographies of finance and financialisation focuses on 
capital which circulates through global capital markets and international financial actors such 
as private equity and venture capital firms. However, as the following section shows, one 
significant finding of the analysis of capital sources for the sample of firms in this study is the 
absence of capital directly sourced from ‘financialised’ sources such as the capital markets and 
private equity. As shown in Section 4.2.2, none of the firms in this study’s sample is organised 
as a PLC with its equity traded on the stock market, bonds issued through the debt market are 
also absent from the firm sample and none is directly owned by private equity. 
This is consistent with the literature on the public listings for firms in Eastern Germany (cf. e.g. 
Clark and Wójcik (2007: 118) for a map showing how few listed companies there are in the 
Eastern Länder, compared to some Western Länder – although there are some in Saxony and 
Thuringia) and is consistent with the more general understanding that publicly listed equity 
(i.e. stocks traded on a capital market) is virtually absent from the SME sector, with only a tiny 
minority of SMEs having their equity listed on a capital market such as Enternext and Alternext 
for European SMEs or the CAC Mid & Small in France and none of the SMEs from this project’s 
scope. It contrasts with countries such as the US or the UK where a higher number of large 
firms and also small- and medium-sized firms are listed.  
Does this mean that capital markets are irrelevant in the context of car component 
manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany? Not necessarily. There is a link of certain 
firms to capital markets via certain larger car component manufacturers they are owned by. 
While direct capital market financing (in the form of both equity and debt) is absent from this 
study’s sample of car component manufacturers, it is traditionally present among the lead 
firms of the automobile sector as well as among the larger international car component 
manufacturers. Most of the lead firms have their equity publicly traded on the stock market. 
General Motors, with its very granular shareholding (largely held by funds who themselves 
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each represent thousands of individuals) and its shares publicly traded since the early 20th 
century is a prime example of what Froud et al. (2002b) call ‘coupon pool capitalism’, although 
even this company was completely nationalized and not on the stock market in 2009 and 2010. 
Volkswagen is a less typical example, with only about 10% of shares freely traded on the stock 
market, a majority of the shares held by the members of one family and the remainder being 
held by governments (Lower Saxony and Qatar). The shares of some of the global tier-one 
suppliers are traded on the stock market (e.g. Delphi Automotive Plc, Magna International, 
Inc. or Lear Corporation), but this is much less likely to be seen among tier-two and tier-three 
supplier SMEs. The lead firms are also very familiar with the debt side of capital market 
finance, issuing bonds (i.e. borrowing financial capital directly from capital market investors 
rather than from a bank) and securitizing certain of their assets or of their claims against third 
parties (such as for example the clients that buy a car on loan). Most major lead firms in the 
automotive industry have been obtaining financial capital in this way for decades. Some of the 
capital that lead firms obtain through the issuance of bonds is used to finance their ‘car 
financing activity’ (consisting in lending to customers the money to buy the cars they sell them) 
(Froud et al. 2002a), i.e. not directly related to productive investment in car manufacturing. 
Private equity firms as well as venture capital are often cited and considered as another form 
of non-traditional, ‘financial’ equity. The private equity market is strongly developed in the US 
and in the UK, where a larger number of firms count some form of private equity actor among 
their shareholders. In continental Europe, the role of private equity is much more limited but 
still present to some extent. By contrast, as seen in Section 4.2.2, private equity is fully absent 
as a direct capital provider from the firm sample analysed in this study, where ownership is 
traditionally family-based or based on ownership by other car component manufacturers 
(although as seen above some are indirectly owned by private equity). Scheuplein (2012) 
shows that there had been a wave of takeovers of German car component manufacturers by 
private equity firms in the first decade of the current century (2000 to 2011), with about 130 
(12%) of those firms with at least 100 employees having at least 25% of their shares held by 
private equity at some point during this time. Interestingly, this phenomenon concerns mainly 
the lower end of the value chain with almost two thirds of the target firms belonging to the 
third tier, only 30% to the second tier and hardly any to the first tier. Geographically, the 
phenomenon was strongly focused on Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine 
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Westfalia (West Germany’s typical car component manufacturing industries) – hardly any of 
the firms taken over by private equity were located in Eastern Germany (Scheuplein 2012).18 
This concurs with the lack of finding of any direct private equity participations in any of sample 
firms of this study in Eastern Germany. This may suggest a bias of private equity investors to 
certain (more central regions) in Germany, like Wray et al. (2011) have shown for venture 
capital in the UK. Scheuplein and Teetz (2014) also provide a more general and detailed 
discussion of private equity actors and takeovers in Germany, including their geographical 
distribution and its implications on firm governance. 
In conclusion, the sample of firms in this study has no direct connection with or reliance on 
capital markets and private equity (and is therefore not ‘financialised’ in that sense), but there 
are indirect connections. Both lead firms and larger car component manufactures that do have 
such ‘financialised’ sources of capital do have commercial relationships with firms in the 
sample, and in some cases also through ownership relationships as shown by some of the 
firms cited in Section 4.2.2 (such as Truck-Lite Europe or Autotest Eisenach owned by firms 
who are themselves owned by private equity, and Boryszew Kunststofftechnik or Novero 
Dabendorf who are owned by firms that have their own equity traded on the stock markets). 
5.1.2 Financing	Operations:	Working	Capital	
The question of how and where firms in Eastern Germany and Hungary source their capital 
both for their investment and for their working capital needs is particularly relevant in the 
automobile supplier industry where due to “stringent working capital management by lead 
firms, financing requirements are more and more shifted towards upstream suppliers” 
(Baumeister and Zademach 2017). As a consequence, the firms not only need to raise long 
term funds to purchase and modernize equipment and increasingly also to fund R&D 
expenses, but also to bridge the gap created by the fact that their buyers (lead firms or larger 
suppliers) benefit from more extended payment terms than the firms’ own suppliers - 
meaning de facto that the firms are net providers of trade credit to their buyers, which 
requires them to raise interim capital through other sources and increases their overall 
financial costs (Baumeister and Zademach 2017). Such interim capital can be raised either in 
                                                        
18  There is one example in this sample with a private equity firm based in Wernigerode in Saxony-Anhalt 
ultimately holding the firm via another car component manufacturer. 
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the form of trade credit granted by their own suppliers, or through short term bank loans. This 
is relevant for another form of indirect exposure which results from a firm’s commercial 
(customer/client rather than owner/subsidiary) relationships with firms that have their equity 
owned (or that are otherwise financed) through the capital market. 
Trade	Liabilities	and	other	forms	of	Inter-firm	Financing?	
Firms finance part of their activities by delaying payment of their suppliers (and therefore 
reducing their own working capital requirement) – corresponding effectively to free short-
term credit granted by the supplier (Froud et al. 2002a). In theory (Pollard 2007), it is mainly 
the larger powerful assemblers that have the negotiation power to impose beneficial payment 
terms onto their suppliers and thereby benefit from trade credit as a source of short term 
working capital. Smaller SME suppliers are expected to have less negotiating power and 
therefore not be able to access such trade credit to the same extent as larger firms (it is mainly 
a question of the ‘net position’ between the trade credit they are able to get and the trade 
credit they are obliged to grant). In fact, inter-firm financing is one of the main forms of 
financing for GPN firms, but SMEs are globally net providers (rather than receivers) of this 
financing. Factoring is one way of “monetizing” these receivables, but its use remains limited 
to date. Inter-firm financing can also be a factor of financialisation when the lead firms of a 
GPN encourage or assist the smaller firms of their network in obtaining [equity or] debt from 
the capital market and thereby enter financialised circuits of capital (Baumeister and 
Zademach 2017). In this context, there is potential for “partners within the value chain [to] 
collaborate to either provide financing/fund investments or facilitate the access to finance in 
cooperation with external investors such as banks” (Baumeister and Zademach 2017), being 
understood that such financial collaborating requires a consideration of power relations, 
network embeddedness and relevant institutional frameworks – which is why the GPN 
perspective is pertinent here. 
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Figure 29 Trade credit ratio for firms owned by domestic individuals 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
How does the actual picture look based on the empirical data for individually owned firms 
(Figure 29) and for foreign owned firms (Figure 30)? Again, data is unfortunately not available 
for small German firms but based on the data available, trade-liabilities seem to be a form of 
capital for a significant number of individually owned firms, and the data does not suggest 
that it is the larger and stronger firms that are able to use this type of capital more than others. 
 
Figure 30 Trade credit ratio for firms owned by foreign corporates 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
No clear patterns appear either when looking at the other firms (Figure 31), although the 
Hungarian firms owned by domestic corporates seem to have a slightly higher capacity of 
imposing trade credit onto their suppliers as compared to their German counterparts: 
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Figure 31 Trade credit ratio for other firms 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
In short, the empirical data of this study do not seem to confirm the general assumption in 
the literature that larger firms within global production networks are able to impose more 
trade credit to their suppliers than smaller firms. There are, however, likely other factors at 
play, such as the firm’s activity or tier-positioning within the global production network which 
was not analysed within the scope of this study (but could be done by future research), which 
may have an impact on the firm’s capacity to impose, or not, trade credit to their suppliers. 
This is an area where the customer relationships with more or less financialised larger car 
component manufacturers might come into play. 
Short	Term	Bank	Loans	
To the extent firms need to advance funds to purchase material to produce their goods before 
receiving payment for these goods once they are finished, i.e. to the extent they cannot 
impose payment timing terms favourable to them and thereby fund the gap through trade 
credit granted by their suppliers, firms need to bridge the gap through short term bank loans 
(revolving credit facility lines). Is this a (costly) compensation for the inability of imposing trade 
liabilities? While it was not possible within the scope of this study to distinguish between long-
term and short-term bank loans, it is likely that this is a relatively rare source of capital for 
many firms, which is consistent with the findings of Bečicová and Blažek (2015) according to 
which small firms in the Czech periphery often prefer not to take on any (even short term) 
bank loans.  
This section has concentrated on the range of theoretically possible (and to a more limited 
extent empirically observed) forms of external capital sourced from third parties outside the 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 1 10 100 1,000
%
 o
f B
al
an
ce
 S
he
et
Balance Sheet in Million EUR
German Firms
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 1 10 100 1,000
Balance Sheet in Million EUR
Hungarian Firms
   
 
 
 
167 
firm to finance investments in the long term and operations in the short term, as one aspect 
of the varieties of capitalism prevalent in Hungary and Eastern Germany consisting in the 
relationships between firms and the capital providers that form part of the institutional 
infrastructure of capital provision in these regions. It was evidenced that the firms use a 
variety of different sources, and the balance depends to a certain extent on the firm’s location, 
size or ownership. However, none of these seems to be a predominant source of finance in 
many cases, with very few exceptions. In the overwhelming majority of cases, all external 
capital sources taken together cover only part of the entire capital needs of the firm. How is 
the remaining need for capital financed? Through retained earnings, an internal source of 
capital, produced by the firm itself, which is often overlooked in geographical analysis of firm 
finance but used by the firms as a means of increasing or preserving their autonomy and self-
reliance. 
5.2 The	Predominant	Role	of	Internal	Capital:	Retained	Earnings	
Retained earnings are capital produced ‘inside’ the firm, through the production process every 
year in which profit made by the firm is retained for future investment rather than distributed 
as dividends to its shareholders. By retaining the profit made in a given year rather than 
distributing it in the form of dividends, the firm creates its own form of capital available to 
fund investments over the long term and constituting a working capital stock in the short term. 
Put into the conceptual framework of variegated capitalism, it has the particularity of not 
being supplied by one of the institutions that form part of the relevant institutional 
infrastructure of capital provision, but rather being produced by the firm itself. As the 
following section shows, this source of capital is widely used by most firms in the sample, often 
as the predominant and sometimes even as the exclusive source of capital for some firms. 
Here again, however, patterns appear between the degree to which firms rely on retained 
earnings as a source of capital and certain of their characteristics such as their location, size 
or ownership – with certain regional gaps evident suggesting that a firm’s location in particular 
and its integration through ownership ties with other GPN firms may impact the degree to 
which it is likely to rely on retained earnings as a capital source. These findings seem to confirm 
those of Donati and Sarno (2015) in the context of peripheral regions in Italy where there also 
seems to be a strong reliance on internal funds.  
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The section is organised in two parts. The first part discusses the general importance of 
retained earnings for most types of firms, regardless of their size or ownership and with only 
limited contrasts observed between Eastern Germany and Hungary. The second part offers a 
more nuanced picture however, highlighting regional contrasts within Hungary that seem to 
indicate the existence of a ‘capital gap’ in particular in the Hungarian periphery. 
5.2.1 A	Central	Source	of	Capital	for	Most	Firms	
As mentioned above, retained earnings constitute a significant source of capital for many of 
the firms in the sample but to a very differing degree. The following section assesses to which 
extent the relative importance of retained earnings for a given firm may be due to certain of 
its characteristics such as size, ownership or location. Past performance (the making of profit 
or losses) and strategy (the distribution of profits made as dividends or rather their retention 
as retained earnings) are also relevant factors but could not be analysed in this study: this 
remains to be done through future research. 
The	importance	of	retained	earnings	for	individually	owned	firms	
The following looks at the prevalence of retained earnings among individually owned firms 
(Figure 32). Unlike what was seen for the external forms of capital earlier, it appears that 
retained earnings are used as a source of capital by almost all firms.  
 
Figure 32 Retained earnings in firms owned by domestic individuals 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
There are only very few exceptions of firms, in all sizes and ownership types, that do not seem 
to use retained earnings at all. Whether this is because they (or more precisely the 
stakeholders controlling their governance) chose not to retain and rather distribute all their 
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profits or whether it is because they have made losses over the last years and therefore were 
not able to constitute or preserve retained earnings as a capital source remains to be 
determined. Among the individually owned German firms that use retained earnings as a 
capital source, examples can be found in every category – from marginal with less than 20% 
to intermediary and even predominant, and one domestically owned small firm even almost 
exclusive (with almost 90% of its capital represented through retained earnings). This being 
said, a majority of individually owned German firms seems not to rely on retained earnings as 
a predominant source of capital. These firms do engage with external capital providers (such 
as banks in particular) that form part of the regional institutional infrastructure of capital 
provision.  
By contrast, the overview for the individually owned Hungarian firms provides a rather 
different picture. Again, firms can be found in all categories, but there are far fewer firms 
where retained firms are marginal (less than 20%) and far more firms where retained earnings 
are predominant (over 50%) or even almost exclusive (over 80%). It clearly appears that there 
is a tendency for retained earnings among individually owned firms in Hungary to play a 
greater role than in Eastern Germany. Hungarian firms, especially the smaller ones, tend to be 
financed to a higher degree through retained earnings than Eastern German firms, suggesting 
that they either cannot find other financing sources or chose not to in order to retain their 
autonomy in terms of firm governance. As a result, these firms engage less with the external 
capital providers that form part of the institutional infrastructure of capital provision in 
Hungary, suggesting a difference in the variegations of capitalism prevalent in Hungary 
compared to the one prevalent in Eastern Germany. 
Importance	also	for	firms	owned	by	foreign	corporates	
As far as foreign-corporately owned firms are concerned (Figure 33), a majority of those in 
Germany have a very little proportion of retained earnings whereas in Hungary there is really 
no perceptible pattern at all: firms with all proportions of retained earnings can be found in 
all size categories. 
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Figure 33 Retained earnings in firms owned by foreign corporates 
Source: author’s calculation based on published annual statements 
The situation for other firms (Figure 34) looks similar. In summary, the analysis of retained 
earnings ratios of the firms in this study’s sample in light of their size and ownership does not 
evidence any clear patterns. The picture is a very diverse one overall: firms for which retained 
earnings constitute the predominant source of capital can be found in all size categories, and 
the same is true for firms for which retained earnings do not play an important role with 
regards to capital sources. This suggests that there is a host of contextual factors that 
determine the relative weight of retained earnings for a firm, illustrating the limits of a binary 
VoC approach.  
 
Figure 34 Retained earnings in other firms 
Source: author’s calculation based on published annual statements 
The general overview in the previous section evidences a rather complex and chaotic picture 
but it also shows that retained earnings constitute the predominant (>50%) source of 
financing for many firms in both Eastern Germany and Hungary, and even the (almost) 
exclusive (>80%) source of capital for some firms particularly in Hungary. It appears that 
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retained earnings are important especially for the smaller ones that are domestically owned 
(as well as, as will be shown later, those in the Hungarian periphery). These firms seem to 
prefer retained earnings over external capital sources, either because they struggle to access 
these external sources or because they find the conditions and constraints attached to them 
too intrusive and because retained earnings enable them to preserve their autonomy and self-
reliance. But this would not be sufficient to explain the predominance of retained earnings: 
the firms also need to have the capacity to accumulate retained earnings by making profits 
over several years and retaining them rather than distributing them as dividends to 
shareholders. This suggests that the small firms in the Hungarian periphery are able to work 
profitably over a number of years and accumulate capital by not distributing dividends – 
although this strategy likely also means that they remain small and do not grow at a pace they 
might if they did resort to external financing sources. Another approach though could be to 
see that those firms that rely most heavily on retained earnings in Hungary are the smaller 
ones. Could it be that they must rely on retained earnings because they struggle to access 
external capital, and at the same time they make only limited profits over the years so they 
remain small in the long term? By contrast, in Germany it seems to be larger firms that seem 
to be relying to a higher extent (though never exclusively) on retained earnings: could this 
mean that they do so out of choice rather than necessity, that they are able to access other 
sources of capital as a complement and therefore grow more strongly than their Hungarian 
counterparts? This remains to be analysed by future research. As Lapavitsas (2011) recalls, a 
strong reliance on retained profits was already observed almost 80 years ago by Sweezy (1942) 
in respect of large corporations, enabling them to finance investment without relying heavily 
on banks. The context is of course different in this study which concerns mainly small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
5.2.2 Regional	Contrasts	and	Capital	Gaps	
The previous section has shown how important retained earnings are for most firms in the 
sample, almost regardless of their size or ownership and with only little contrast between 
Eastern Germany and Hungary, i.e. without at first sight a strong geographical differentiation. 
This section draws a more nuanced picture by highlighting what the previous section did not 
show: the likely existence of a capital gap in the Hungarian periphery which appears when the 
importance of retained earnings is put into perspective with the firm’s location. Just as 
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strikingly, however, the empirical data shows no sign of such a gap among the sample firms in 
Eastern Germany. 
Regional	capital	caps	for	individually	owned	firms?	
As seen earlier, the firm’s size and ownership does not seem to provide a satisfactory 
explanation for the very unequal importance of retained earnings among the firms, so another 
possibility to be explored is whether geography, the firm’s location might be an explaining 
factor. The firms’ location in either Germany or Hungary is therefore analysed now and, within 
each of these two regions, in more central or more peripheral regions, to assess whether these 
factors might evidence patterns as well as what the explanations might be. Map 6 and Map 7 
project the firms owned by domestic individuals in Hungary and Eastern Germany 
respectively, differentiated by the relative importance retained earnings play among their 
capital sources as follows: 
• In red, firms for which retained earnings represent only a very small proportion of their 
capital sources (less than 15%): these firms rely primarily on external capital sources 
such as industrial equity, bank loans or trade liabilities. In other words, these firms 
engage to a stronger extent with external actors that are part of the relevant regional 
infrastructure of capital provision; 
• In yellow, firms for which retained earnings represent between 15% and 75% of their 
capital sources 
• In green, firms for which retained earnings represent over 75% of their capital sources: 
these firms are most autonomous in their financing and rely the least on third party 
capital providers (whether by choice or by necessity remains to be determined) 
The size of the firms is also reflected by the size of the symbols between small, medium-sized 
and large firms. 
In Hungary (Map 6), it seems to appear clearly that there is a contrast between the centre and 
the periphery: while the metropolitan region of Budapest is dominated by red and yellow 
firms, i.e. firms that have a low to medium level of retained earnings and therefore (are able 
to) rely strongly on other external forms of capital, the rest of Hungary (i.e. the more 
peripheral regions) is strongly dominated by (mostly small) yellow and green firms, i.e. firms 
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that have a medium to high level of retained earnings and therefore use external capital only 
to a very limited extent.  
 
Map 6 Retained earnings for individually owned firms in Hungary 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
This looks like a potential confirmation of the idea that, similar to the question regarding the 
existence of a ‘credit gap’ discussed in the literature (cf. section 2.3.1.), there might be a 
regional equity gap as far as Hungary is concerned, because firms in the periphery seem to be 
lacking external capital and therefore relying on retained earnings, due to the distance from 
banks and the capital market in Budapest as discussed in Chapter 4.  
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Map 7 Retained earnings for individually owned firms in Eastern Germany 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
As Klagge and Martin (2005) recall, even though to a certain extent decentralised financial 
markets exist for example in Germany, other countries continue to have a very centralised 
financial system, as is the call of Hungary for example.  
The data in Eastern Germany (Map 7) shows a very different picture: there are far fewer 
‘green’ firms with a high reliance (>75%) on retained earnings, and the few that are seen are 
not in the periphery but in Berlin and in or near the automobile cluster of Thuringia. There are 
far more ‘red’ firms with very little (<15%) retained earnings, and this significantly includes 
most firms in the more peripheral region such as Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Sachsen-
Anhalt. What this suggests is that, unlike their Hungarian counterparts, firms in the Eastern 
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German periphery seem to be able to access other forms of capital from external sources and 
therefore rely less on retained earnings. It is far less evident to suggest the existence of a 
regional equity gap here than it is in Hungary, based on the empirical data of this study. 
A different look at the same data is proposed by Figure 35, which distinguishes individually 
owned Hungarian firms between those located in the ‘centre’ (defined here as the NUTS1 
region around Budapest) and the ‘periphery’ (comprising the two other NUTS1 regions of 
Hungary). 
 
Figure 35 Retained earnings for individually owned Hungarian firms (center vs periphery) 
Source: author 
While it is not very obvious to see a clear difference between the two groups (which means 
that there are firms with very high and very low retained earnings both in the Hungarian 
centre and in the Hungarian periphery), a closer look does reveal that firms with very high 
retained earnings tend to be located more in the periphery: while only 6 out of the 38 firms in 
the centre (i.e. 16%) have retained earnings above 70%, this is the case for 11 out of the 47 
firms in the periphery (i.e. 23%). The contrast appears even more clearly when the threshold 
is set not at 70% but at 60%: while only 10 out of the 38 firms in the centre (i.e. 26%) have 
retained earnings above 60%, this is the case for 18 out of the 47 firms in the periphery (i.e. 
38%.). This conclusion needs to be nuanced of course: rather than revealing an ‘absolute’ 
distinction (which would have been that ‘all firms in the periphery rely on retained earnings 
to a higher extent’), it rather reveals a tendency (i.e. ‘firms in the periphery tend to rely on 
retained earnings to a higher extent’) and also recalls that the level of retained earnings (like 
the other capital sources, but maybe even more than the others) ultimately depends on a 
range of factors (such as the performance over the last years etc.) other than the firm’s size, 
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location and ownership, as well as the integration in the institutional infrastructures of capital 
provision and their relation with capital providers that are discussed in the next chapter. It 
may be a reflection of the firm’s ability or choice to use external capital sources such as banks 
loans in particular, but it also depends on a range of other factors which could not be analysed 
within the scope of this study.  
A	different	situation	for	firms	owned	by	foreign	individuals	
The situation looks rather different for the foreign-owned firms in Hungary: 
 
Map 8 Retained earnings for firms owned by foreign corporates in Hungary 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
These tend to have a lower portion of retained earnings than their locally owned counterparts 
(although they also tend to be located in less peripheral regions), likely a reflection of their 
disembeddedness out of their regions through their embeddedness through ownership 
relations in global production networks leading to their higher capacity (or need) to source 
external capital. Whether it is a question of necessity or choice for these Hungarian firms to 
almost exclusively use external capital sources is not revealed by this data.  
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In Germany (Map 9), with only six foreign owned firms for which the retained earnings ratio 
could be assessed, none of the firms in the sample show any material proportion of retained 
earnings but this could still be analysed in more detail to distinguish between those that use 
no loans and those that use some to see whether there is a difference between those that are 
ultimately owned by private equity and those ultimately owed by families or the stock market. 
 
Map 9 Retained earnings for firms owned by foreign corporates in Eastern Germany 
Source: author’s calculations based on published annual statements 
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Regional	capital	gaps?	Contrasting	pictures	between	Hungary	and	Eastern	Germany	
In summary, this chapter has analysed the differentiated financing patterns of the firms and 
the higher or lesser degree to which they finance their investments and activities through 
external rather than internal capital sources, and the degree to which they both generate and 
retain profits (or not) enabling them to finance themselves through retained earnings (in turn 
enabling them to repay previously incurred external capital and/or to grow). This sets the 
empirical ground for the next chapter which explores the second and third research questions 
presented in Chapter 2: why these patterns may look the way they do and what the 
implications thereof might be. For example, to the extent a significant difference was found 
between German and Hungarian firms, this might be due to the respective variegated 
capitalism of these regions (as the concept was defined in Section 2.1). To the extent 
significant differences were found between firms in relatively central locations as opposed to 
the periphery, an explanation might draw on the literature on regional equity or debt gaps as 
discussed in Section 2.3.1. To the extent size or ownership has turned out to be a significant 
factor, the literature on geographies of finance (as presented in Section 2.3.2) more broadly 
might provide plausible explanations. The firm’s ownership can also be analysed from the 
perspective of global production networks (as presented in Section 2.2) for both a theoretical 
support to provide a plausible explanatory account and potentially a critical reflection on 
potential predictions of the theory itself, to the extent the firms are owned by other car 
component manufacturers. 
To conclude this chapter, the few key findings of the previous pages, regarding patterns of 
capital sourcing that were observed among a set of car component manufacturers in Hungary 
and Eastern Germany, can be summarised as follows: 
• Capital markets: equity or debt sourced directly through the capital markets is virtually 
completely absent from the sample of firms but it is very present indirectly through 
the foreign car component manufacturers owning the firms in the sample, especially 
in Germany. The variegations of capitalism in both Hungary and Eastern Germany 
seem to involve connections with the capital markets for most firms only indirectly. 
• Equity: owners’ funds (i.e. capital contributed by the shareholders) are significant only 
for those firms that are owned by other car component manufactures, they are 
marginal for all others (in particular for firms owned by individuals). In other words, 
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only firms that are integrated in global production networks through ownership 
receive a significant proportion of their capital from their shareholders. 
• Bank loans: bank loans are used more by German firms (“Mittelstand” in particular) 
than by Hungarians, suggesting a difference in the Hungarian and Eastern German 
variegations of capitalism with respect to the role played by banks in the respective 
institutional infrastructures of capital provision. Banks are virtually absent in firms 
owned by foreign firms, suggesting that the network embeddedness of firms through 
ownership by foreign firms weighs more in the decision to use (or not) bank loans as a 
capital source than the firm’s geographic location in a territory. A regional bank loan 
gap could however not clearly be evidenced by the data. 
• Trade liabilities: the relative weight of trade liabilities does not seem to reflect the 
unequal power relations between smaller and larger firms within the global production 
networks. This somewhat contradicts the expectation based on the literature, but 
further factors would need to be studied to better understand whether or not unequal 
power relations between firms lead to a higher capacity of certain firms to use trade 
liabilities as a flexible alternative source of capital. 
• Retained earnings: retained earnings are by far the most significant source of capital, 
in particular for individually owned firms in the Hungarian periphery. Firms in the 
Eastern German periphery rely on them significantly less than their Hungarian 
counterparts, evidencing a clear difference in the behaviour of firms based on their 
geographical location, both between Hungary and Eastern Germany and between the 
centre and the periphery of each of these two regions. 
The next step, after having identified and described these patterns of how firms are financed, 
needs to be an attempt to explain them, identify the underlying causes and mechanisms why 
firms finance their activities the way they do and what the implications of these patterns on 
the firms’ governance and development prospects might be. This is the objective of the 
following Chapter 6, exploring the institutional context of capital provision in Hungary and 
Eastern Germany as well as potential other explanations and implications. 
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Chapter	6 Institutional	Infrastructures	of	Capital	Provision	and	
Potential	Implications	
As discussed in Chapter 5, capital markets and private equity are virtually absent as a source 
of financing for car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany. The 
utilisation of bank loans is very unequal and is more common among German firms than 
among Hungarian ones. Many firms, especially the smaller individually owned ones in more 
peripheral regions in Hungary, rely to a significant extent on retained earnings as an internal 
source of capital to cover their financing needs. This chapter explores (i) why that may be the 
case and (ii) what the potential implications on the firms’ governance (and the role different 
stakeholders play therein) might be as well as wider local and regional development 
implications, with the objective of answering the second and third research questions of the 
study. 
The chapter is organised in four sections: framed by the conceptual framework of variegated 
capitalism presented in Section 2.1, the first section (6.1) explores how the car component 
manufacturers engage with the (national and regional) institutional infrastructures of external 
capital provision in Hungary and Eastern Germany, both with regards to capital markets and 
private equity as more ‘new’ or ‘financialised’ sources of capital and with regards to banks and 
industrial equity as more traditional sources. It relates this to the empirical firm-level data 
discussed in Chapter 5 to illustrate and corroborate or contrast expectations deriving from the 
review of existing literature by the findings of the empirical research. The second section (6.2) 
aims to understand how this institutional context of external capital provision constrains (or 
is constrained by) the agency of firms and shapes their financing patterns (or is shaped by 
them) through the effects of different forms of embeddedness. It shows that the regional 
variegation of financing patterns observed in Chapter 5, especially with respect to the relative 
importance of retained earnings for firms in the Hungarian periphery, may at least partly be 
explained by regional variegations of capitalism and the firm’s relative position in global 
production networks. The analysis thereby contributes to advancing understandings and 
explanations beyond the national frame, revealing factors that drive variegations of finance 
at different scales beneath the level of the national, with a key role among these factors for 
the firms’ place within global production networks and regional variegations of capitalism.  
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The third section (6.3) focuses on the social and spatial geographies of power relationships 
between car component manufacturers and different types of capital providers in Hungary 
and Eastern Germany, and on what this means for governance within the firms. Capital indeed 
constitutes a relationship between the capital provider and the capital user, a relationship in 
which power is distributed unevenly. It further analyses what this implies in terms of circuits 
of value and for the ability of car component manufacturers and regions to both create and 
capture value. The fourth section (6.4) discusses what these variegated power relationships 
resulting from different capital forms mean for the firms’ agency in terms of value 
enhancement and industrial upgrading, as well as for their resilience in crises and wider local 
and regional development implications. The analysis of the implications of various capital 
sources is thereby broadened from the impact on the immediate firm to wider implications in 
the local and regional development context in which the firms are embedded.  
6.1 Firm	Engagement	with	Institutional	Infrastructures	of	Capital	Provision19	
In both Hungary and Eastern Germany, the national and regional institutional context of 
capital provision as conceptualized in Section 4.3 is marked by comparatively underdeveloped 
capital markets and private equity (i.e. comparatively ‘new’ and ‘financialised’ sources of 
capital) and by a banking sector and industrial capital (i.e. capital that is provided by investors 
that are themselves individuals or industrial firms rather than financial investors) which are 
strong but contrast starkly between the two regions. This section looks at how the car 
component manufacturers engage with these two groups of capital sources respectively.  
6.1.1 Capital	Markets	and	Private	Equity:	the	Big	Absentees	
As set out in Section 2.1, capital markets and private equity are both most strongly developed 
in the Anglo-Saxon world (mainly the US and the UK) where they constitute a very common 
and important source of capital even for small and medium-sized firms. In the economic 
geography literature, they are considered as comparatively ‘financialised’ forms of capital in 
the sense that they introduce and increase the weight of financial metrics into a world 
traditionally more driven by industrial metrics. Capital markets and private equity are further 
seen in this literature as comparatively short-term oriented forms of capital, as opposed to 
                                                        
19 For further relevant context cf. also the FESSUD reports on Germany and Hungary (Detzer et al. 2013; Szikszai 
et al. 2013; Detzer et al. 2014; Detzer and Hein 2014; Badics and Szikszai 2015) 
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longer-term oriented bank loans and industrial investment. The following pages examine to 
which extent the car component manufacturers analysed in this study engage (or not) with 
capital markets and private equity in Hungary and Eastern Germany, as well as potential 
reasons therefore. 
The	Absence	of	Direct	Involvement	of	Capital	Markets	and	Private	Equity	
As shown in Section 5.1, car component manufacturers in Eastern Germany hardly use capital 
markets to source their capital, be it in the form of equity or debt: none of the firms in the 
sample analysed have their equity listed on a stock market, which would be the evidence of 
equity being sourced through the capital market. Similarly, none of the firms analysed seem 
to have any bonds outstanding, i.e. debt sourced through the capital market. The situation is 
similar in Hungary where almost half of the firms are individually owned and a significant 
number of firms is corporately owned, but none of the firms analysed seems to have its equity 
traded on the stock market. Similarly, the data collected did not evidence any bonds issued by 
the firms. Not precluding that there may be important indirect links and implications as will 
be discussed later, Section 5.1 has therefore shown that capital markets are totally absent as 
a direct source of financing for car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern 
Germany. This stands in stark contrast to the US or the UK for example, where numerous car 
component manufacturers source at least some of their capital in one form or another 
through the capital markets including not only large firms (e.g. Delphi Automotive Plc, Magna 
International, Inc. or Lear Corporation). While Börse Berlin theoretically and technically is a 
source of capital available for car component manufacturers in Eastern Germany, it is not in 
practice, evidencing that the institutional infrastructure of capital provision in the variegations 
of capitalism prevalent in Hungary and Eastern Germany does not typically imply a direct 
relationship between (even the local) capital markets and firms such as car component 
manufacturers.  
As shown in Section 5.1.1, any form of direct private equity investment is also absent from 
this study’s firm sample, although several firms are indirectly, i.e. ultimately, owned by private 
equity. Is this absence of direct private equity investment due to a general absence of private 
equity investors from the institutional landscape in Hungary and Eastern Germany, or is it due 
to certain features of the car component manufacturing industries in these regions that make 
them less attractive to private equity investors – or firm owners less willing to see a private 
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equity firm enter the capital of their firm? In Eastern Germany, private equity would in theory 
constitute a source available for car component manufacturers as there is an active market 
for private equity even for car component manufacturers in Germany as shown by Scheuplein 
(2012). However, as Scheuplein (2012) also shows, there are hardly any in Eastern Germany. 
This seems to suggest the existence of a regional private equity gap in Germany as evidenced 
by Wray et al. (2011) in respect of venture capital in peripheral UK regions. In Hungary, private 
equity is generally less present, and not relevant for the small, individually owned firms that 
constitute the bulk of car component manufacturers in this region, as well as for the foreign 
owned firms that constitute the other material group in the sample. 
This institutional context of private equity in Hungary and Eastern Germany which is part of 
the overall institutional infrastructure of capital provision in these regions is likely to drive the 
demand and supply of capital markets and private equity capital for car component 
manufacturers in these regions. The absence of direct financing through capital markets and 
private equity may partly be due to the predominance of small firms in the sample, but also 
to cultural and other reasons. Recourse to capital markets and private equity would allow 
significant growth, but would also imply a loss of control, which is resisted by firms in 
particular when they are individually owned and when capital is less required such as in the 
case of firms owned by foreign corporates. In the absence of interviews with the firms 
themselves, however, this interpretation remains speculative and would need to be confirmed 
and further developed through future research. 
No	 ‘Impatient	 Capital’	 for	 Car	 Component	Manufacturers	 in	Hungary	 and	 Eastern	
Germany?	
What does this mean for the second research question, i.e. why the firms finance themselves 
in the way they do, as opposed to how they could do it in theory or how they actually do it in 
other regions (notably the US and the UK)? Why is ‘impatient capital’ (here defined as mobile 
or volatile capital contributed through the capital markets or by private equity firms) largely 
absent from the sample of firms (as seen in Section 5.1.1) and why do they therefore focus 
more on ‘patient capital’20 (bank loans, industrial equity and, crucially, retained earnings)? 
                                                        
20 A term that emerged in the US in the 1980s (Knafo and Dutta 2016) and developed in particular by Zysman 
(1983) for example.  
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One potential further reason might be timing and access to capital i.e. in some ways internal 
decision making concerning allocation of retained earnings might be the quickest source of 
capital of all (and at the same time the most patient), relying only on internal decision making 
within the firm whereas external capital involves other actors and interests and decision 
makers. Capital markets are the most ‘impatient’ and the slowest to access – but capital 
market can provide more resources and enables quicker growth in the medium term. 
How does the different institutional context of capital provision in Hungary and Eastern 
Germany (as compared to the UK and the US for example) explain the significant difference in 
connection between car component manufacturers and capital markets? The differences or 
variegations in institutional context of capital markets in these regions may explain and help 
understand the absence of ‘impatient’ capital among car component manufacturers in 
Hungary and Eastern Germany. As seen in the literature review and in Chapter 5, small and 
medium-sized firms in Germany and Hungary traditionally do not have a direct link with the 
capital market and close to none of the equity or debt is sourced through these sources. Unlike 
larger firms, their shares are not traded on the stock market, they do not issue bonds on the 
bond market and they do not securitise their assets. This is due mainly to the comparatively 
small size of both their operations and financing needs and the resulting comparatively high 
transaction costs that would result in accessing the capital markets directly (Pollard 2003).  
The private equity landscapes in Hungary and Eastern Germany also differ significantly from 
those of more developed/traditional private equity markets such as the US and the UK. Private 
equity operates differently and targets different types of firms than capital markets, but 
constitutes a different dimension of financialised, ‘quick’ capital. This is another reflection of 
variegated capitalism which translates into a context that conditions the choices of firms when 
it comes to determining their sources of capital. 
Despite this current absence of ‘impatient’ capital among the firms analysed within the scope 
of this study, there is currently some effort made towards a more direct circulation of financial 
capital in the form of debt between these firms and the capital market: one form of enhancing 
the access of small and medium-sized firms to capital market finance are Supply Chain Finance 
(SCF) programs, whereby receivables of smaller suppliers against the larger lead firms are used 
as collateral to obtain capital for the smaller suppliers from either banks or from institutional 
investors (through securities sold on capital markets). As shown by (Baumeister and Zademach 
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2017), such programs are present in the German automotive industry, although they are for 
the time being more common in Brazil. Under certain conditions, they can contribute to 
facilitate the access of SMEs to cheaper capital, although it can also be argued that they 
contribute to maintaining the uneven distribution of financial burdens in place (Baumeister 
and Zademach 2017). What role does this play in practice? As mentioned above, the absence 
of direct link between firms and capital markets does not preclude there being indirect links 
(with many of the foreign-owned firms in the sample being ultimately owned by private 
equity).  
In line with what was seen in the literature review (in particular on variegated capitalism) 
capital markets and private equity play no big role in the provision of capital for car component 
manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany and this is mainly due to a general 
underdevelopment of capital markets and private equity financing in these regions. 
6.1.2 The	Reliance	on	‘Patient’	Forms	of	Capital	
While Chapter 5 evidenced the absence of capital market and private equity finance among 
this study’s firm sample as discussed above, it also showed that the more traditional/patient 
forms of capital provision that are banks and industrial capital do play an important though 
variegated role in the two regions concerned by this study.  
As seen in Chapter 5, commercial banks constitute a very important tool of capital provision 
for all types of firms in both Eastern Germany and Hungary, albeit to a different extent: bank 
financing is more common and systematic for firms of all sizes and locations in Eastern 
Germany (with the rare exception of the few firms owned by foreign corporates). By contrast, 
it is less commonly found among Hungarian firms, in particular among those located in the 
periphery of the country. As discussed in Chapter 2, the institutional infrastructure of banks 
in Eastern Germany is marked by a strong relationship between firms and their ‘home bank’ 
(Hausbank, cf. Handke 2011)). The same is likely true for the car component manufactures of 
this study. In Hungary, by contrast, banking relationships are traditionally less developed and 
it is likely that individually owned firms may chose not to take any loans in order to preserve 
their autonomy, as shown by Bečicová and Blažek (2015) for car component manufacturers in 
the Czech Republic. What are the main differences between the banking landscapes in 
Hungary and Eastern Germany? How concentrated or regionalised are the banking sectors in 
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these two regions? Bečicová and Blažek (2015) question the relevance of this question (i.e. 
whether a more concentrated banking sector means more difficult access to credit for the 
firms in the periphery) in the context of a study on the concentration/foreign domination of 
the Czech banking sector. While the German banking sector is dominated by domestic 
institutions, the Hungarian banking sector is dominated by foreign institutions. 
As seen in Chapter 5, most types of firms get only a very limited proportion of their capital 
from their shareholders directly: they rather rely on capital provided by banks or, even more 
strongly, on retained earnings. The only exception are those firms that are owned by other 
GPN firms, i.e. other firms that are themselves producers in global production networks of the 
car component manufacturing industry. In Eastern Germany, only a few of the firms of the 
sample fall into this category, such as Truck-Lite Europe or Autotest Eisenach for example. In 
Hungary, by contrast, a very large number of car component manufacturers is owned by 
foreign corporates and therefore receives a material portion of its capital from their owners.  
The likely reason for the foreign-owned firms receiving more capital through equity is that, to 
the extent the owners are individuals, they do not have the financial capacity to raise and 
inject significant amounts of capital. If the owners are domestic firms, they might have the 
capacity but no competitive advantage compared to the conditions at which their subsidiaries 
can raise capital in the form of loans from banks. The only material exception to this are those 
firms that are owned by foreign shareholders, which is likely due to their capacity to source 
capital at more interesting terms in their home country and then provide it to their local 
subsidiary. 
There is a significant differentiation between car component manufacturers in Hungary and 
Eastern Germany regarding their ability to obtain bank loans and the conditions at which they 
can do so: one fundamental differentiation is geographical (SMEs in Western Germany having 
significantly more access to bank debt than comparable SMEs in Eastern Germany), another 
one concerns the ownership situation: SMEs owned by larger firms tend to obtain bank loans 
more cheaply than independent SMEs. From the bank’s perspective, this is explained by an 
unequal credit risk – from the SME’s perspective, this translates into an unequal ability to fund 
its projects and an unequal cost/financial burden for the SME.  
As seen in the previous section, one measure increasingly considered to increase the amount 
of loans granted by banks to SMEs is to securitise them, i.e. to have banks sell these loans to 
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institutions that issue bonds subscribed by capital market investors, in particular to insurance 
companies. By selling the loans, banks remove them from their balance sheet, meaning that 
they are no longer required to reserve capital for the portion of the loans sold. This in turn 
increases the profitability (because the bank will have been paid an upfront fee for the initial 
granting of the loan) and hence the incentive for the bank to grant new loans. The 
securitisation of SME loans however seems to be far from the reality of bank loan financing in 
Eastern Germany, where the relationship between the bank and the firm very strongly 
remains seen as a long term relationship between the firm and its ‘Hausbank’ and in Hungary, 
where even though the banks tend to be foreign-owned and the relationship arguable a less 
long-term one, securitisation is not a common practice.  
Does the above analysis evidence a strength of ‘patient capital’ (in the form of bank loans and 
capital injected by foreign GPN owners) among car component manufacturers in Hungary and 
Eastern Germany, as opposed to the weakness or absence of ‘quick capital’ (as embodied by 
capital markets and private equity) discussed earlier? The answer is probably more nuanced 
than that. It also needs to be mitigated by the finding that the really predominant form of 
capital is no external capital at all, but retained earnings as seen in Chapter 5.  
6.2 Embeddedness	and	Interaction	with	Agency	
This section broadens the scope by putting the analysis of the previous section into 
perspective with the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2, in order to explain how 
institutional infrastructure of capital provision, set up and conditions of these various forms 
of capital sources determine whether and to what extent these sources are used by the firms. 
Looking at it from the perspective of embeddedness and agency and taking the institutional 
infrastructure of capital provision as analysed in the previous section as a basis, this section 
shows how territorial and network embeddedness constrain and modify the agency of firms 
and shape financing patterns in the way that was observed empirically. The main question 
explored is to which extent network embeddedness may affect territorial embeddedness and 
to what extent agency goes beyond both. 
The section is organized in two parts as follows: the first part uses the concept of territorial 
embeddedness developed in Section 2.1 to explain how the location of car component 
manufacturers in certain regions and their relationship (or the absence thereof) with other 
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actors in these regions determines the capacity of the firms to use certain sources of capital 
rather than others. The second section broadens the analysis based on the concept of network 
embeddedness to explain how some firms are somewhat disembedded from their territories 
(and the associated constraints and limitations with regards to their sourcing of capital) by 
their being embedded in networks of global production, particularly in the form of ownership 
by another foreign car component manufacturer. One associated question is to which extent 
territorial and network embeddedness are a cause or a consequence of the financing patterns 
observed. 
6.2.1 Effects	of	Regional	Embeddedness	in	Variegated	Forms	of	Capitalism	
Most car component manufacturers analysed in this study are small to medium-sized firms 
with a single production site, located at the same place as the management and financial 
direction of the firm. Their location and territorial attachment to a specific place can 
consequently be assumed to be strong unless other factors (such as foreign ownership for 
example) mean they are disembedded from the region. In principle, the firms are embedded 
in a specific territory with relationships to a range of actors therein such as employees living 
there, clients and providers operating in the same region, regional government and others. 
Even for firms with a strong territorial embeddedness, relationships of course also exist with 
actors located beyond the region, such as with clients and providers located in other regions 
or countries, national government etc. However, the regional embeddedness determines the 
operation of the firms in many ways. Furthermore, it is not only firms as users of capital but 
also other actors as providers of capital that are embedded in their respective geography, their 
regions, their networks of relationships and their institutional context.  
Embeddedness	 in	 Regional	 Variegations	 of	 Sources	 of	 Capital	 Provision	 and	 Firm	
Agency	
Literature on the territorial embeddedness of firms usually focuses on the attachment of firms 
within a specific territory and the relationships with different types of actors therein. What 
does territorial embeddedness mean with respect to capital provision for car component 
manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany? What is the relationship between these 
firms and the various types of capital sources and providers in their regions, in particular with 
local shareholder and local banks? How is each of them embedded regionally, and what does 
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it mean for their mutual relationships? Do high retained earnings mean high regional 
embeddedness and therefore stronger agency, stronger autonomy in their governance? How 
are the firms embedded in the institutional context of capital markets and private equity 
firms? How does embeddedness materialise concretely in this empirical context? How are the 
firms embedded in the institutional context of banks and GPN owners? When looking at how 
the regional embeddedness of car component manufacturers in variegated forms of 
capitalism frames their access to different capital sources, it first needs to be considered how 
capital providers themselves are embedded (or not) in the regions where the firms are 
located.  
The single form of capital provider with a very strong territorial embeddedness are individual 
owners of the firms – but as seen in the previous sections these tend to contribute only a very 
small portion of the capital in the firms. As a result, firms with a strong regional territorial 
embeddedness tend to most easily access individual owners as capital providers, but these 
tend to be able to contribute only a very small portion of the capital. Industrial capital tends 
to be contributed mainly by foreign GPN firms that own a car component manufacturer in the 
region, so here again the territorial embeddedness of the capital provider is low, or created 
mainly through its owning the car component manufacturer in that region. The 
embeddedness with GPN owners materializes through the existence of capital provided by 
and shares owned by these GPN owners, also establishing a relationship between the firm and 
the GPN owner and embedding the firm in a network of relations with its implications. The 
embeddedness can also be indirect through a trading relationship between a firm and another 
one that has bank loans or is owned by a GPN owner. 
Similarly, banks tend to be global institutions but there is a large empirical literature 
evidencing the importance of spatial proximity between firms and decision makers within the 
bank in respect to extending a loan. Second in the availability of capital based on the territorial 
embeddedness of firms and capital providers, banks will be available sources, to the extent 
they are themselves present in the regions in which the firms operate. And this is where a 
regional variegation of capitalism appears in Hungary and Eastern Germany. While banks in 
Germany have a strong local network and decision making takes places in spatial proximity to 
the locations of our firms, the landscape in Hungary looks different and firms located in the 
periphery of the country far from the larger cities and Budapest have much weaker ties and 
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relationships with banks than their Eastern German counterparts. This may explain why firms 
in the Hungarian periphery use banks loans to a lesser extent than firms in Eastern Germany 
regardless of the centrality of their location. The embeddedness of car component 
manufacturers in the institutional context of banking are primarily materialized through loans 
granted by banks to these firms. These loans materialise a relationship between the firm and 
the bank and come with a number of implications that shape the relationship and the action 
of the firm.  
Private equity providers are global players too but spatial proximity does play an important 
role as evidenced by Wray et al. (2011) for example. In other countries (such as the UK for 
example), private equity would function according to a similar logic of spatial proximity as the 
banks, but as seen in Section 6.1.1 private equity is comparatively underdeveloped in Hungary 
and Eastern Germany and not really an available source of financing for the firms. Capital 
markets are probably the least embedded form of capital provision as seen above, as the firms 
that use them tend to be located all over the globe and spatial proximity does not seem to 
play an important role. Capital markets, finally, have a very low regional embeddedness (and 
therefore their location within or without the region of the firm should have relatively little 
impact) but as seen above the firms do not use them for other reasons.  In short, the regional 
embeddedness of the car component manufacturers in variegated forms of capitalism, with 
what that means in terms of access to different forms of capital providers, has a direct impact 
on the availability of certain sources of capital over others for different types of these firms in 
Hungary and Eastern Germany. 
What does this territorial embeddedness into regional institutional contexts of capital 
provision mean for the agency of the firms, how does it shape or constrain – in other words, 
how does it interact with it? To which extend does it make, in principle, available (or not) a 
range of different capital sources to the firms? The understanding of how firms are directly or 
indirectly embedded in institutional contexts of capital provision, as described above, does 
not in itself sufficiently explain why firms finance themselves the way they do. Another 
important question is what agency firms have, to which extent they can or cannot exercise 
options to use one source of capital or another.  
The existence of banks providing loans in a region generally does not mean all firms can obtain 
bank loans in the same way. Banks have eligibility criteria determining to which types of firms 
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they are willing to lend and under which conditions they are willing to lend. Certain types of 
firms, such as those in peripheral regions in Hungary for example, may find it more difficult 
than others to obtain bank loans. This means that, within the institutional context of bank loan 
provision in these regions as a whole, the agency of firms is differentiated depending on their 
characteristics. The ability of a firm to use capital markets or private equity as a source of 
capital depends not only on whether these sources of capital are generally available in the 
relevant region. It also depends on whether the firm concretely fulfils the eligibility criteria 
requested by these types of capital providers. 
The	Relevance	of	Regional	Financing	Gaps	
Linking back to the second research question (why firms finance themselves the way they do), 
how do this study’s empirical quantitative findings challenge or corroborate the expectation 
based on the literature review? The preceding section explained how the uneven territorial 
embeddedness of firms and capital providers respectively interacts with the firm’s agency for 
sourcing capital from different sources and thereby helps better understand the existence of 
the regional capital gaps observed in Chapter 5 especially with regards to retained earnings, 
which are much more prevalent in small, individually owned car component manufacturers in 
the Hungarian periphery. 
While there is a regional capital gap due to firms choosing not to engage with banks and the 
capital markets (or not being able to), a range of efforts is made by governments to change 
this and to facilitate SME financing through a variety of programs.21 In the US, the SBA (Small 
Business Administration) has been dedicated since more than 50 years to guaranteeing 
financing extended by banks or other institutions to SMEs and also facilitates the obtaining of 
grants by SMEs. Similar institutions exist in Europe. Even where the state does not directly or 
indirectly provide financial capital in the form of equity, debt, subsidies or guarantees, it has 
a crucial role as a regulator for all other forms of financing: financing of GPN firms in Central 
Europe through the capital markets only became possible when the Central European 
governments and the EU allowed financial capital to circulate across the borders and allowed 
local firms to be purchased by foreign firms or to issue equity or debt to capital market 
investors. Governments and public institutions continue to play an important role in the way 
                                                        
21 Such as public support programmes especially when part of regional policy instruments, e.g. EU Funds. 
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capital market finance is regulated and encouraged or discouraged. Several lead firms in the 
automotive industry have even recently been and continue to be directly owned and/or 
financed by their respective governments: cf. for example the USD 17 billion loan by the US 
government to General Motors in 2008 (followed by its nationalisation between 2009 and 
2013), the participation of the French state in the EUR 3 billion capital increase of PSA Peugeot 
Citroën announced in January 2014 or the long-standing participation of the regional 
government of Lower Saxony in the ownership of Volkswagen. In other words: (at least partial) 
public ownership of automobile firms and their financing by the state has never been limited 
to state socialism. This however seems to be limited to the large, strategic companies, i.e. the 
lead firms in the automotive manufacturing industry and does not concern the smaller 
companies in the automotive supplier industries. 
Strong regional territorial embeddedness also seems to confirm the thesis of defensive 
financial behaviour according to which peripheral SMEs choose not to raise external capital 
and to use only the capital they can accumulate internally (Dow 1992). This is clearly 
something observed very strongly in the firms of the Hungarian periphery in this study. A 
fortiori, these firms will not be interested in any ‘exotic’ forms of equity such as private equity 
or venture capital (also the case for example among Czech firms, cf. Bečicová and Blažek 
(2015)). Can this be seen as a confirmation of the pecking order theory? In any case, this seems 
to be a case where strong territorial embeddedness means that agency exists (because it is 
the firms that choose not to use any external financing) but is used in a way that means that 
available sources of capital are not used. When a firm, such as the firms in the Hungarian 
periphery, strongly relies on retained earnings and hardly uses any other sources of capital, 
does this correspond to a strong territorial embeddedness and a weak network 
embeddedness (with other capital providers)? In any case, it is probably possible to say that a 
higher reliance on retained earnings reduces the dependence of the firm on outside sources, 
and thereby its embeddedness in networks of external capital provision. Does this at the same 
time strengthen their territorial embeddedness in their region? Probably yes, but this is an 
area for future research. 
6.2.2 Effects	of	Network	Embeddedness	in	Global	Production	Networks	
The previous section demonstrated how territorial embeddedness of firms in their respective 
regions interacts with their agency for obtaining capital from different sources and leads to 
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capital gaps in certain peripheral regions in Hungary. This section has a closer look at a 
different form of embeddedness, network embeddedness, to explain some of the exceptions 
observed in the financing patterns where the constraints to agency resulting from territorial 
embeddedness seem to be overridden by other factors. It argues that one such factor is the 
network embeddedness of firms in global production networks, in particular in the form of 
ownership by other GPN firms.   
Network	Embeddedness	through	Ownership	by	other	GPN	Firms	and	Interaction	with	
Agency	
While the territorial embeddedness discussed in the previous section is characterized by 
spatial proximity between car component manufacturers and other relevant actors such as 
individual shareholders and local banks, network embeddedness does not rely on spatial 
proximity but on other forms of links which may exist between actors in very different places. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, global production networks are a very relevant manifestation 
thereof, with firms being embedded in networks of supplier and client firms that can be 
located across the globe. The focus of the analysis here lies less on customer relationships 
between supplier and client firms (because this does not imply a direct transfer of capital, 
even though there is an aspect of working capital provision that could be explored by future 
research) but rather on the relationships of ownership that exist between some GPN firms. As 
seen in Chapter 4.2.2, while this is rarely the case in Eastern Germany, a significant number of 
firms in Hungary are owned by foreign GPN firms and thereby very strongly embedded in a 
network that stretches far beyond the limits of the region. Network embeddedness provides 
access to other financing sources such as in particular owner’s funds, as shown in Chapter 5. 
By contrast, the large number of firms from the sample that are owned by domestic individuals 
has a much weaker network embeddedness reaching beyond the limits of the region as it is 
constituted ‘only’ by the customer relationships they have with suppliers and clients within 
the GPN (and sometimes even these are weak in cases where exports constitute only a small 
portion of the business of the firms as is the case for some of them). Ownership by foreign 
firms may also change the culture in the owned firm and could, in theory, lead to an increased 
willingness to use capital sources such as the capital market, although this is in practice 
unlikely to play a material role.  
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Embeddedness in international networks of capital could materialise, for example, through 
the existence of listed shares or bonds of the firm that are traded on the capital markets, 
which is however the case for none of the firms in this study. Even for firms that do not have 
any listed shares or bonds, it can also be materialized through a trading relationship with a 
firm that does. The constraints imposed on the firm that does have listed shares or bonds can 
reflect on the trading relationship with the other firms, imposing certain standards for 
example or certain profitability requirements. In a similar way, the embeddedness of a firm 
with private equity materializes primarily through its being owned, usually not fully but partly, 
by a private equity firm. However, it can also materialise indirectly through its trading 
relationship with a firm that has a private equity firm among its owners. The constraints 
imposed on the firm that is owned by private equity can influence the behaviour of that firm 
towards its environment, including other firms that are not owned by private equity. In short, 
the embeddedness of car component manufacturers in the institutional context of capital 
markets and private equity can be both direct, through a direct relationship with such capital 
providers, or indirect, through a relationship with another firm that has such as direct 
relationship. Establishing a relationship of capital (be it of equity or debt) comes with several 
constraints imposed by the providers of capital, or by the legal and regulatory framework 
governing that type of capital. Examples could be obligations of transparency, adoption of 
certain accounting standards etc.  
When car component manufacturers have a strong network embeddedness reaching beyond 
the limits of their regions as in the case of the numerous firms (especially in Hungary) owned 
by foreign car component manufacturers operating in the same global production networks, 
it clearly appears they tend to be financed in a very different way, using other types and 
sources of capital than their locally and individually owned counterparts. While locally owned 
firms rely to a significant extent on retained earnings and (for some of them in particular in 
Eastern Germany) on bank loans, foreign owned firms tend to have a much lower ratio of 
retained earnings, little to no bank loans, and tend to be financed primarily to industrial equity 
provided by their foreign owners. Does this mean the agency of the one group of firms is 
stronger than the agency of the other group? Not necessarily, it could rather be argued to be 
different without implying more or less capacity to act for one group of firms over the other.  
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Foreign owned firms benefit from their network embeddedness for example by banks giving 
‘credit’ to this ownership (whether or not there is an explicit guarantee by the foreign owner) 
and therefore more easily extend loans, or, probably more importantly, by the firms obtaining 
capital directly from their owners more easily than through other sources. This on the surface 
seems to strengthen the firm’s position. However, this does not mean the firms have a larger 
choice and more freedom in choosing between different sources than the locally owned firms. 
In reality, foreign owned firms no longer make the finance decisions themselves, these 
decisions are made by the foreign owning company and the agency of the local firms is just as 
constrained as the ones of the locally owned ones, even though the resulting capital sources 
used differ between the two.  
Territorial	Disembedding	through	Network	Embedding?	
The above evidenced how the specific network embeddedness of certain firms (in the form of 
their being owned by a foreign GPN firm) has a ‘territorially disembedding’ effect on the firms 
and affects the agency of these firms when it comes to choosing between different financing 
sources. However, it was also shown that it is not possible to conclude which of the two 
situations leads to a stronger agency of the firms: it was rather concluded that the agency is 
constrained in both cases, albeit in different ways leading to different financing patterns. It 
opens up new options to source capital (in particular in the form of owner’s funds, while at 
the same time reducing the level of decisions taken at the level of the firm). In essence, this 
does seem to confirm the territorially disembedding effect of a firm’s ownership. However, 
the data also shows that there are limits to such disembedding, such as when foreign-owned 
firms have significant retained earnings that are reinvested locally.  
6.3 Implications	on	Firm	Governance	and	Value	Capture	
As shown in Chapter 2, any external source of capital used by a firm implies a relationship 
between that firm and the provider of that capital, and this relationship implies an unequal 
distribution of power between the two. The relationship takes different forms, is formalized 
to different degrees and has variable durations, depending on the source of capital at hand. It 
means that the capital provider has some form of say over operating and strategic decisions 
taken by the firm. In other words, and based on the definition of firm governance as the 
‘authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human 
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resources are allocated and flow within a [firm or network of firms] (Gereffi 1994: 97) as seen 
in Chapter 2, the capital provider is one of the stakeholders involved in the firm’s governance 
and a particularly important one: some relationships are critical/key to the firms and capital 
is a central one (6.3.1). Through their say in the firm’s governance, capital providers also 
influence the circulation and capture of value: the extent to which value created by the firm 
is retained and reinvested within the firm (retained earnings), distributed to shareholders 
(dividends) or transferred to other capital providers (banks in the form of interest, capital 
market investors in the form of a bond coupon) is influenced, among other factors, by the 
capital provider’s weight on governance decisions (6.3.2). The degree of control over decisions 
relevant to the firm, the directness of that control and the capacity to effectively and durably 
influence governance and value circulation and capture differs depending on the source of 
capital at stake, as well as on the location, regional contexts and network embeddedness of 
the providers and users of the capital. Differences in the sourcing of capital by firms in Hungary 
and Eastern Germany result in different configurations of power relations and governance 
outcomes in these two regions. 
6.3.1 Power	Relations	and	Firm	Governance:	a	Question	of	Autonomy	and	Control	
This section explores how the different modes of capital sourcing identified for car component 
manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany may lead to different outcomes in terms of 
the governance of the firms. 
Power	Relationships	Resulting	from	Different	Capital	Sources	and	Variegated	Impact	
on	Firm	Governance	
Every provider of capital to a firm, be it in the form of equity, debt or subsidies has some form 
of control over what happens in the firm. The degree and form of that control, the channels 
through which it operates and the moments in the firm’s life in which it is the most active, 
however, strongly depend on the type of capital at hand and the type of counterparty that 
provides it. Retained earnings are an exception in that they do not imply a relationship with a 
third party: they are sourced within the firm, even though it is primarily the shareholders that 
decide whether the firm can retain the earnings and use them as a source of capital. Relying 
on retained earnings (as many of the firms in this study’s sample do) as a primary source of 
capital could therefore be seen as a means of reducing the firm’s dependence on external 
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stakeholders and thereby preserving the firm’s autonomy. The following discusses the form 
and type of unequal power relationships implied by the main forms of capital found to be used 
by the car component manufacturers in this study’s sample in Hungary and Eastern Germany, 
distinguishing between equity, bank loans, subsidies and retained earnings. 
Capital raised in the form of equity implies the most direct form of power: shareholders are 
the owners of the firm, they have the ultimate say when it comes to taking strategic decisions 
such as including, but not limited to, appointing new management, agreeing to a restructuring 
plan or deciding to wind up the firm. When equity is contributed by an individual or family 
founding a firm or entering its capital as a business partner, by a larger car supplier taking an 
equity stake in a smaller one, by institutional investors investing through the stock market or 
by private equity or venture capital firms taking a strategic equity stake, they become the 
owners of the firm and, as such, acquire the right to vote in all strategic and other important 
decisions to the extent these are not delegated to the management within the firm. The 
degree and frequency of their involvement (and hence the degree of ‘activeness’ as a 
stakeholder) depends on the type of firm: individual family shareholders (which is the case of 
most of the firms in this study’s sample both in Hungary and in Eastern Germany) are typically 
involved much more strongly in the day to day management of the firm than the granular 
shareholders of a publicly listed company where decisions tend to be limited to validating (or 
not) the proposals made by the firm’s management in the annual shareholder meeting. Firms 
owned by foreign firms (like a significant number of Hungarian firms in the sample) are in an 
intermediate situation: their shareholder’s involvement tends to be less daily than that of an 
individual family shareholder’s, but much more present that the one of shareholders in a 
publicly listed company (financing decisions, for example, will typically be taken at the level of 
the firm’s foreign owners rather than of the firm itself as was confirmed to the author in a 
conversation with one of the firms in Hungary). As a result, most of the firms in this study’s 
sample are in a configuration where shareholders have a relatively strong presence in the 
firm’s daily management and the firm’s managers (to the extent they are different at all from 
the firm’s owners) have little autonomy for strategic decisions compared to the situation in 
large publicly listed firms. An important distinction however needs to be made here: when the 
firm is individually or family owned, often the owners will at the same time also be the 
managers of the firm and there are no external ‘third-party’ shareholders as such. This means 
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that in terms of governance, decisions are taken by the firm’s management directly and there 
is no equity in place that would confer voting rights to shareholders external to the firm. This 
situation applies to a very large number of firms in this study’s sample both in Hungary and in 
Eastern Germany. 
Capital raised in the form of bank debt implies a different and less direct form of control: banks 
are not owners of the firm and as such do not have the same power and voting rights as the 
shareholders. However, loan agreements typically include a series of ‘covenants’ and other 
undertakings which de facto oblige the firm to orient its operations in a way which ensures 
these undertakings are complied with. This can include both the obligation of doing certain 
things (such as reporting a pre-agreed set of information on a regular basis), refraining from 
doing certain things (such as not granting security over its assets to other third parties) and 
ensuring certain things (such as performance ratios) are complied with. The power of the bank 
is based on these undertakings in the loan agreement and reinforced by the security over its 
assets that the firm will sometimes grant to the bank as a guarantee of its obligations. If there 
is a breach in any of these undertakings there is a risk that the bank enforces its security and 
takes control over these assets to get its loan repaid. To avoid this happening once the loan 
contract’s obligations are breached, the firm is obliged to negotiate with the bank, the bank’s 
power over the firm increases, the firm’s obligations may increase further (and become more 
restrictive than before) and sometimes the firms will need to give further concessions to the 
bank if it wants the term of its debt renewed or refinance it through other debt. For those of 
the firms in this study’s sample that use loans granted by large international banks (like some 
of the Hungarian firms), they must comply with standards (of reporting, covenants, format of 
documentation etc.) usual on the international loan markets, while for those firms that use 
loans from small local banks (which will more often be the case in Eastern Germany), more 
local standards of obligations may apply. In summary, the power of bank lenders over the firm 
tends to materialise in a different form and at different times than the one of the firm’s 
shareholders. 
Subsidies, granted by public entities such as the state or supra-national institutions such as 
the EU also entail certain obligations of the firm vis-à-vis the subsidy granting entity and 
thereby an unequal power relationship between the two. These will typically be of a different 
nature because subsidies explicitly aim to foster the development of the receiving firm but 
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may also comprise certain obligations of reporting and entail the obligation of using the funds 
for certain purposes rather than for others. Although, as seen in this study’s firm sample, the 
amount of capital obtained through subsidies tends to be relatively small in comparison to the 
firms’ other capital sources, the impact these obligations have on the firm can still be material. 
However, they will normally not entail anything like the strategic decision making power 
granted to the firm’s shareholders, nor the threat of certain of its assets being seized as in the 
case of bank loans. 
Finally, when a firm ‘sources’ capital by delaying payment to its suppliers, this creates a liability 
of the firm vis-à-vis the suppliers and therefore in theory some form of power of the supplier 
over the firm (in particular if the firm ultimately failed to pay the suppliers). In practice, 
however, this comes with very little power for the supplier ‘providing’ this source of capital. 
The power relationship is rather reversed in this case with the firm having been able to impose 
such favourable payment terms to the suppliers in the first place. 
Retained earnings, by contrast, do not come attached with the transfer of any power to a third 
party. This is a form of capital that has not been contributed by an external party but rather 
been generated by the firm itself, it does not have to be repaid or remunerated and therefore 
is not directly attached with an unequal power relationship between the firm and an external 
capital provider. This suggests one of the primary potential reasons why some firms use 
retained earnings as a primary source of funding: it may stem from a desire not to enter into 
more formalised relations with external financial intermediaries. The one power relationship 
that does matter in this context, of course, is the one between the firm and its existing owners 
given that it is they who decide to which extent the firm is able to accumulate and maintain 
retained earnings as a source of capital (by retaining profits rather than distributing them in 
the form of dividends). 
To summarise, each of the various sources of capital used by car component manufacturers 
in Hungary and Eastern Germany – equity, debt, subsidies, trade liabilities and retained 
earnings – comes with its specific form of unequal power relationship between the firm and 
the external actors that either enable the firm to accumulate and preserve the capital (in the 
case of retained earnings) or directly provide it (in all other cases). In some cases power 
relations may exist with third parties that have not directly contributed the capital themselves, 
but that have acquired the ownership stake from someone else (at a price which may be very 
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different from the amount of capital that was contributed originally). This is however 
particularly relevant for equity (and, to a lesser extent, debt) traded on a capital market, and 
therefore not of relevance for the firms in this study’s sample. 
By establishing different types of (usually unequal) power relationships as discussed above, 
the sourcing of different types of capital implies different forms of impact on the firm’s 
governance. How does the power relationship specific to each type of capital provider impact 
the governance within the firm? Which of the car component manufacturers in Hungary and 
Eastern Germany see their governance modified because of their financing choices? Here it is 
necessary not only to distinguish between equity, debt and retained earnings as in the 
previous section but also to have a closer look at the different forms and sources each of these 
types of capital can take as well as on the locations of the capital providers.22 Amable et al. 
(2005) discuss how financial systems differ between countries both in the predominance of 
certain sources of funds over others (retained earnings vs. bank credit, bonds, shares etc.) and 
in the types of corporate governance prevalent: ‘close links or loose links between firms’ 
owners and managers, whether labour is represented on boards, the presence of an active 
market for corporate control etc.’ (Amable et al. 2005: 321), the main differentiating factor 
being the various degrees of focus on short term profit objectives for the firm’s capital owners. 
Although the rights of an equity provider as owner of the firm are in principle the same 
regardless of the type of equity at stake (even though in practice there is some difference 
depending on the legal form of the firm and on the jurisdiction), the governance impact on a 
firm through the arrival of a new equity provider significantly differs depending on what type 
of equity provider this is. While private equity or venture capital investors will typically have 
a very active hands-on approach focusing on financial profitability and growth, industrial 
capital investors (such as individuals/families or GPN firms) will have an approach which is just 
as active but more focused on long-term/industrial growth. According to Scheuplein and Teetz 
(2014: 1), there is empirical evidence that, at least in certain cases, the takeover of a firm by 
private equity in Germany led to a decrease in the negotiating power of the works council 
(Betriebsrat) and trade unions within the governance structure of the firm. Scheuplein (2012) 
notes with respect to the German car component manufacturing industry that private equity 
                                                        
22  See also Amable et al. (2005) referring to institutional complementarity theory the impact financing 
relationships have on the strategic choices of firms. 
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firms as shareholders tend to exercise a stronger influence on the firm’s strategic 
management than other types of shareholders, but that they at the same time hardly 
communicate with the firms works council – thereby weakening the traditionally strong say of 
works councils in the determination of firm strategy in German firms. Institutional investors 
investing through traded shares on the capital market, by contrast, tend to have a more 
distant approach (often mediated through asset managers and other intermediaries very 
much focused on financial metrics – here we are in the most financialised form of financing). 
However, the simple fact of having the equity traded on the capital market will have a 
significant impact on the firm’s governance through legal and regulatory obligations of 
transparency, disclosure etc. which depend on the market on which these shares are traded. 
Only very few to none of the car component manufacturers in Eastern Germany and Hungary 
are in this case, with virtually no firms having their equity publicly listed on a stock market or 
counting private equity among their shareholders. Financialisation does not seem to play an 
important role here. What is more relevant is the presence of foreign GPN firms as owners of 
the Hungarian firms in particular: some of these are publicly listed themselves and as foreign 
owners tend to exert a rather close control over the local firms, the standards of international 
capital markets may filter through to some of the firms through this bias. As evidenced earlier, 
the most common form of equity is industrial equity contributed by either the individual 
founders/owners of the firms or by other car component manufacturers which have acquired 
an ownership stake in them. Financial capital in the form of stock market equity and private 
equity or venture capital is largely absent. Does this mean that, as far as equity is concerned, 
most of these firms are subject to a traditional, patient-capital type of approach? How does 
this materialise in practice/concretely? Among other implications, it means the firms are 
firmly anchored within ‘closed governance’ as opposed to ‘open governance’ as these terms 
have been theorized by Clark and Wójcik (2007). The overwhelming number of firms being 
individually owned in both Hungary and Eastern Germany, their shareholders are local 
individuals with usually a very close relationship based in the long term (often being founders 
of the firm which is passed on from generation to generation). As for the few firms that are 
corporately owned by other car component manufacturers, the shareholder relationship is 
less necessarily long term than that of individual shareholders, but still significantly more 
stable and involved than would be floating ownership through the stock market. 
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On the debt side as well, governance impact will depend on who the debt provider is. In a 
‘German-style’ relationship banking relationship, the bank takes a long-term partnership 
approach with a close presence in governance of the firm. Sometimes, in the case of very large 
firms, this even materializes through the bank’s presence on the firm’s board but this is more 
rarely the case for small and medium-sized firms which represent the bulk of this study’s firm 
sample in Germany. By contrast, a more transactional style banking relationship as found in 
Hungary will be more opportunistic or transaction based and imply less of a permanent 
dialogue reflected in the governance of the firm. In both cases, however, the loan agreements 
between the firm and the bank will foresee a certain number of covenants corresponding to 
obligations of the firm that have a certain impact on the firm’s governance. Those of the firms 
in this study’s firm sample (i.e. of most Hungarian firms) that do not use loans as a source of 
capital are free from any governance interference by banks, while those firms that do (i.e. 
most of the Eastern German firms) have a regular dialog with one or several banks as part of 
their ongoing governance discussions. While most of the firms have relatively long term (and 
closely involved) governance through their equity side, the situation is a bit more complex on 
the debt side. As shown earlier, many (but far from all) firms use bank loans at least as a 
complementary (although never exclusive) source of capital. Is it possible to evidence how the 
different types of banking relationships (relationship banking vs. transactional banking) 
translate into governance-relevant impacts? It would likely be found that, for those of the 
Hungarian firms that do use bank loans, relationships between the firms and their banks are 
less strategic and durable than their relationships with their shareholders (be they individual 
or even foreign corporate). In Germany, by contrast, it would likely be found that the banking 
relationships are almost as strategic and stable as the equity relationships, even among the 
Mittelstand firms that are owned by individuals or families.  
By contrast, bonds on the capital market would come with many obligations of transparency 
etc. which would have an impact on governance, although the bonds holders themselves 
would tend to be very distant and not directly involved in the firm’s governance – unless the 
firm defaults on its obligations in which case the presence of the bond holders may increase 
significantly. This form of governance impact, however, is not directly present in this study’s 
firm sample given that none of the firms have been found to be using capital markets to raise 
debt or equity. What does the above mean concretely for this study’s sample of car 
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component manufacturers and their governance? How do the unequal power relationships 
implied by the various forms of capital that these firms primarily use impact the way their 
governance is organized?  
Autonomy	through	retained	earnings?	
Can the reliance on retained earnings that was found to be prevalent in a very large number 
of firms, in particular in the Hungarian periphery, be seen as a means of preserving the firm’s 
autonomy and keeping it free from the governance interference of third party stakeholders? 
Very likely so, and potentially with an impact on the firm’s strategy seeking to maximise profit 
(that can then be retained as retained earnings) rather than market share for example. As for 
subsidies, they probably also imply some form of governance interference through the 
conditionality that usually comes attached with them. Trade liabilities, on the other hand, 
likely do not come associated with governance impact given that this capital source, by 
contrast to the others, usually comes with a power relationship that is reversed (to the benefit 
of the capital receiver). 
How about the firms that rely exclusively on retained earnings as a capital source? Are they 
free from any governance-related interference by third party capital providers? Their 
governance will be largely driven by the owners of the firm, even if (as is the case for many 
individually owned firms) these have contributed only very little capital in the form of equity 
themselves. But it is these owners that decide whether the profits generated within the firm 
are distributed as dividends or retained within the firm as a future source of capital. 
Ultimately, this is a question of autonomy and control: by choosing to use certain sources of 
capital rather than others, the firm’s decision makers (i.e. the management and its owners) 
determine whether and to which extent the firm remains autonomous in its operations and 
independent in its strategic decisions or to which extent the governance of the firm is modified 
through the transfer of power and control capacities to other, external actors. The flipside is 
that a reliance on retained earnings limits the amount of capital available to the firm and 
therefore its capacity to invest in order to maintain its equipment up to date and further grow 
its business. Furthermore, is a reliance on retained earnings and the absence of third party 
capital sufficient to ensure the firm’s autonomy and protection from outside financial 
pressures? No, considering that the firms have trading relationships with other firms which, 
in particular if they are integrated in global production networks, can arguably be almost of a 
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nature comparable to the one with a third party capital provider in terms of impact on the 
firm’s governance. 
6.3.2 Impact	on	Circuits	of	Value	and	Value	Capture	
The capital source-specific forms of unequal power relationships between car component 
manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany and capital providers do not only have 
differentiated outcomes for the governance of the firms as discussed in the previous section: 
they also have a direct impact on the way value circulates between firms and regions and on 
the capacity of firms and regions to capture part of the value that is created in these firms and 
transits through the relevant global production networks and regions.  
Circuits	of	Value	and	Value	Capture	
As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of circuits of value is used in the global production 
networks literature to highlight how value created in the production process circulates 
between different actors and territories. What do the financing patterns observed in Chapter 
5 mean in terms of value circuits? And how do the power relations analysed in Section 6.3.1 
impact this circulation of value? It was observed that the firms in this study’s sample have 
virtually no capital market or private equity funding, only little equity funding (except for 
foreign-owned firms), are funded through bank loans to various degrees (Eastern German 
banks by tendency more than Hungarian banks) and many firms rely to a very large extent on 
retained earnings as a capital source. This translates into a variegated range of power relations 
impacting the firms’ governance and way the value the firms create circulates within and 
beyond the regions in which they are based.  
 Do the firms in this study’s sample show little integration into wider (global?) value circuits 
through the limited degree of capital they source through capital markets, private equity and, 
even, bank financing? This needs to be nuanced given that there is integration through 
exports, i.e. in the trading relationships the firms have with other foreign firms within the 
global production networks. There also is integration through foreign ownership for those of 
the (mainly Hungarian) firms that are foreign owned. As a result, constraints, rules and metrics 
relevant on the capital markets and in the private equity world can have an impact on the 
circulation of the value created by the firms even though they are not directly related to these 
(financialised?) sources of financing. No empirical data is available to show the impact of 
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capital market debt, but relevant benchmarks might be used to compare this with the types 
of capital that are found in this study’s firm sample through future research. 
One concrete manifestation of the circulation of value are the profits generated by firms and 
their utilization either for payment of dividends to their shareholders or their conservation 
within the firm as retained earnings. When profits are distributed in the form of dividends, the 
value created by the firm circulates from the firm to its shareholders. When shareholders are 
located abroad, this means the value circulates away from that region to another region. 
When profits are retained within the firm and reinvested, for example through the acquisition 
of machines to modernize the technological stock of the firm, the value created by the firm 
does not circulate away but is retained within the firm. The profit distribution patterns 
typically vary quite significantly depending on the profile of the owners. Which types of 
ownership tend to come with particularly high levels of dividend distribution, which ones with 
particularly low levels of dividend distribution? Future research might show that firms owned 
by individuals tend to distribute less of their profits in the form of dividends, while firms 
owned by other firms, in particular financial firms and capital market investors, tend to 
distribute a higher share. In other words, value circulates to a higher degree away from the 
firm if the firm is corporately rather than individually owned (as evidenced by the lower degree 
of retained earnings?).   
It should also be noted that the portion of turnover used to pay financial costs such as interest 
on debt is also part of value circulation. When a firm pays interest on a loan it has obtained 
from a bank, it uses part of the profit is has generated to do so, and that part of the profit 
thereby circulates away from the firm to the bank. When the bank is foreign based, this means 
this portion of the value circulated between regions from the region of the firm to the region 
of the bank. The firm and the bank thereby form part of an inter-regional circuit of value. 
Future research could analyse how much the firms in this study’s sample typically pay for debt 
service and how this differs between different types or regions. It would likely be found that 
value circulates to banks more from German firms than from Hungarian firms given that 
German firms use bank loans to a higher extent – unless the interest rate paid by Hungarian 
firms is higher than the one paid by German firms (which is likely) in which case the contrary 
might be true. In any case, the analysis of interest payments between the firms and the banks 
is part of a broader analysis regarding the circulation of value between the firms and capital 
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providers, within or beyond the regions in which the firms are located, depending on the type 
of capital provider involved.  
What does the high reliance of many of the firms in this study on retained earnings mean in 
terms of circulation of value? At first sight, one could think that the retention of earnings 
means that this portion of value does not circulate, that there is no circulation of value with 
respect to this portion of the value created by the firm. The value created by the firm is 
retained within the firm and reinvested in the modernization of machines or acquisition of 
new machines (unless it serves to increase the salaries but in that case it does not really 
constitute retained earnings because the money does not reach the stage of materialising in 
profit). In conclusion, it can be said that the various sources through which the firms are 
financed, through the variegated impact the resulting unequal power relationships have on 
the governance of the firm, result in differentiated outcomes in terms of circulation of the 
value created by the firm.  
A concept closely related to ‘circuits of value’ is ‘value capture’ as defined in Chapter 2. A point 
of departure of the empirical analysis here is the analysis of circulation of value in the 
preceding section, given that the capture of value is a result of its circulation: value is captured 
at the end of the circuit in which it circulates. This can either be within the firm or region in 
which it was created, or within another firm and/or region to which it has circulated. The 
empirical data of this study does not allow to show how profits are distributed, which 
proportion of value created is used to remunerate capital, and how this differs between the 
various types of financing forms but this could be done through future research using the 
information contained in the firms’ annual statements. An interesting distinction to be made 
here is between the location of capital providers, whether they be equity or debt providers, 
between local/domestic or foreign. 
Does the absence of capital market funding and private equity in the sample of firms analysed 
mean that the value created by the firms does not circulate to these types of capital providers, 
and hence that no value is captured by global/financialised institutions? Not necessarily, as it 
has been demonstrated that there can be an indirect link through business and/or ownership 
relationships with firms that do have a direct link with capital markets and private equity. 
Thus, it is possible to be assessed by future research that trading conditions between car 
component manufacturers and their business partners are influenced by these firm’ link with 
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capital markets and private equity in a way that, for example drives supplier prices down in a 
way that the firms create less value and, as a consequence, are able to capture less value than 
they would have had their off-takers price policy not been driven by capital markets and 
private equity.  
By contrast, high levels of profit distribution to foreign shareholders are a clear sign for a low 
level of profit capture within the firm and the surrounding region. Future research would need 
to establish to which extent this is the case. A high level of profit distribution to local 
shareholders (even individuals) is a more complicated question, as it is not known where these 
profits are stored and what they are used for. If they are transferred to some bank account 
abroad this probably does not correspond to any value capture within the firm or its region. 
With regards to bank loans, it would be interesting here to analyse (through future research) 
the location and origin of the banks that lend to the firms, although it would also be necessary 
to look at the sources through which these banks themselves are refinanced to complete the 
picture. Do firms that are financed to a high degree through loans (such as some of the 
German firms) reduce their capacity to capture value? Is a higher degree of value captured if 
the firms have less bank loans and therefore pay less interest? This would need to be explored 
through future research. 
A high level of profit retention in the form of retained earnings is a clear sign for a high degree 
of value capture within the firm and the surrounding region. Profits retained within the firm 
directly correspond to value captured within the firm as they are translated into productive 
value such as machines. Is it possible to say that this means the value is captured within the 
region and benefits other local stakeholders such as employees (through wages), the local 
state (through taxes) and customers (to the extent these are local)? Future research could use 
the empirical data contained in the annual statements of the firms to show how much of the 
value created by these firms is retained, and hence captured, differentiating as relevant may 
be between the different categories of firms and between the regions. It would likely be seen 
that those firms that rely primarily on retained earnings as a source of equity capture a higher 
proportion of the value they create. At the same time, however, it would also be seen that 
these firms tend to be smaller than the others. Therefore, even though the amount of value 
they capture is higher in proportion, the amount of value they create may be smaller. 
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Consequently, the amount of value they capture in absolute terms may not be higher than the 
one captured by firms that are financed through other sources.  
Retained	earnings	for	maximisation	of	value	capture?	
The preceding section looked at how variegated patterns of demand and supply of capital, as 
evidenced among this study’s empirical sample of car component manufacturers in Hungary 
and Eastern Germany, might translate into variegated patterns of circuits of value and value 
capture depending on the types and origins of capital providers and users involved. It was 
shown that the degree to which capital circulates and is captured within the firms and regions 
where it was originally created depends on various elements related to how the providers of 
capital impact the governance of the firms concerned.  
An important question is whether retained earnings are indeed the strategy that allows a 
maximisation of value capture for the firms and their region, with a differentiation between 
the situations in Hungary and Eastern Germany. How does the different profile of capital 
sourcing in these two regions lead to different circuits of value? How, for example, does the 
predominance of local equity and bank financing in Germany determine how value is created, 
circulates and is captured by the firms in Eastern Germany? How, by contrast, does the 
predominance of both foreign equity and foreign bank debt in Hungary lead to a higher 
circulation of value and potentially less capture of value by car component manufacturers in 
Hungary than in Eastern Germany?  
This analysis is driven by the predominance of retained earnings in many Hungarian firms: by 
relying on retained earnings to a very high degree, many of the Hungarian firms have only a 
limited participation in international circuits of value in the form of dividend distribution of 
interest payments. There may, however, nevertheless be a participation in international 
circuits of value if the main clients of these firms are foreign GPN firms. In this case, the value 
may circulate through the goods traded between the firms and these other foreign firms 
within a global production network. It could be analysed whether the empirical data tells 
anything relevant about this aspect, although it might be difficult to do so in a meaningful way.  
This section discussed what lessons can be drawn from the analysis of financing patterns of 
car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany in terms of circulation and 
capture of value in these regions and other regions. Focus was given to the different power 
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relations resulting from the different forms of relationships between suppliers and users of 
capital shape the governance of the firms and, as a result, the firms’ agency in terms of circuits 
of value and capture of the value the firms create. The next section broadens the perspective 
to analyse wider local and regional development implications of these questions.  
6.4 Local	and	Regional	Development	Implications	
What can this study tell about the wider local and regional development implications of 
different forms of capital sourcing? Based on the assessment of how the car component 
manufacturing industry in Eastern Germany and Hungary is structured and on the variegated 
forms in which these firms finance their operations depending on certain geographical factors, 
this section assesses what this means in terms of regional development and on the possibilities 
these firms have to influence these financing patterns to enhance their options.  
This question is answered by looking at what the different forms of financing observed may 
mean for the capacity of the firms to enhance value and achieve industrial upgrading by 
modernizing their equipment to conform with the standards imposed by OEMs and higher-
tier suppliers (6.4.1). It further assesses what the firms’ contrasting financing choices imply for 
their resilience or vulnerability in times of economic crisis and whether there are different 
models of regional development and different development trajectories that result from these 
contrasting financing choices (6.4.2). 
6.4.1 Value	Enhancement	and	Industrial	Upgrading	
Industrial	Upgrading	and	Value	Enhancement	
How does the utilisation of certain capital sources over others (or the reliance exclusively on 
retained earnings as an internal capital source) impact the firm’s capacity for industrial 
upgrading? The integration of car component manufacturers in the global production 
networks of higher-tier car component manufacturers and OEMs, or the continuation of their 
presence within them, is often conditioned by the compliance by these car component 
manufacturers with certain standards of production. These standards of production often 
imply a certain quality of equipment and a regular modernization to keep up with the required 
standards. Financing the acquisition of the equipment necessary to achieve this 
modernization and/or keeping up with the required standards may in some instances be 
possible by the firms’ own resources (i.e. through retained earnings). Often, however, these 
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investments are of a size that cannot be financed merely through the firm’s own resources 
and would require the access to larger sources of capital, be it in the form of equity or debt. 
As shown in Chapter 5, it may be that some firms (in particular the smaller ones in Hungary) 
are reluctant to use capital sources other than retained earnings because, as shown in Section 
6.3.1, such external capital sources would imply a loss of power and a surrendering of control 
to external parties. This raises the question whether this (voluntary) keeping away from 
external capital sources leads to these firms’ incapacity to modernize in a way that would be 
necessary for their inclusion and/or maintenance in global production networks of larger car 
component manufacturers and OEMs and therefore perpetuates the dichotomy of car 
component manufacturers in Central and Eastern Europe with industrial upgrading and higher 
tier positions often reserved to foreign-owned firms and to locally owned firms being confined 
to lower-tier positions for limited value-added components. 
What does this mean for value enhancement in the regions in which the firms operate? Does 
the strong reliance on retained earnings (and the resulting limited industrial upgrading of the 
firms) mean there is less value enhancement in the region, in the short, medium or long term? 
If many of the firms analysed (in particular the smaller Hungarian ones owned domestically 
and by individuals) remain excluded or struggle to integrate effectively into global production 
networks because of their reluctance or incapacity to source capital from external sources, 
the question is whether this also implies a reduced potential for value enhancement in these 
regions in the short, medium or long term. This might at least partially be mitigated, however, 
in the case of Hungary, by the many foreign owned firms that do access external financing and 
are therefore able to modernize and maintain their integration in the global production 
networks? To the extent these foreign-owned firms are otherwise embedded in Hungary 
(through local supplier relations, employment of the workforce, payment of local taxes etc.), 
their network embeddedness will likely lead at least to some value enhancement in the 
regions. 
Retained	earnings	limiting	industrial	upgrading	and	value	enhancement?	
What does the above mean for the evolution of the firms in terms of industrial upgrading and 
the resulting integration and maintenance in global production networks, and how does the 
situation in Hungary contrast with the one in Eastern Germany? Is it in particular the small, 
   
 
 
 
211 
privately owned, peripheral firms in Hungary that are penalized by their unwillingness or 
incapacity to access external capital sources? The question is whether the corollary of the 
firm’s reliance on retained earnings to preserve autonomy and maximise the capture of value 
is a limitation in their capacity to achieve industrial upgrading and value enhancement for 
their regions. 
6.4.2 Resilience	and	Local	and	Regional	Development	
Broadening up the perspective from the concepts of industrial upgrading and value 
enhancement in the regions, this raises the question of what the variegated patterns of capital 
sourcing by car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany mean for 
resilience of these firms and regions in times of economic crisis, and for local and regional 
development more generally. 
Resilience	and	Local	and	Regional	Development	
Resilience, as this concept has been discussed in Chapter 2 from a geographical perspective 
(cf. also Pike et al. (2012)) also needs to be considered here. What do the firms’ choices (in 
particular reliance on retained earnings rather than on external capital) mean for their 
resilience or vulnerability during times of economic crisis when their turnover goes down, 
client orders are reduced, prices for supplies go up, bank loans become more difficult to obtain 
etc.? What does this study’s empirical data say about this? 
As mentioned earlier, each type of capital comes with specific conditions which may vary 
between different regions and varieties of capitalism therein, and these conditions imply not 
only decisions at the operating and strategic level but also remuneration and repayment of 
the capital. Regarding the remuneration and repayment, there are big differences between 
the capital sources: while equity does not need to be repaid but dividend expectations can be 
relatively high (in particular for equity that is traded on the stock market and where 
shareholders are not directly involved in the management of the firm), debt needs to be repaid 
at a certain moment and a fixed interest (usually much lower than a typical dividend) is due 
on a regular basis. This has very different effects on the firm in times of economic crises, when 
the firm’s cashflows are much more strained and firms struggle to generate the cash required 
to service the capital. When firms are unable to pay the interest of their debt the consequence 
can be very significant and imply that the loan becomes entirely repayable, assets seized etc., 
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and the firm risks becoming insolvent. Equity is more flexible in that respect (as no principal 
repayment is due and dividends not fixed) but if the shareholders are ‘impatient equity’ and 
unsatisfied with the performance of the firm, they can provoke measures that are just as 
drastic such as shutting down plants, selling off parts of the business etc. 
By contrast, a firm that relies primarily on retained earnings has none of the above constraints 
and is much more flexible, arguably more resilient in time of crisis. Does this mean that relying 
on retained earnings is always the best and safest way to be resilient in terms of crisis? 
Possibly, although it could also be argued that even the absence of obligations to repay or 
remunerate external capital may be insufficient to cover ongoing liabilities to suppliers, 
employees etc. in case of reduced turnover and therefore insufficient to avert insolvency. A 
firm that has access to external capital (in particular one that is owned by a foreign GPN firm 
and has access to capital support from that owner) may be better protected in case of a 
particularly severe crisis – provided the foreign owner is willing to support the subsidiary and 
help him through the crisis. 
As discussed earlier, none of the firms in the sample of this study has any private equity firm 
investors as direct shareholders but what effect this might have on their resilience in times of 
crisis might be shown by what happens to firms that do: according to Scheuplein (2012), one 
of the frequently observed effects of a private equity take over on a firm is an increased rate 
of indebtedness (explained by the ‘down-streaming’ of the debt used by the private equity 
firm to purchase the firm to the firm itself, which results in a higher amount of bank debt held 
by the firm (in exchange of previously retained earnings that are up-streamed in the form of 
shareholder loans). Such new indebtedness cannot be used for new productive investments 
and may have a destabilizing effect on the firm. 
During the global financial crisis that started in 2008, German car component manufacturers 
were particularly strongly hit (with turnover decreasing by more than 40% in many cases), 
many became insolvent and the firms controlled by private equity were concerned largely 
over proportion – over the entire decade between 2000 and 2010, a third (43) of the 130 
German car component manufacturers controlled by private equity became insolvent 
(Scheuplein 2012). Was this due to the firms’ over-indebtedness and other fragilising 
strategies of the private equity investors? Scheuplein (2012) offers a different potential 
explanation: while many car component manufacturers with no private equity investor 
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received strong support by the OEMs during the crisis (in the form of advance payments, or 
through assistance in the negotiations with banks, for example), firms with private equity 
investors did not get this support and (absent further financial support by the private equity 
investors) got into financial trouble and in many cases insolvent. After the insolvency, the 
OEMs in some cases helped broker a sale of the firms from private equity investors to (often 
foreign) industrial investors. This illustrates how the conflicting strategies between financial 
investors and OEMs (as identified in Section 2.2.3) can lead OEMs to exercise their power 
within their global production networks in a way that fragilises firms that are controlled by 
private equity and may ultimately lead to private equity reducing their investments in the 
sector, as it seems to have happened in German car component manufacturing (Scheuplein 
2012). Scheuplein (2012) insist, however, that this strongly depends on the specific local 
context of the concerned industry and regions analysed, and that the strong trend observed 
in the case of car component manufacturers in Western Germany cannot necessarily be 
transposed to other industries or geographical contexts. Resilience in crisis (and its impact on 
regional unemployment) is therefore impacted by car component manufacturer’s integration 
in global production networks not only via their relative position within the networks (as 
established e.g. by Pavlínek and Ženka (2010) in respect of Czech car suppliers) but also on 
their capitalistic relationship with other foreign car component manufacturers.  
More broadly, balancing the various factors discussed (value enhancement/industrial 
upgrading, value capture and resilience), what do the capital sourcing patterns observed 
among car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany mean for regional 
development in these regions? Do the different financing strategies discussed above (i.e. 
reliance on retained earnings or utilization of other external capital sources), with their 
respective implications on firm governance, circuits of value, value capture, value 
enhancement, industrial upgrading and resilience correspond to different models of regional 
development and lead to different development trajectories for the firms and the regions in 
which they operate? Does it make sense to say that reliance on retained earnings and 
reluctance to use external capital sources corresponds to a model of regional development 
based on slow, resilient, autonomous, sheltered growth? Given the empirical findings of this 
study, is this the model that would be prevalent in Hungary, at least in the regions dominated 
by locally owned rather than foreign owned firms? There is probably an argument to that, 
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although it needs to be mitigated in order not to be too simplistic (in particular considering 
the many foreign owned firms in Hungary that do rely on external capital provided by their 
foreign owners). On what kind of development trajectory are the firms that rely strongly on 
retained earnings? 
By contrast, can it be said that a larger exposure to external sources of capital, be it in the 
form of equity provided by foreign owners (as in the case of many Hungarian firms) or of debt 
(such as is the case of many firms in Eastern Germany), corresponds to a regional development 
that is more turned towards quicker and dynamic growth, more strongly integrated into global 
production networks but also more exposed and vulnerable in times of economic crisis? This 
would then be the model prevalent in Eastern Germany and except for the foreign-owned 
firms in Hungary. Again, there is certainly an argument for that although it needs to be 
moderated. The fact that much of the external capital in Eastern Germany is provided by 
German banks in particular, and the traditionally strong relationship between the firms and 
their Hausbanken as seen above (Handke 2011) probably mitigates the vulnerability of the 
Eastern German firms in times of economic crisis. 
Ultimately, this boils down to the well-known question of ‘what kind of local and regional 
development and for whom’ (Pike et al. 2007): both strategies (reliance on retained earnings 
vs. access to external capital sources) have their pros and cons in terms of local and regional 
development, but they correspond to very different development models and to contrasting 
development trajectories, implying different short, medium and long term outcomes for the 
firms and their internal and external stakeholders such as employees, owners, clients, or 
business partners. 
A	more	nuanced	evaluation	of	the	impact	of	relying	on	retained	earnings	
This chapter has attempted to identify potential underlying reasons explaining why car 
component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany source their capital in the way 
they do depending in particular on where they are located and who they belong to, and what 
implications this might have on their firm governance and on local and regional development. 
In the absence of interviews with the firms which would provide further insight about the 
firm’s motivations in their capital choices, the potential reasons and impacts identified 
necessarily remain assumptions which would need to be tested through further research. 
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Among the potential reasons identified, focus was given to the institutional infrastructure of 
capital provision prevalent in Hungary and Eastern Germany as part of the existing 
variegations of capitalism in these regions. This includes in particular the comparatively 
underdeveloped capital markets and the comparative lack of private equity investment in 
both regions. The role of banks was found to be different in Germany (with a traditionally 
stronger role of relationship banks with firms) than in Hungary (where the concept of 
‘relationship banking’ seems to be less prevalent). By contrast, foreign GPN firms as equity 
investors play a much more important role in Hungary than in Eastern Germany, simply due 
to the much higher number of foreign-owned firms in Hungary.   
Among the potential implications, variegated impacts on the firm’s governance due to the 
presence or absence of different types of capital providers were identified, as well as 
implications of the firms’ ability to industrially upgrade, for their development trajectories as 
well as, more globally, for the circuits of value, value enhancement and regional development 
models of the regions in which these firms operate, which may lead to contrasting 
development outcomes and trajectories in each region.  
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Chapter	7 Conclusions	
This study set out to explore the geographical implications of how firms are financed through 
different capital sources such as equity, debt or retained earnings. It endeavoured to 
understand why certain types of firms use certain types of capital more than others and what 
this may mean for these firms’ governance as well as for local and regional development. The 
study’s conceptual framework combined theoretical work on three related areas: first, 
varieties of capitalism and variegated capitalism, reflecting the idea that the institutional 
infrastructure of capital provision to firms is not uniform across space but materialises 
differently in places depending on political, historical, social, economic and institutional 
context and particularities of regions. Second, global production networks to conceptualise 
network embeddedness of firms in trans-regional networks of production also comprising 
non-firm actors. Third, geographies of firm finance, with important contributions already 
made by economic geographers to better understand geographical implications of firm 
finance such as, among other aspects, the difficulty of small and medium-sized enterprises to 
obtain capital in peripheral regions, or the impact, on a firm’s development, of sourcing capital 
from a new source such as the capital market (cf. the example of the Vauxhall brewery in 
Sunderland (Pike 2006)). Chapter 2 highlighted certain conceptual, theoretical and empirical 
research gaps identified in these areas: first, the calls by literature on variegated capitalism 
for more critical attention to less well studied geographies such as post-socialist areas of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Second, the need for better understanding how finance interplays 
with global production networks as highlighted by GPN research. And third, the need for a 
more nuanced and fine-grained analysis of the geographical nature and implications of firm 
finance evidenced by research on the geographies of firm finance. 
To address these gaps, the study explored three research questions through empirical analysis 
of a sample of car component manufacturers in Hungary and Eastern Germany:  
• What are the main sources of capital used by these firms and which structural patterns 
can be observed? 
• How can these patterns be explained by geographical factors concerning both firms 
and capital providers, as well as their respective institutional context? 
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• What is the potential impact on the firms’ governance and on local and regional 
development more broadly? 
The choice of the empirical scope was justified by these firms being both a good and well-
researched example of global production networks (with inter-regional connection and 
network embeddedness with other firms and regions) and strongly anchored in two regions 
that share a state-socialist past and current EU-membership and at the same time contrast in 
the path they have taken since the fall of the Iron Curtain - Eastern Germany having been 
absorbed in the pre-existing specific variety of capitalism prevalent in Western Germany and 
Hungary having had to develop its own path. The mixed methods approach used to conduct 
the empirical research combined analysis of quantitative data for about 320 firms across the 
two regions with qualitative data from academic and other publicly available secondary 
sources.  
This final chapter discusses the key empirical findings, main conceptual and theoretical 
contributions, limitations and avenues for future research. Empirically (7.1), the study 
highlights the marked absence of capital markets and private equity as a direct capital source 
for the firms analysed in both regions, a dominance of retained earnings for most firms, 
similarities in bank lending between Hungary and Eastern Germany and the significant impact 
foreign corporate ownership has on the behaviour of firms when it comes to sourcing capital. 
It further provides indications for the potential existence of a regional capital gap in Hungary, 
but not in Eastern Germany. Conceptually (7.2), it highlights the conditional and limited nature 
of financialisation, the territorial disembedding effect of ownership in global production 
networks and the double-edged nature of retained earnings as a tool for enhancing firm 
agency. The main limitations and avenues for future research (7.3) concern the access to 
qualitative firm level data to interpret the quantitative data collected, the consideration of 
tier-positioning and trade relationships between GPN firms from a financial perspective and a 
broadening of the scope of analysis, in particular in temporal terms with regards to the 
evolution of capital sources over time.  
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7.1 Key	Empirical	Findings	
In empirical terms, the key findings of this study contrast in some aspects with what was 
expected based on previous research conducted on related topics, while in others it has 
confirmed such expectations. 
Absence	of	capital	markets	as	a	direct	funding	source	
Much literature on geographies of finance, in particular when dedicated to financialisation, 
focuses on the impact of capital sourced through the capital markets on a publicly listed firm’s 
governance and development (mainly because data is most easily available for those firms 
(Zingales 2000)) as well as on private equity ((Clark and Wójcik 2007)). One finding of this 
study, however, is that these types of capital sources are not only in the minority (as already 
expected based on Zingales (2000)) but even absent as direct capital sources for the sample 
of firms analysed. This is very likely due to the combination of the characteristics of the firm 
sample analysed, consisting largely of small and medium-sized firms, and of the geographies 
studied: Hungary and Eastern Germany where capital markets and private equity are less 
developed compared to the US or the UK. While small and medium-sized firms do source 
capital through these sources in regions with comparatively more developed capital markets 
and private equity (such as the US or the UK, even Western Germany), and while there is a 
capital market in Hungary and Eastern Germany used by larger firms in particular, the small 
and medium-sized firms in both regions tend not to have any direct access to these (more 
‘financialised’) sources of capital.  
What this suggests is that, within a specific variegation of capitalism, the particular 
relationship between firms and the financial markets of a society (as identified as a relevant 
factor by Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997b: 2) for example) can also materialise in the form of 
an absence of engagement with these types of actors. This might be an indication that firms 
(by way of exercising their agency) choose to avoid a confrontation with the “set of 
expectations [of capital market investors] as regards […] the proper form of governance 
[which may be] at odds with history and geography [of the firm]” (Clark and Wójcik 2007: 17) 
by refraining from seeking to obtain capital from this type of investors. In some ways this is 
not fully surprising considering that some of the existing literature recognises that “even in 
market finance systems, internal finance and bank debt remain the predominant sources of 
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financing […] and the stock market does not play a major role” (Aglietta and Breton 2001: 
450). 
As a consequence, the study did not explore the potential implications of direct capital market 
and private equity funding on car component manufacturers to compare findings with existing 
literature concerned with these questions. However, while no direct presence of capital 
sourced through the capital markets or private equity could be evidenced, an indirect 
presence was identified for a majority of those firms that are owned by foreign GPN firms, as 
these foreign GPN firms often have their equity traded on the stock market and/or are owned 
by private equity. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, this is the case for an important proportion of 
the firms particularly in Hungary, while foreign ownership (and hence indirect ownership 
through the capital market and/or private equity) is found much more rarely in Eastern 
Germany. This study found no marked difference in the financing patterns, within the group 
of foreign-owned firms, between those that are ultimately owned through capital markets 
and private equity and those that are owned by foreign firms that are themselves privately 
held: the main differentiating factor seems to the ownership by a foreign firm (whether that 
is ultimately owned privately or through the capital markets) as discussed below. There may 
nevertheless be an impact of indirect ownership through the capital markets, which might 
materialise in impacts on the firms without necessarily being reflected in the financing patters 
– this would need to be explored through further research.  
The	dominance	of	retained	earnings	
Another finding which somehow contrasts with most of the existing literature reviewed is the 
dominance of retained earnings for most firms. Much of the existing literature on geographies 
of finance focuses on unequal power relationships between firms and various types of third 
party capital providers, but little attention so far has been given to the one source of capital 
which does not imply any relationship (and hence governance implication) with a third party: 
retained earnings as capital produced by the firm itself. A high proportion of the firms in the 
sample were found to be using retained earnings to a relatively high extent, almost regardless 
of their size, location or ownership situation. While retained earnings seem to play an 
important role for most firms in both Hungary and Eastern Germany, there does seem to be 
geographical differentiation between Hungarian firms on the one side and Eastern German 
firms on the other side, with almost all Hungarian firms having a minimum “safety cushion” of 
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at least 20% retained earnings, while there are some German firms that have virtually no 
retained earnings. The proportion of retained earnings was found to be particularly important 
for small- and medium-sized firms in Hungary, some of which rely on it as an almost exclusive 
source of capital. In accordance with what would be expected from the pecking order theory 
(Myers 1984), this might suggest a preference of firms for this internal source of capital to 
external sources such as bank debt or equity from third parties, with the additional insight 
suggested by the findings of this study that the pecking order theory might be of particular 
relevance for firms in the geographical periphery.  
The main implication of this is that when firms are found to be relying heavily on retained 
earnings, this reduces the extent to which these firms depend on external capital providers 
and the extent to which these external capital providers play a role in the governance of the 
firms. This is likely (as already suggested by some of the existing research, e.g. Bečicová and 
Blažek (2015)) an important reason why these firms chose to rely primarily on retained 
earnings rather than on external capital sources. When Hall and Soskice (2001b) consider that 
one of the key dimensions characterising a particular variety of capitalism is the way firms 
resolve the coordination problem in the sphere of corporate governance, this study suggests 
that one form of resolving it might consist in avoiding the role of any third parties in the firm’s 
governance by refraining from sourcing any capital from such third parties and relying on 
retained earnings instead. It also means that while capital is very relevantly conceptualised as 
a ‘social relationship’ between capital owners and firms (Bryan et al. 2009; Corpataux and 
Crevoisier 2016), it is also necessary to consider that some firms may choose to avoid the 
implications of such relationships by having recourse to retained earnings which do not entail 
such a social relationship with an external third party.  
Similarities	in	bank	lending	between	Hungary	and	Eastern	Germany	
In terms of bank loans, the study has shown that they are used in a more prevalent manner 
by German firms than by Hungarian firms, which often do not use this as a source of financing 
at all. And even when Hungarian firms use bank loans as a capital source, these tend to 
represent a smaller proportion of the aggregate capital sources of the firm (often not more 
than 20%) while the proportion of those German firms that do use bank loans is generally 
higher (around 40%). Most of the banks providing loans to firms in Eastern Germany are local 
in the sense that they are based in the same country (even though most are based in Western 
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Germany) while most Hungarian banks are foreign owned. This might reflect different 
financing practices of banks in the two regions, with banks in Eastern Germany accepting a 
higher ‘leverage’ (i.e. proportion of the bank loan compared to the firm’s assets) than in 
Hungary – or potentially a willingness of the Hungarian firms that do use bank loans to keep 
this comparatively limited. These potential reasons would need to be further explored and 
verified through further empirical research. One methodological obstacle was the fact that 
small firms in Germany tend not to report the proportion bank loans represent on their 
balance sheet (simply because they are not legally obliged to do so), meaning that while the 
existence of bank loans could be tested for Hungarian firms of all sizes, this could only be done 
for medium-sized and large firms in Eastern Germany. The findings of the study nevertheless 
suggest that the reasons for such variegation in bank loan utilisation are, for part at least, due 
to the different institutional infrastructure of capital provision in the two regions, with a role 
of banks traditionally more relationship based in Germany (Handke 2011), even Eastern 
Germany, than in Hungary.  
Based on the limited data available, the findings of this study do not seem to suggest there is 
a credit gap for (at least medium-sized and large) individually owned firms in Eastern Germany 
with regards to their more central or peripheral location - at least with regards to the outcome 
of their negotiations with banks (which is what is evidenced by the existence or not of bank 
loans on the firms’ balance sheet). This does not, however, allow us to assess whether or not 
the process of obtaining bank loans is more difficult for firms located further away from the 
financial centres in Eastern Germany, as discussed by Klagge and Martin (2005) for example – 
such an assessment would require a direct discussion with the firms concerned through future 
research. 
Foreign	corporate	ownership	as	a	key	differentiating	factor	
One factor which was found to be highly relevant for the patterns of capital sourcing of the 
firm is their ownership, and in particular the ownership ties which often exist between firms 
that are part of the same global production networks. As highlighted by Czaban and 
Henderson (1998), firm ownership is an important factor in post-socialist economies 
influencing the way firms behave in various aspects and the high number of foreign-owned 
firms in Central and Eastern Europe is at least partly due to the fact that many foreign GPN 
firms chose to acquire equity stakes in local firms rather than develop less committed (and 
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therefore less controlled) forms of corporate relations. Those of the firms that are now owned 
by foreign corporates (which in almost all cases are larger international GPN firms) were found 
to have markedly different patterns of capital sourcing than those who are not (and which in 
an overwhelming majority of cases are owned by local individuals, often the same as those 
who also manage the firm on a daily basis): the foreign-owned firms are the only ones that 
are financed to any significant extent through equity (in the sense of fresh capital injected by 
the owners) and who almost never use bank loans as a source of financing. This is probably an 
indication that these firms can source capital more cheaply in their home region than is 
possible for the local firm in Hungary or Eastern Germany. It is also not necessarily in 
contradiction with Myers (1984)’s pecking order theory considering that the pecking order 
theory stipulates that firms will avoid raising capital from new external equity providers if they 
can because this would be the most expensive form of capital and in order to avoid a transfer 
of power and governance influence to these new external actors, but that in the case of equity 
provided by a foreign corporate owner, this form of capital is not necessarily more expensive 
(or simply more easily available) and that power and governance influence already resides 
with that foreign firm: as a consequence, there is no further transfer of power and governance 
and influence induced by the provision of equity by that foreign owner. 
Regional	capital	gaps?	
Finally, the study also revealed indicators for variegation at regional (rather than national) 
levels and the potential existence of a regional capital gap, at least in Hungary, challenging the 
VOC school’s “tendency to reify national economic boundaries” (Peck and Theodore 2007: 
738). Looking at the reliance of Hungarian firms on retained earnings for example, a gap 
appears between those closer to the capital city Budapest with its financial institutions 
(tending to rely on retained earnings to a lesser extent) and those located more in the 
periphery (tending to rely more strongly on retained earnings and only rarely taking out loans 
from banks). This supports the argument of Crouch et al. (2009) for the existence of regional 
variegations of capitalism, according to which a firm’s behaviour can be less dependent on 
national institutions and infrastructure as classical VOC theory would suggest, but rather 
depend on other, more local factors such as the absence of local financial institutions in 
peripheral regions or a limited propensity of the institutions in the centre to provide capital 
to these firms. The research thus advances the knowledge of variegations of capital not only 
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at the national but also at the regional level, but these findings should be used with caution 
as not all factors which might influence the degree of retained earnings (such as losses made 
in previous years, distributions of dividends to shareholders etc) could be analysed within the 
scope of this study. Furthermore, none such regional variegation could be evidenced in 
Eastern Germany where there is no perceptible difference in the financing patters observed 
for firms in more central locations (around Berlin and in Thuringia) than in the periphery 
(Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) for example.  
For Hungary where there seem to be indications for the existence of a regional capital gap, 
the only apparent factor seemingly neutralising the effect of a firm’s location in the periphery 
is its ownership by another (foreign) car component manufacturer, which leads to the firm’s 
being primarily financed through shareholder funds and less relying on either bank loans or 
retained earnings, regardless of its location. This is coherent with Crouch et al. (2009)’s 
assertion that larger firms (or firms that are owned by larger foreign firms) have the ability to 
establish governance (or capital sourcing) structures that contrast with the ones otherwise 
typically seen in the region. In GPN terms, this might be an indication that the network 
embeddedness of firms in global production networks (at least when this network 
embeddedness takes the form of ownership ties) is able to override the effects of the firm’s 
territorial embeddedness when it comes to the sourcing of capital by the firm, as discussed in 
the summary of this study’s conceptual contributions hereafter.  
7.2 Main	Conceptual	and	Theoretical	Contributions	
Based on the empirical findings summarised above, what are the main conceptual and 
theoretical contributions of this study, how do they tie in with wider questions and debates in 
economic geography and cognate social sciences? 
The	conditional	and	limited	nature	of	financialisation	
By evidencing the absence of direct provision of capital to these firms through capital markets 
and private equity, the study highlights the conditional and limited nature of financialisation. 
From the perspective of variegated capitalism, the study has indeed evidenced differences in 
the institutional infrastructure of capital provision in the formerly state-socialist regions of 
Hungary and Eastern Germany compared to more ‘financialised’ (or, in VoC terms, LME-type) 
regions such as the US and the UK with more strongly developed capital markets. The prime 
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difference identified - and one in respect of which there seems to be little difference between 
Hungary and Eastern Germany - is the marked absence of capital markets and private equity 
among the institutions that form part of the customary infrastructure of capital provision for 
local firms. Capital markets and private equity are overall comparatively less developed in 
these regions, with fewer companies having their equity or debt listed on the local capital 
markets, fewer investors investing capital through the local capital markets and fewer private 
equity firms investing in fewer firms that are located in these regions.  
Most likely, this lack of engagement between the firms analysed in this study and the capital 
markets is due to a limited willingness of the relevant parties to engage due to their 
geographies: on the one hand, it is likely that many capital market investors and private equity 
firms (which in most cases are based at a certain geographical distance outside the region of 
the firm) have only limited or no appetite to invest in regions where comparably less market 
information is available (and more difficult to obtain due to the geographical distance) or 
where the risk is perceived to be higher. On the other hand, it is likely that some local firms, 
even though they would in principle be able to source capital through the capital markets or 
from private equity, refrain from doing so in order to preserve their autonomy (be it at the 
cost of remaining small in the medium term in the absence of significant third party capital 
injections), or simply because they are not familiar with it. Even though it was not possible to 
test this assumption empirically, it appears plausible in the light of Bečicová and Blažek 
(2015)’s finding that some firms in the Czech periphery choose not to apply for bank loans in 
order not to compromise their autonomy. If firms refrain from seeking capital from local 
banks, it appears very likely they would also refrain from seeking it from foreign capital 
markets or private equity investors. Indeed, in the capital market, firms are the object of a 
‘public evaluation that brings together and co-ordinates the opinions of the largest pool of 
potential investors available’ while bank loans represent bilateral relations between the firm 
and the banks that provide credit (Aglietta and Breton 2001: 438); firms that hesitate to ask a 
bank for a loan will be even more reluctant to obtain capital through the capital market. 
What this suggests is that some firms exercise agency in their choice of capital sources with a 
view to preserving their autonomy, and refraining from seeking capital from institutionally, 
geographically and maybe even culturally ‘distant’ sources such as capital markets or private 
equity, where the lack of precedent experience between the actors involved increases the 
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perception of uncertainty. The firms choose to restrain the scope of potential capital sources 
(effectively reducing their options to grow and to source the capital required to invest and 
modernise), for reasons due to the organisation of their governance, but maybe also simply 
in continuation of their previous ‘way of operating’ without external capital sources. This 
might potentially be seen as a form of local resistance to ‘financialisation’, a form of mediation 
of it through local firms, and a transformation of the process compared to how it unfolds in 
other regions such as the UK or the US – unless it (potentially more likely) rather reflects an 
‘insulation’ and ‘overlooking’ of these regions, which might be due to a perceived geographical 
or cultural ‘distance’ between these regions and global institutions. The study thus contributes 
to a critical re-evaluation of literature on geographies of firm finance and on financialisation 
by evidencing that the latter is far from being a universal, uniform and irresistible 
phenomenon. One further form of potential resistance to financialisation is the opposition of 
OEMs against car component manufacturers owned by private equity as observed by 
Scheuplein (2012), materialising in the OEM’s comparatively limited willingness to support 
these firms in times of crisis. This suggests that resistance originates not only from local actors 
in the territories where firms operate, but also through global production networks from the 
OEMs that constitute the lead firms of these networks. Another element relevant to debates 
on variegated capitalism is what appears to be the different role played by banks, with a 
seemingly higher importance of banks in Eastern Germany than in Hungary, in accordance 
with the literature discussing the ‘relationship bank’ status of banks in Germany (Handke 
2011) which seems to be absent in Hungary. Both regions share a state-socialist past and an 
EU-present but took different paths after the fall of the Iron Curtain when Eastern Germany 
was absorbed into the pre-existing capitalism of Western Germany while Hungary had to go 
its own way and develop its own variegated form of capitalism. The different role played by 
banks in these regions is thus another indicator of differences in variegations of capital within 
the group of formerly state-socialist regions. 
The study thus supports the argument of persistently divergent rather than convergent 
patterns of financing, thereby challenging arguments of homogenization as a result of 
processes such as globalization or financialisation, and supporting the view of financialisation 
as a ‘profoundly geographical phenomenon’ (Hall and Leyshon 2013). There clearly remains a 
difference in the way Hungarian firms are financed compared to firms in Eastern Germany, 
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both are different than what is seen in the US and the UK, and there are even indications for 
regional differences within Hungary. The study contributes to understanding how and why 
variegations of capitalism might diverge or converge, or not, over time.  Overall, this 
challenges theoretical accounts of tendencies to homogenization in global capitalism, such as 
Dimaggio and Powell (1983)’s institutional isomorphism argument according to which 
institutions start in different places but eventually converge towards norms and common 
structures, and supports the argument for the persistence or variegations of capitalism across 
time and space. Clearly a more nuanced and fine-grained analysis is necessary to better 
understand how variegations of capitalism develop, unfold and persist in different ways in 
different contexts, both between countries and regionally within countries, and what different 
implications this has for the firms concerned. 
The	territorial	disembedding	effect	of	ownership	in	global	production	networks	
While the VoC school focuses on how the embeddedness of firms in their institutional 
environment determines the organisation and regulation of production in a given context (Hall 
and Soskice 2001b), this study has highlighted that this territorial embeddedness determines 
not only the production but also the sourcing of capital by the firms. In addition, and in line 
with a “relational conception of the firm as a social institution” (Peck and Theodore 2007: 
738), it has highlighted that the network embeddedness through ownership in 
‘discontinuously territorial’, (Henderson et al. 2002: 446) global production networks has a 
‘territorially disembedding’ effect in that it fundamentally alters the way these firms source 
their capital. By showing how firms that are owned by foreign GPN firms source their capital 
compared to those that are not, with the implications this has on the firm’s governance and 
on local and regional development, the study contributes to a critical discussion of the role 
finance plays in global production networks and how finance should be conceptualized, more 
solidly and more systematically, as an integral and relevant dimension of these networks. As 
the empirical analysis has shown, the form of integration of a firm into a global production 
network has a significant impact on the way it is financed. Firms that are part of global 
production networks but owned by local individuals (as is the case or a large number of firms 
in both Hungary and in Eastern Europe where they represent the ‘Mittelstand’) tend to have 
very little capital contributed by their owners and therefore rely either on banks as external 
capital providers or on retained earnings as internally produced capital. By contrast, firms that 
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are owed by foreign GPN firms tend to have a significant portion of their capital provided by 
their foreign owner. In other words, the VOC school’s assumption that firms behave in 
accordance with the specific institutional framework of their national economy (Crouch et al. 
2009) and its “tendency to reify national economic boundaries” (Peck and Theodore 2007: 
738) is at least partly contested by the observation of this disembedding effect of ownership 
integration in global production networks, supporting the call of Peck and Theodore (2007: 
758) for the consideration of ‘models within models’ at the local scale and network-style 
‘models between models’ in trans-local space. Similarly, while Lane (2008) highlights how each 
political economy’s financial system and regulatory context shape firms’ access to finance, this 
study shows that this effect can at least be partly overridden by the firms’ GPN integration 
through ownership which significantly shapes firms’ options in terms of access to finance. This 
can further be seen as one way through which lead firms can influence capitalist variegation 
in host countries (Lane 2008) by changing the way certain local firms (i.e. those that they own) 
source their capital differently compared to their locally owned peers. 
In conceptual terms, the particular form of network embeddedness of firms owned by other 
GPN firms overrides their territorial embeddedness, and their behaviour in terms of capital 
sourcing is different from the firms which otherwise share the same location in a given 
territory with its particular form of variegated capitalism. The implications thereof are that 
the firms owned by foreign GPN firms are involved in strong relationships of power with their 
foreign owner but much less so with local providers of capital, whereas the locally owned firms 
do not have this strong relationship of power with a foreign owner and instead are in unequal 
relationships of power with local banks if they use bank loans (or none if they rely exclusively 
on retained earnings). In other works, this territorial disembedding through network 
embedding has an impact on the firms’ governance. The study thus helps better understand 
how the firms’ governance is constituted, who exercises it (i.e. among others the firm’s capital 
providers), what its implications are (i.e. that certain geographical factors such as the firm’s 
location or the type and location of the firm’s owners impact and modify the firm’s 
governance). A large body of literature in business administration is concerned with the way 
firm governance is organized and drives the operations and strategic development of the firm, 
but this rarely takes into explicit account the relevance of geographical factors. This study 
highlights that certain geographical factors, such as the firm’s location as well as the type and 
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location of the firms’ owners, play an important role in the way the firm is financed and, as a 
result, in the way the firms’ capital providers form part of the firm’s governance and therefore 
contribute to shaping the governance itself. This might be seen as an illustration of local and 
regional development as the “dynamic outcome of the complex interaction between 
territorialised relational networks and global production networks within the context of 
changing relational governance structures” (Coe et al. 2004), further illustrating the space-
relevance of capital provision and of the relationships between providers and users of capital 
(Klagge and Martin 2005).  
Retained	earnings	as	a	double-edged	tool	for	enhancing	firm	agency	
The third main theoretical contribution of this study derives from the observed strong reliance 
of many firms on retained earnings as a capital source, which ties in with the discussion of the 
role firm agency plays in the geographies of firm finance. The utilisation of retained earnings 
by a firm is both a result of factors which are ‘external’ to the decision making process 
regarding the sourcing of capital and hence the firm’s agency (the making of profits in previous 
years which created earnings that could be retained and the absence of losses which would 
have destroyed the earnings retained in previous years) and factors that are within the scope 
of the firm’s agency (the decision to retain earnings once they are made rather than 
distributing them as dividends) – unless the contrary is imposed by external shareholders. This 
is part of the question how power and value are distributed in the relational interaction 
between local and non-local actors (firms and capital providers) in global production networks 
(Coe et al. 2004). It further highlights that in addition to the corporate, institutional and 
collective forms of power traditionally considered by GPN research (Henderson et al. 2002), 
the power exercised by the capital providers over the firm needs to be considered as an 
additional dimension of relevance. Ultimately this plays into the firm’s governance as the 
“authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human 
resources are allocated and flow” within a network (Gereffi 1994).  
When firms decide to finance their operations primarily through retained earnings, as many 
analysed in this study do, in accordance with expectations of the pecking order theory (Myers 
1984), they preserve their autonomy and refrain from entering into unequal relationships of 
power with third party capital providers which, once they have contributed their capital, form 
part of the governance of the firm and have their say with regards to the conduct and certain 
  Conclusion 
 
 
 
229 
strategic decisions of the firm. This study suggests a potential spatial dimension to the pecking 
order theory in that firms in Hungary seem to have a higher propensity to rely on retained 
earnings than firms in Eastern Germany (also illustrating the relevance of national variegations 
in access to capital), and firms in the Hungarian periphery more than in the Hungarian centre 
(illustrating the relevance of regional variegations). 
The exact form of power and scope of influence a third party capital provider wields depends, 
inter alia, on the form of capital, the type of capital provider and the stage in which the capital 
or the firm is (for example a bank’s influence will typically increase significantly if a loan is in 
default, and the direct influence of all third party capital providers will decrease significantly 
if the firm is insolvent as in that case the governance is taken over by the insolvency 
administrator) but it in almost all cases corresponds to some form of loss of autonomy by the 
firm and the entering into an unequal relationship of power with a third party. The strong 
reliance on retained earnings can therefore be seen as an enhancement of regional value 
capture (Mackinnon et al. 2009).  While Coe et al. (2004: 473) highlight the “availability of 
investment and equity funds [as] critical to growth and development” of a region and that the 
“uneven access to local and non-local forms of financial capital can both enhance the strategic 
importance of some regional economies to global production networks and diminish others”, 
this study suggests that some firms choose not to have recourse to such capital provided by 
third parties and rely on retained earnings instead. This is consistent with the argument that 
external capital (in particular equity, but also debt) involve a loss of autonomy of 
entrepreneurial management and control and involve a shift of power and control to external 
stakeholders (Klagge and Martin 2005). Defining governance as the “authority and power 
relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and 
flow within a chain” (Gereffi 1994: 97), a firm’s reliance on retained earnings is a means of 
preserving this authority and power within the management of the firm. 
On the other hand, the reliance on retained earnings as a capital source and the absence of 
utilisation of third party capital also means that the firm is more limited in its capacity to raise 
capital and hence in its capacity to grow and acquire. This may well be a choice of some firms, 
likely illustrated by the fact that most firms particularly in Hungary are small rather than 
medium sized or large. However, it potentially also limits their capacity to modernise 
equipment and keep on track with technological evolution, which may be required to remain 
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competitive or achieve industrial upgrading (despite the recognised limitations of this concept 
(Bair 2005)) and not gradually weaken their position in global production networks. This is 
particularly relevant for small and medium-sized firms which traditionally have more 
difficulties in accessing capital (Pollard 2003; Appleyard 2013) than “multi-institutional, multi-
national and multi-local groups whose parent companies are well connected to the financial 
milieux and who know how to use financial resources to develop their activities and external 
growth” (Corpataux and Crevoisier 2016: 618). 
As a result, this study highlights the double-edged nature of retained earnings as a tool which 
allows firms to enhance their agency (by preserving their autonomy and reducing their 
reliance on external capital providers) while also potentially limiting their development and 
capacity to fund further investments. This ultimately influences the firm’s governance and 
hence autonomy, resilience and ability to produce, enhance and capture value in the long 
term. This ultimately relates to questions of local and regional development, as the degree to 
which firms rely on retained earnings likely corresponds to different forms of development: 
while a low degree of reliance on retained earnings might correspond to a form of 
development enabling faster and more radical growth at times when capital is more easily 
available, a higher degree of reliance on retained earnings might imply a slower and more 
incremental growth path, with potentially a higher degree of resilience in times of economic 
crisis.  
7.3 Reflections	on	the	Study,	Limitations	and	Avenues	for	Further	Research	
The empirical findings and theoretical contributions summarized above illustrate the value of 
the methodological approach taken in this study, but the conduct of the study has also 
evidenced its limitations. This section discusses some of these limitations and potential 
avenues for further research that might be able to address them and further advance the 
knowledge and understanding of the geographical nature and implications of firm finance. 
Access	to	qualitative	firm-level	data	
The main obstacle encountered during the conduct of the study, and its main limitation, was 
the access to qualitative firm-level data through interviews with firm representatives.  This 
was part of the initial research design but had to be abandoned for the reasons discussed in 
Section 3.2.2 when it appeared the conduct of the interviews to discuss the firms’ internal, 
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non-published financial figures and considerations would not be possible due to the sensitive 
and proprietary nature of such information. It was the original intention of the author to 
conduct such interviews with representatives from firms in both Hungary and Eastern 
Germany, but after a certain number of attempts it quickly appeared that firms were very 
reluctant to speak about these matters. Difficulties were indeed to be expected based on the 
previous experience for example by Ram and Holliday (1993) in interviewing small firms or 
Bečicová and Blažek (2015) in exploring financial topics with firms. As this study aimed to 
conduct a wider cross-national comparison, achieving only a handful of interviews would have 
been of limited value. This route was therefore eventually abandoned and the study relied on 
publicly available secondary qualitative data to provide a qualitative explanation of the 
quantitative data collected and analysed. The collection of quantitative firm level data from 
publicly available sources which constituted this study’s main data source is a valuable source 
of data on a topic on which it is otherwise difficult to get concrete information to look inside 
the ‘black box’ of firm finance, even though it did not yield conclusive findings in every aspect 
analysed (cf. Yeung (1998: 23) for a previous attempt to evidence spatial patterns finance that 
did not yield very satisfactory results for a number of reasons (data quality, uncertainty on 
data content and imprecisions). In this area which is notoriously difficult and under researched 
(for good reason), the pulling together of quantitative data on this scale is a contribution 
showing that it is possible to collect firm-level quantitative data on a relatively large scale and 
that this does allow the identification of patterns which were not always expected based on 
the existing literature. However, the insight provided by this quantitative type of data is 
necessarily shallower than an in depth case study and does not allow an exploration of the 
underlying reasons and potential implications of the patterns observed.  
To understand the motivations of the firms in their choices of capital sourcing and their 
perception of the implications on governance and local and regional development, it would 
be necessary to undertake more qualitative work with firms as Bečicová and Blažek (2015) did 
for example. Interviews with representatives of the firms to discuss how and why they use the 
capital sources they do would significantly deepen the provision of plausible explanations as 
to the motivations of the firm’s various stakeholders and the advantages and disadvantages 
of the various forms of available forms of capital. Firm representatives would be able to 
explain some of the factors that may mean that theoretically available capital sources are not 
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actually available to the firm for one or the other reason, they would explain some of the 
reasons taken into account when evaluating the opportunity of using one source of capital 
rather than another, and they would explain the impact on the firm’s governance and 
operations of the sources of capital chosen, maybe with an evolution over time if the sources 
of capital have changed over the recent years. 
Consideration	of	tier	positioning	and	trade	relationships	between	GPN	firms	
While the method chosen to collect quantitative data from a comparatively large number of 
firms allowed to collect information on the firms’ location, size and ownership, it did not 
permit a systematic collection of information concerning the firms’ activity, tier positioning 
and commercial relationships which are further key forms of GPN integration beyond the 
ownership dimension that was analysed as part of this study – in other words a broader 
consideration of the “diverse forms of equity and non-firm equity relationships” (Coe et al. 
2004: 471) that characterise global production networks. 
The activity of a firm could be of relevance for the analysis of the firm’s patterns of financing 
and financial behaviour more generally to the extent it determines the extent and regularity 
with which the firm will raise capital to invest in new machines or to develop new products. 
Categories of activity by which firms could be categorised might include interior, exterior, 
motor, electronics or engineering to reflect which sub-system of car manufacturing the firm is 
involved in (Scheuplein 2012). This would facilitate the identification of the firms’ tier-
positioning within the global production networks and the position their products occupy in 
the process of car manufacturing. Combined with its relationship with other firms in the global 
production network, the firm’s activity determines the firm’s positioning as OEM or as tier-1, 
tier-2 or tier-3 supplier. Depending on how ‘value-adding’ the activity is, this might determine 
the firm’s profitability and power in its interactions with other firms. A further methodological 
difficulty encountered here is that there are several, partly overlapping ways of categorizing 
the activity of firms in the automotive supplier industry, and it is not always straight forward 
to assign a firm to one or the other of these categories. The collection of standardized and 
reliable data on this front turned out to be problematic and was therefore not pursued for the 
purpose of this study. To the extent the firm’s activity and tier-positioning could be 
determined systematically, this could allow the identification of certain buyer-supplier 
relationships between suppliers (in particular between foreign-owned and domestic owned 
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firms) and between suppliers and OEMs. Such tier positioning of the firms within the global 
production networks is likely to have an impact on how the firms’ operations are financed.  
Another type of information the available data did not allow to systematically identify is the 
identity of the main commercial partners of the firms. The objective here would be to identify 
which global production networks these firms are part of and what position they occupy in 
the respective global production networks. This is unfortunately not a type of information that 
can be collected systematically in a comparable manner across a panel of firms: by contrast to 
their ownership (which firms are obliged to disclose by law in both Hungary and Germany), 
many firms do not disclose the identity of their main commercial partners. When they do, they 
do not do so systematically and probably insist on the ‘big names’ (such as VW, GM or Suzuki) 
rather than on their ‘main partners’ (in terms of proportion in their own turnover). While some 
mention their direct partners, others mention the ultimate OEMs they indirectly supply via 
one or several other steps in the chain. Almost none provide a detailed breakdown of their 
turnover in terms of allocation to specific clients. Many firms have not one or two main 
partners but supply a large range of different firms, and the lists of partners are in constant 
evolution. In conclusion, this was a type of information that could not be collected in any 
meaningful and systematic way (and then combined with information about ownership and 
location) for a large panel of firms. This would therefore need to be collected to the extent 
possible for a smaller number of firms through interviews with firm representatives.  
A systematic collection of data concerning the tier-positioning and trade relationships of the 
firms would enable the analysis of further dimensions of the variegated capital sourcing of 
these firms and its implications, such as the factors at play for the sourcing of capital in the 
form of trade liabilities and the implied capitalistic relationship between ‘supplying’ this form 
of capital (by being paid late) and the firm ‘obtaining’ this form of capital (by paying its supplier 
late). It would facilitate a better understanding of how variegations of capitalism also contain 
capitalistic relationships between trade partners and what implications this may have, and it 
would allow for an analysis of how the relative position of firms in global production networks 
(beyond the question of ownership which has been analysed within the scope of this study) 
may have an impact on the way the firms source their capital with the resulting implications 
on their governance and local and regional development. This remains to be explored by 
future research.  
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Sampling	and	Representativeness	
It is also necessary to bear in mind the approach retained for the sampling of firms of which 
the empirical data was used in this thesis, and the implications this has on the representative 
character (or otherwise) of the empirical findings presented herein. As set out in Chapter 3, 
the empirical study used the data of members of the official car component manufacturers’ 
associations in Hungary (Majosz) and Eastern Germany (ACOD), two ‘self-selecting’ groups of 
firms with respectively 211 and  281 members at the time of analysis. Given time and resource 
limitations, data was not collected for all of these firms, but only for a randomly selected 
sample of 160 firms in each group, representing about 80% of the Hungarian firms and about 
56% of the Eastern German firms. It is possible that this random selection of firms led to the 
identification and prevalence of relationship types between the firms, capital sources used by 
the firms, as well as geographical and network patterns of capital sourcing that are true for 
the firms analysed, but not necessarily representative for car component manufacturers in 
Hungary and Eastern Germany as a whole. A different selection of firms (such as, for example, 
analysis of data of all 492 firms, or a sampling based on equal representation of each type of 
firms in terms of size, ownership and location) might have led to different results on each of 
the questions asked. By way of example, a different sampling might have led to a regional 
capital gap in Hungary being more apparent than it was in this thesis, or on the contrary less 
apparent or even absent. The empirical findings of this thesis should therefore be taken with 
some caution and considered as reflecting the patterns found in this particular sample of 
firms, rather than being necessarily representative of the sector as a whole. The approach was 
justified as the aim of the study was to examine the causal relations, mechanisms and 
processes at work rather than to provide a representative sample, i.e. the approach taken was 
an intensive rather than an extensive research methodology. 
The degree to which findings from a different sampling might differ could be tested by future 
research using a different sampling technique (such as potentially the data of those 20% of 
Hungarian firms and 44% of Eastern German firms that were not analysed within the scope of 
this thesis) to determine whether the empirical findings would be in any point materially 
different to those presented in this thesis. 
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Broadening	of	scope	–	especially	over	time	
Finally, the scope of the analysis could be extended in geographical, sectoral, typological and 
temporal terms to other regions and countries, to sectors other than the car component 
manufacturing industry, to other types of financing and to cover a period of time rather than 
a point in time as was done in this study. One of the challenges inherent in qualitative case 
studies focusing on micro-scale analysis, i.e. in the analysis of qualitative data collected in 
company interviews as this is frequently undertaken in GPN research and more generally in 
relational and practice oriented geography (Jones and Murphy 2011; Jones 2013) is that they 
do provide deep insight into processes and mechanism at firm level within specific GPNs, but 
that it might be difficult to generalise these findings because of their limited sample size and 
the fact that they often implicitly focus only on the largest firms of a particular industry 
(Pavlínek and Ženka 2011). The approach used by this study to collect data for 160 Hungarian 
and 160 German firms provides a broader picture, but is still limited in scope (similar to what 
Pavlínek and Ženka (2011) did on the Czech automotive industry). 
Extending the geographical scope of the analysis beyond Hungary and Eastern Germany to 
other economies of Central and Eastern Europe would allow us to test whether the common 
differences identified between these two regions on the one side and more financialised 
economies like the UK and the US on the other side are a common trait of post-socialist 
economies or whether a more fine-grained and nuanced analysis is (likely) necessary and 
would provide evidence for further variegations of capitalism within Central and Eastern 
Europe. Extending the sectoral scope of the analysis to sectors other than car component 
manufacturing might shed light on whether the mechanisms identified in this study work 
differently in other types of global production networks (for example in less capital intensive 
industries such as the garment industry). Extending the scope to other forms of financing (such 
as supply chain financing, factoring or securitisation) would allow us to explore whether it is 
possible to evidence evolutions in financing practices (and potentially ‘financialisation’) which 
it was not possible to evidence based on the types of financing analysed as part of this study. 
This study focused on a small number of ‘traditional’ capital sources as these constitute the 
empirically most frequently encountered form of capital: equity provided by individual owners 
or by other GPN firms, bank debt, retained earnings as well as, to a lower extent, subsidies 
and supplier credit. Future research could explore whether any alternative forms of finance 
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exist or are developing within the car component manufacturer industries in Hungary and 
Eastern Germany, such as alternative financing institutions (Appleyard 2013) or supply chain 
financing (Baumeister and Zademach 2017) for example, to compensate the increasing 
difficulty for these firms to access the capital they need to operate and further develop. 
Further research could also explore whether the lack of engagement between firms analysed 
in this study and the capital markets might also be due to a difference in legislative 
arrangements: the question to be explored would be whether the local legislation is less 
favourable than the one in the UK or the US for the sourcing of capital through the capital 
markets or for private equity. This has not been tested within the scope of this study and 
would need to be analysed through future research.  
The most important extension in scope, however, would be the analysis of capital sources 
over a period of time rather than a point in time as was done in this study. The data for this 
would be available as annual statements are generally available for firms in both Hungary and 
Germany since at least 2008, allowing analysis of change for about a decade since the global 
financial crisis. Ideally the temporal scope of the analysis would be extended even further by 
going further back in history to see how these patterns and practices evolved in the 1990s 
when state-socialism was still a recent memory in both Hungary and Eastern Germany. The 
constitution of retained earnings as a predominant or exclusive source of capital requires the 
accumulation and retention of profits over the years. Similarly, the absence or erosion of 
retained earnings as a source of capital can probably be explained by the firms making losses 
or by distributing as dividends the profits they make. The first mechanism leads to the firm’s 
existing retained earnings to be eroded, while the second one prohibits the firm to retain 
earnings and thereby increase the weight of this capital source relatively to the others. 
Retained earnings are not contributed by an external party but rather ‘produced’ by the firm 
itself through the retention of annual profits. They can therefore not be constituted in one 
operation (as opposed to the granting of a large bank loan or the raising of a large amount of 
equity through an IPO on the equity market) but need to be accumulated over the years. This 
study did not explore, by looking at the timeline of profits made by firms over the last years 
and the extent to which they were retained or distributed, how retained earnings are 
constituted over time. Nor did it explore to which extent the high or low importance of the 
retained earnings as it can be observed today is due to the firms’ capacity to generate earnings 
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(by making a profit) and to retain them (by not distributing it in the form of dividends to 
shareholders) in the past. This remains to be done by future research and would allow to 
distinguish different groups among the firms: those that have been able to constitute retained 
earnings over the years (by making profits and being able to retain them), those that did not 
retain earnings although they made profits (because these were distributed as dividends) and 
those that did not retain earnings because they did not make profits. This would, among 
others, evidence the unequal impact of the last crisis on firms depending on their size, 
ownership and location and the extent to which extend the past performance depends on the 
firm’s size, ownership or location. This would further allow to compare firms with a similar 
profile of retained earnings by looking at their genesis to determine how a similar weight of 
retained earnings in a firm may hide a different story. It would allow to assess the impact of 
other geographical factors on how the firm’s capital sources look like at a given point in time, 
and to analyse how their policy of retaining rather than distributing these earnings is impacted 
by their size, ownership, location or activity. This would inter alia help highlight the impact of 
economic crises such as the financial crisis of 2007 and the following years, to show for 
example how the firms’ financing choices impact their resilience in times of economic crisis. 
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